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I.

INTRODUCTION

Domestic law scholars and policymakers have long debated issues
surrounding privatization.1 Over the past twenty years, the U.S. government
has increasingly contracted with private organizations to perform a variety of
functions—from health care, 2 to education, 3 to welfare, 4 to prison

†
Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Article was first presented at a
Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues of International Law, sponsored by the American Society of
International Law, in The Hague, Netherlands in July 2005. The ideas contained here were also
presented at a faculty workshop at George Washington University Law School, and at a conference on
“The Future of the State in International Law,” held at the University of Virginia School of Law. I
acknowledge the participants in all three events for helpful comments and suggestions. In addition,
special thanks go to Dan Bedansky, Paul Schiff Berman, Rosa Brooks, Nestor M. Davidson, Robert W.
Gordon, John Harrison, Paul Kahn, Harold Hongju Koh, David Luban, Jordan Paust, Leila Sadat, Steven
Schooner, and Dinah Shelton for their useful contributions to this draft at various stages along the way.
This Article was selected for inclusion in the Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum, held at Yale Law
School in June 2006.
1.
A recent symposium issue of the Harvard Law Review even goes so far as to declare that
we are in “an era of privatization.” See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1211 (2003).
2.
See generally THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY
PERSPECTIVES (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003).

Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=873086
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management.5 While advocates of privatization have generally argued for the
practice on efficiency grounds,6 critics have worried that, even if privatization
may cut financial costs, it can threaten important public law values.7 Because
many constitutional norms protect individuals only from government
misconduct,8 and because courts have been largely unwilling to view such
norms as applicable to private contractors, 9 these critics have argued that
privatization will dramatically reduce the scope of public law protections in
the United States. 10 Others have sought a middle ground, arguing that
privatization offers a means to extend public law values through the
government contracts themselves, in a process of “publicization.”11
To date, however, none of these scholars has squarely confronted the
growing phenomenon of privatization in the international realm or its impact
on the values embodied in public international law. Yet, with both nationstates and international organizations increasingly privatizing foreign affairs
functions, privatization is now as significant a phenomenon internationally as
it is domestically. For example, states are turning to private actors to perform
3.
See Pearl Rock Kane & Christopher J. Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of
Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION 203 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001) (discussing rise of
privatized education generally and noting that number of charter schools grew from two to nearly 2,500
from 1992 to 2002).
4.
See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2000) (authorizing implementation of welfare programs
“through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations”); see also Pamela Winston et al.,
Privatization of Welfare Services: A Review of the Literature 3-6 (Mathematica Policy Research Inc.,
Reference No. 8834-002, 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/privatization02/report/pdf
(discussing increase in private welfare providers).
5.
See ALLEN J. BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 4 (2001) (reporting that private
prison facilities held 76,010 inmates at mid-year 2000).
6.
See, e.g., Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory,
Evidence, Prospects, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Winter 1997, at 67, 72-75 (arguing that privatization
is efficient in a variety of contexts); F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter, What Does Private
Management Offer Public Education?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271 (2000) (arguing for private
management of “public” schools).
7.
See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 439
(2005) (arguing that prison privatization undermines core public law values of humanity and
parsimony); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (arguing
that privatization can threaten public law values embodied in constitutional norms).
8.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . .”) (emphasis added).
9.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the National
Collegiate Athletic Association is not a state actor); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee, a corporation
created by federal statute and given control over U.S. participation in the Olympics as well as exclusive
oversight of private amateur sports organizations participating in international competition, is not a state
actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (holding that private nursing homes providing
long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries are not state actors, even though they operate under contract
with the government and make need determinations authorized by statute); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding that private schools are not state actors even though the government
contracted with the schools to fulfill its statutory obligation to provide education to special-needs
students). But see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001)
(holding that a private organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school athletic events is
a state actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a private doctor treating prisoners
pursuant to a contract with a prison is a state actor).
10. See Dolovich, supra note 7, at 446-50 (arguing that private prisons fail to fulfill society’s
obligations to inmates); Metzger, supra note 7, at 1373-74.
11. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1300 (2003).
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core military, foreign aid, and diplomatic functions. Military privatization
entered the popular consciousness in early 2004, when private contractors
working as interrogators and translators for the U.S. government abused
detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.12 But this kind of military privatization
is only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, though the United States does not yet
contract out direct combat functions, we now frequently turn to private actors
to provide logistical support to those in combat on the battlefield as well as to
aid in strategic planning and tactical advice. 13 Other states, such as Sierra
Leone, have used private contractors to engage in direct combat, 14 and
international organizations have weighed the possibility of using private
contractors to perform peacekeeping.15 In the foreign aid context, states and
international organizations are increasingly entering into agreements with
private non-profit and for-profit entities to deliver all forms of aid, including
humanitarian
relief,
development
assistance,
and
post-conflict
16
reconstruction. Even diplomatic tasks such as peacekeeping negotiations are
being undertaken by private actors in conjunction with governments and
international organizations.17
All of this privatization in the international sphere raises the same sort of
question for international public law that domestic privatization raises for
domestic public law: Will privatization erode fundamental public law values,
such as human rights norms, norms against corruption and waste, and
democratic process values? 18 After all, international law norms, like many
domestic constitutional norms, traditionally apply only to states. The
Convention Against Torture, for example, generally prohibits only official

12. See Douglas Jehl & Kate Zernike, Greater Urgency on Prison Interrogation Led to Use of
Untrained Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at A11.
13. See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003).
14. See Abraham McLaughlin, Guns for Hire Thrive in Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 6.
15. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 13, at 182-86.
16. See, e.g., BEYOND U.N. SUBCONTRACTING: TASK-SHARING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDING NGOS (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1998) [hereinafter U.N.
SUBCONTRACTING]; Ian Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship Between
Northern NGOs and Northern Governments, in STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT-NGO PARTNERSHIPS FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 7 (Ian Smillie & Henny Helmich eds., 1999) [hereinafter
STAKEHOLDERS].
17. See, e.g., James L. Taulbee & Marion V. Creekmore, NGO Mediation: The Carter Center,
in MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOS 156 (Henry F. Carey & Oliver P. Richmond eds., 2003).
18. One can, of course, challenge the idea that certain values can even be labeled “public law
values.” Indeed, as both critical legal studies and public choice theory teach, the line between the
“public” and “private” is largely incoherent. Yet, that is precisely my point. Instead of seeing
privatization solely as a threat to public values, as if there were some meaningful divide between the
two, we should focus on the negotiated contractual relationships between the public and the private. As
Jody Freeman has noted in discussing domestic privatization, “[t]he view that private actors . . . are
menacing outsiders whose influence threatens to derail legitimate ‘public’ pursuits—features
prominently in the dominant models of the field. And yet, private actors are also regulatory resources
capable of contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy of administration. This realization suggests the
possibility of harnessing private capacity to serve public goals.” Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-49 (2000). Similarly, I seek to use privatization
contracts to pursue what are usually deemed the public ends of international law.

386

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31: 383

misconduct. 19 Thus, we must ask: as more and more non-state contractors
emerge on the international scene, will these individuals and groups
necessarily fall through the cracks of international law and evade any public
accountability?
My answer to that question is “no,” and in this Article I suggest that the
domestic U.S. administrative law literature may provide a useful set of
responses to privatization that has been largely overlooked by international
law scholars, policy-makers, and activists. In particular, I argue that
possibilities for extending public law values inhere in the privatized
relationship itself, particularly in the government contracts that are the very
engine of privatization. Indeed, the contracts governments enter into with nonstate actors can include many provisions that would help to create both
standards of behavior, performance benchmarks, and a means of providing
some measure of public accountability. While such contractual provisions are
not a panacea, they may be at least as effective as the relatively weak
enforcement regime of public international law. 20 At the same time, by
considering international privatization, I seek to open what I believe could be
a fruitful dialogue between domestic administrative law scholars and
international law scholars about possible responses.
Significantly, while domestic scholars of privatization have not yet
turned their attention to foreign affairs privatization, international law scholars
have not really focused on privatization at all, and, in any event, have not
seriously considered contract as a source of solutions to the potential threat to
public law values that privatization may seem to pose. Of course, international
law scholars have recognized concerns about how to apply international legal
norms to non-state actors in general.21 But “non-state actors” is too broad a
category because a private contractor is very different from, say, a guerrilla
soldier. In particular, because privatization involves an increasing contractual
relationship between governments (or international organizations) and private
actors, contractual mechanisms for importing public accountability are
potentially available with regard to privatization, whereas they obviously are

19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14 (defining torture as
certain activities designed to inflict pain or suffering when such “pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity”). Of course, this international “state action” requirement can be challenged on a
variety of grounds. See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
20. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, in considering the question of whether privatization
undermines international law’s public values, we need to recognize that it is not as if state actors are
always held accountable for failing to uphold these values. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for
Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 135 (2005). After all, international law has often been criticized for having relatively
weak enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17, 18-20 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998)
(noting lack of enforcement in international human rights law). And while this fact may not be cause for
celebration, it does serve to remind us that we do not quite lose as much when we privatize in the
international sphere as we do when, for example, we privatize domestically.
21. See, e.g., PHILIP ALSTON, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); Math
Noortman, Non-State Actors in International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 59, 71-72 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001).
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not relevant to many other instances in which non-state actors play a role in
the international sphere.
Moreover, to the extent that international law scholars and policymakers have proposed any solutions to potential problems created by
privatization, these proposals fall far short. At the extreme, some have argued
that the best response to military outsourcing, for example, is simply to
oppose it altogether, because military functions are somehow “inherently”
governmental or because state bureaucracies can be better monitored and held
to account in court than private contractors can.22 However, those who simply
resist privatization are misguided because the trend toward outsourcing of
foreign affairs functions previously performed by state bureaucracies (at least
in the recent past) is probably irreversible. The privatization train has not only
already left the station, but has gone far down the track. Indeed, even those
who seek to send the train back home should favor alternative solutions in the
interim, because any return is likely to take a very long time.
Others have argued that private actors with significant impact in the
international sphere should be more formally brought within the normative
framework of international law. Thus, with each wave of non-state actors—
such as guerrilla movements,23 terrorists,24 non-governmental organizations,25
and corporations26 —many international law practitioners and scholars have
considered expanding the coverage of public international law to apply to
each group. They have therefore contended either that states should (by treaty
or customary international law) develop new norms that apply directly to
these categories of non-state actors,27 or that any “state action” requirements
contained in existing norms (again either in treaties or customary international
law) should be interpreted expansively to apply to non-state actors linked to
the state.28 At the same time, these scholars and practitioners have tended to
focus on the need for courts and tribunals—in many cases new ones—to apply
and interpret these norms.

22. John Sifton, Remarks on Private Military Contractors at Conference at Georgetown
University Law Center (Apr. 2005).
23. See, e.g., Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 29,
30-33 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 756-57 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Noortman, supra note 21, at 72.
26. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 524-30 (2001) (arguing that more international law norms should be
extended to bind corporations directly); see also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2003) (same). But see Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect
Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005) (urging
caution).
27. See Junod, supra note 23, at 34-38 (discussing guerrillas and insurgents); Noortmann,
supra note 21, at 71-74 (discussing the “legal personality” of NGOs under international law); Ratner,
supra note 26, at 524-27 (discussing corporations).
28. See, e.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts.
4, 8, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (stating that the “conduct of any State organ shall be considered an
act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s conduct shall be attributed to the state if he
or she is acting on the state’s instructions or under the state’s direction).
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Yet this approach, though it is important because it results in the
articulation of norms in the international sphere, can have only a limited
effect. Even if the proposed courts and tribunals are established and fully
functioning, and even if they expand the norms of international law to apply to
the broad range of privatized action, these tribunals will never have the
capacity to hold more than a limited number of individuals (and groups) to
account. Accordingly, we need to seek alternative mechanisms for extending
and implementing public law values to privatized actors in the international
sphere. And though literature on corporate responsibility, 29 NGOs, 30 soft
law,31 and transnational networks32 has attempted to address some informal
modes of accountability, international law scholars have so far not sufficiently
discussed the possibility of contract.
This Article begins by laying out the scope of the problem, surveying the
extent of foreign affairs privatization, the potential threat it poses to public
law values, and the failure of current outsourcing contracts to address this
problem. Using Iraq as a case study, I examine the publicly available military
contracts as well as contracts to provide foreign aid, and I suggest serious
deficiencies in the contracts thus far. Then, drawing on examples and insights
from the domestic privatization literature, I set forth nine ways in which
contractual provisions could be used to extend and enforce public law values
in the foreign affairs privatization context. Specifically, I suggest that
contracts be drafted to: explicitly extend relevant norms of public international
law to private contractors, delineate training requirements, provide for
enhanced monitoring both within the government and by independent thirdparty monitors, establish clear performance benchmarks, require accreditation,
mandate self-evaluation by the contractors, provide for governmental
takeovers of failing contracts, include opportunities for public participation in
the contract negotiation process, and enhance whistleblower protections and
rights of third-party beneficiaries to enforce contractual terms. And, because
these public values would be embodied in that quintessential private law
instrument—the contract—they would more readily come within the purview
of domestic courts or private arbitral bodies and so would rely less on
international public law enforcement mechanisms (though those are possible
as well). As a result, these contractual provisions may at least make some
progress in attempting to ensure that private contractors are accountable both
to the publics they serve and to those who are most affected by their work.

29. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 952-58 (2004); Sean
Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. INT’L L.
389, 424-30 (2005); Ratner, supra note 26, at 531-34; Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility
and the International Law of Human Rights: The Next Lex Mercatoria, in ALSTON, supra note 21, at
177-226.
30. See Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical
Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE U.N., AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 40-43 (Leon
Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 1996) [hereinafter GLOBAL GOVERNANCE].
31. See DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2003).
32. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
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Of course, one might think that these proposals are unrealistic because
one of the main reasons governments privatize is precisely to avoid the kind
of accountability I propose. Yet governments are not monolithic, and there are
undoubtedly many people within bureaucracies, such as contract monitors,
who honestly wish to do their job and would therefore welcome (and lobby
for) contractual mechanisms that increase accountability. In addition, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations can
sometimes pressure states to adopt oversight regimes such as the ones I
discuss. The problem is that the policymakers and scholars have not
sufficiently focused on privatization or the possible accountability
mechanisms that could be embodied in contracts. Thus, this Article seeks both
to raise awareness about the ways in which contractual provisions might
embody public law values and to stimulate a broader-ranging debate about the
best way to respond to privatization in the international context.
II.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIVATIZATION AND THE THREAT TO PUBLIC LAW
VALUES

States and international organizations are increasingly turning to private
entities, both for-profit and non-profit, to fulfill a broad range of foreign
affairs functions. Just as they are contracting with private organizations to
provide domestic services such as welfare, health care, education, and prison
management, they are also outsourcing military and intelligence activities,
foreign aid, and diplomatic tasks. Yet, until recently, this trend has largely
escaped scholarly attention. Moreover, to the extent that scholars have
addressed this issue, they have not examined the full scope of privatization
across a number of different areas of state activity.33 This Part briefly maps
out the broad-ranging nature of foreign affairs privatization and then discusses
the dangers such outsourcing poses to public law values.

33. To date, military/security privatization has generated the most scholarly attention. See
generally SINGER, supra note 13; Tina Garmon, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility:
Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 325 (2003); Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call To Recognize and Regulate
Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2003); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879
(2004); Peter Warren Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004); Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a
New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World
Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75 (1998). Other scholars have focused on privatized foreign aid. See
Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 30, at 1; Smillie, supra note 16, at 7. However, not only do these
specialized studies necessarily tell only part of the story, they do not systematically explore the
possibility of using contractual mechanisms to hold private actors accountable, nor do they draw on the
domestic administrative law literature on privatization. At the same time, domestic administrative law
scholars have not generally applied their insights to the international context, though there are important
exceptions. See generally, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, TAMING
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM 154-55 (2004) (identifying the democracy deficit created by
privatization and situating that deficit within a global context); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power:
How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy, 46 B.C.
L. REV. 989 (2005) (identifying the problems of military privatization).
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The Scope of Foreign Affairs Privatization: Military, Foreign Aid, and
Diplomatic Functions

The degree to which states and international organizations have farmed
out foreign affairs activities to private actors is truly breathtaking. It would not
be an exaggeration to say that the U.S. government has hired private entities
to help fight our wars, to deliver much of our foreign aid, and to play an
important role mediating our conflicts and engaging in other diplomatic
activities. Many other states are pursuing a similar course. International
organizations are likewise turning to private entities to support peacekeeping
and to deliver all manner of humanitarian, development, and post-conflict
reconstruction assistance, as well as to participate in peacemaking
negotiations.
The privatization of military functions is perhaps the most remarkable
example. Probably no function of government is deemed more
quintessentially a “state” function than the military protection of the state
itself, and some scholars of privatization in the domestic sphere have assumed
that the military is one area where privatization does not, or should not,
occur.34 Indeed, some have argued that, by hiring private armies to keep itself
secure, the state would threaten its own existence because it would have no
way to control these private military actors.35
Yet, governments around the world, including the United States, are
increasingly hiring private military companies to perform core military
functions. 36 For decades, of course, the U.S. government has entered into
agreements with private companies to build weapons and other equipment, as
well as to provide the basic goods necessary to run a government agency—
everything from desks to office supplies.37 However, such contracting activity
now covers services to active troops in the field.38 These activities include not
only support services, such as food, accommodations, and sanitation for
troops on the battlefield, but also core functions such as intelligence gathering,
communications, weapons maintenance, and even troop training.39 According
to one commentator, “while contractors have long accompanied U.S. armed
forces, the wholesale outsourcing of U.S. military services since the 1990s is
unprecedented.”40
Indeed, if one looks to U.S. forces deployed on the battlefield, the ratio
of private contractors to troops has increased dramatically in the past fifteen

34. Cf. Freeman, supra note 11, at 1295, 1300.
35. See, e.g., Rosky, supra note 33, at 882-83 (stating that a state in which the supply of
military force is entirely private is more vulnerable to military revolt than one in which the supply of
military force is entirely public and that “the intensity of force justifies the state’s monopoly of the
supply of force”).
36. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 3-17.
37. See Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 369, 371-72 (2004).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 416 n.312.
40. SINGER, supra note 13, at 16.
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years. In the first Gulf War, the ratio was roughly one to one hundred;41 in the
current war in Iraq, the ratio is one to ten.42 Although the United States has
not yet used the employees of private companies in actual combat roles,43 it
has deployed them to fulfill tasks such as military intelligence gathering, troop
training, weapons maintenance, and support functions that are very close to
combat; these private actors even have the power to wield force in a variety of
circumstances. 44 Other countries, such as Sierra Leone and Angola, have
explicitly hired private armies. 45 In many modern conflicts, these private
military companies have played a decisive role.46
The pervasiveness of the U.S. military’s use of contractors captured
media attention with news of their role in Iraq. When stories surfaced that
U.S. military personnel had abused detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, it
soon became clear that private contractors employed by CACI, Inc. and
working under an agreement with the Department of the Interior had
participated in the abuse.47 Indeed, intelligence operatives may actually have
given orders to uniformed military. 48 Translators hired under a similar
contract with the firm Titan, Inc. were also implicated in the abuse.49 News of
gruesome security contractor killings by Iraqi insurgents has sparked
additional popular attention.50
Yet, CACI is not an anomaly. Firms such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root
(KBR) have for years built and maintained military bases, transported troops
and equipment to and on the battlefield, repaired and maintained roads and
vehicles, distributed water and food to troops, washed laundry, refueled
equipment, attended to hazardous materials, and performed related
environmental services,51 earning roughly $1.7 billion annually from military
41. George Cahlink, Army of Contractors, GOV’T EXEC, Feb. 1, 2002, at 43, available at
http://www.govexec.com/features/0202/0202s5.htm.
42. Singer, supra note 33, at 523.
43. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, first issued in 1966 and revised as
recently as 2003, requires agencies to outsource all functions that are not “inherently-governmental.”
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-76,
PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 1-3 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/circulars/a076/a76_rev2003.pdf. In 1998, Congress gave added force to Circular A-76 by
mandating that all agencies must identify government positions that are not “inherently governmental”
and contract with the private sector to fill those positions if doing so would be more efficient than filling
them with governmental employees. Implementation of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR)
Act of 1998, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,927 (June 24, 1999). Inherently governmental functions may not be
outsourced, however, and such functions include combat positions. See Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up:
An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 233, 256-58 (2000).
44. Vernon, supra note 37, at 407-09.
45. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, ECONOMIST, July 29, 1995, at 32.
46. See Zarate, supra note 33, at 94-97.
47. See MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, 26, 36, 48 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]; SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF
COMMAND 32-34, 61 (2004); Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15.
48. HERSH, supra note 47, at 61.
49. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 47, at 26, 36, 48; Brinkley & Glanz, supra note 47, at
A15.
50. James Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, for Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at
A1.
51. See, e.g., Halliburton Company, About KBR, http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/aboutKBR/
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work.52 Beyond this logistical support, other companies provide core military
functions such as troop training and intelligence gathering. For example, since
1996, another U.S company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated
(MPRI) has run the ROTC training programs at universities around the
country and has played a key role in numerous programs to educate U.S.
forces, including officer training, war gaming, and tactical planning. 53 In
recent years, moreover, MPRI has expanded its services to a wide variety of
countries, including Croatia, Bosnia, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka,
Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea, 54 as well as to regional intergovernmental
programs such as the African Crisis Response Initiative.55 Finally, and most
controversially, military companies have provided direct combat services. For
example, the now-dissolved South African company Executive Outcomes,
which drew its personnel largely from the apartheid-era South African
Defense Force, won contracts with governments in Angola, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, Congo, and others to engage in
direct combat during the 1980s and 1990s.56 Indeed, its activities in Sierra
Leone and Angola are widely believed to have altered the outcome of the
conflicts in those states.57
Although privatization in the military context has received far more
attention, overseas aid is another area in which states are also increasingly
turning to private contractors to fulfill functions formerly performed directly
by the state.58 From emergency humanitarian relief, to long-term development
assistance, to post-conflict reconstruction programs, private actors under
contract with the United States, other governments, and international
organizations are taking a larger and larger role. The most dramatic surge in
privatized aid has involved humanitarian relief. The United States, for
example, has contracted with private companies such as KBR to build refugee
camps,59 and with nonprofit NGOs such as Save the Children to deliver relief
supplies and medical services.60 For fiscal year 2003, the USAID Office of
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance spent sixty-six percent of its nearly $300
million budget through NGOs. 61 Other countries and international

index.jsp (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
52. SINGER, supra note 13, at 139.
53. See News Release, Army Reserve 88th Regional Readiness Command, Team MPRI
Looking for ROTC Instructors (July 3, 2000), available at http://www.usarc.army.mil/
88thrsc/news/archive/news_rotc_instructors_needed.asp; see also MPRI, National Overview,
http://www.mpri.com/site/nat_overview.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
54. SINGER, supra note 13, at 130-32.
55. Id. at 131.
56. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, supra note 45, at 32.
57. See Zarate, supra note 33, at 94-97.
58. Ian Smillie, United States, in STAKEHOLDERS, supra note 16, at 253.
59. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 144.
60. See USAID, DCHA/PVC-ASHA PORTFOLIO, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at B-5 (2005), available
at
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/portfolio
05.pdf.
61. USAID OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2003),
available
at
www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/
annual_reports/pdf /AR2003.pdf.
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organizations are similarly turning to NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid. 62
Longer-term development aid has followed a similar trend. By the mid-1980s,
development agencies had begun to shift their focus from general funding for
foreign governments to more targeted direct support both to grassroots
organizations helping to eradicate poverty and to other civil society
institutions seen as necessary for democracy and development.63 In the United
States, for example, the government now uses both international and foreign
NGOs to deliver much of its aid overseas, rather than providing aid directly to
foreign governments. 64 As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan make clear,
privatization is also taking place in the arena of post-conflict reconstruction,
with multimillion dollar contracts awarded not only to nonprofit organizations
but to for-profit corporations as well. 65 Indeed, so far in Iraq USAID has
awarded fifteen contracts worth a total of $3.2 billion to for-profit companies,
while it has awarded only six grants worth $40 million to nonprofit
organizations.66
In addition to military and foreign assistance functions, governments
have also turned to private entities to assist in peacemaking and other
diplomatic tasks. The Carter Center, probably the best-known organization in
this field, has engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts to avoid or end
conflicts at the behest of governments around the world.67 For example, in
1994, former President Carter assisted the U.S. government in reopening talks
with North Korea, negotiating an agreement for the peaceful departure of
Raoul Cedras from power in Haiti (thereby averting the need for increased
U.S. military intervention), and also brokering a ceasefire in Bosnia.68 More
recently, the Center has engaged in peacemaking activities at the request of

62. Smillie, supra note 16, at 9 (describing foreign aid in France, Sweden, and the EU); see
also Andrew S. Natsios, NGOs and the U.N. System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or
Cooperation?, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 30, at 73 (noting the relationships of UNICEF and
UNHCR with NGOs); Ruth Wedgwood, Legal Personality and the Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations and Non-State Political Entities in the United Nations System, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS
NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 23 (Rainer Hofmann ed., 1998) (describing the use of
private contractors by UNHCR).
63. See, e.g., Mark Duffield, NGO Relief in War Zones: Toward an Analysis of the New Aid
Paradigm, in U.N. SUBCONTRACTING, supra note 16, at 139, 146 (“By the mid-1980s, a noticeable
change in donor funding policy had occurred, from direct donor assistance to recognized governments in
favour of international support for private, non-governmental sectors.”).
64. See Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 30, at 17, 37.
65. See USAID, ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ: ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES (2005),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activities.html [hereinafter ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE].
66. Id. Although USAID has awarded a total of sixteen contracts, one of those contracts was
awarded to the U.S. Air Force, so I did not include it in the total. Id.; see also Rony Brauman & Pierre
Salignon, Iraq: In Search of a ‘Humanitarian Crisis’, in IN THE SHADOW OF ‘JUST WARS’: VIOLENCE,
POLITICS AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION 269, 271 (Fabrice Weissman ed., 2004) (noting increased use of
for-profit aid providers in Iraq) [hereinafter IN THE SHADOW].
67. See Taulbee & Creekmore, supra note 17, at 156-71 (discussing the Carter Center, a
prominent NGO in these fields).
68. Id.
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numerous governments, including Uganda, Sudan, and Ecuador. 69 Other
organizations have performed similar roles around the world.70
Finally, it is important to note that, in addition to states, international
organizations such as the United Nations have also turned to private entities.71
For example, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has entered partnerships with hundreds of NGOs around
the world for services including refugee protection, community services, field
security, child protection, engineering, and telecommunications in emergency
relief situations. 72 Although the United Nations has not deployed private
military firms in combat roles,73 some policymakers and commentators have
suggested that such a step would provide badly needed help to peacekeeping
and peace enforcement operations.74 And even those who do not endorse a
direct combat role for private firms nonetheless argue that the United Nations
should privatize military logistics functions, much as the U.S. government has
done.75
To be sure, one might argue that privatization in all of these areas of
foreign affairs is nothing new. With respect to the military, mercenaries
(loosely defined as soldiers working for private gain) have appeared
throughout history. From the Swiss guards of the Middle Ages, to the
merchant-armies of the British and Dutch East India Companies during the
colonial period, to the privateers of early America, to the French Foreign
Legion still active today, mercenaries have played a significant role over the
centuries. 76 Indeed, before the Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the
emergence of the state system that eventually gave rise to large standing
national armies, mercenaries were the norm rather than the exception.77 By the
twentieth century, however, apart from some post-colonial wars of
independence (where mercenaries often fought against national liberation
movements), the bulk of military security work has been performed by
professionalized, bureaucratized armies and not private actors.78 It is against

69. The Carter Center, International Conflict Resolution and Management,
http://cartercenter.org/peaceprograms/program12.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).
70. For example, the Public International Law and Policy Group has represented numerous
countries, including Bosnia, Somalia, and Sudan, in peace negotiations. Public International Law and
Policy Group, Peace Negotiations and Post-Conflict Constitutions, http://www.areas/peacebuilding/
negotiations/index.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).
71. See generally U.N. SUBCONTRACTING, supra note 16 (analyzing devolution and task
sharing by the U.N. and the implications for global governance); see also Natsios, supra note 62, at 73
(noting the relationships of UNICEF and UNHCR with NGOs); Wedgwood, supra note 62, at 23
(describing the use of private contractors by UNHCR).
72. UNHCR, NGO PARTNERSHIPS IN REFUGEE PROTECTION 16 (2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/partners/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PARTNERS&id=41c162d04.
73. Thalif Deen, U.N. Rejects Private Peacekeepers, INTER-PRESS NEWS, Aug. 27, 2004.
74. See, e.g., U.K. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES:
OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, at 18, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/
Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf.
75. Peter H. Gantz, Refugees International, The Private Sector’s Role in Peacekeeping and
Peace Enforcement, GLOBAL POL’Y F., Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
peacekpg/training/1118peacekeeping.htm.
76. Milliard, supra note 33, at 2-3.
77. Id.
78. SINGER, supra note 13, at 8.
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this backdrop that we have seen, over the past two decades, the increasing reprivatization of military functions.
Likewise, the privatization of foreign aid and diplomacy are not wholly
recent developments. With respect to foreign aid, private groups from the
United States funneled aid overseas for specific causes long before the
government developed foreign assistance programs.79 Indeed, the practice of
government-sponsored foreign assistance did not develop in a significant way
in the United States until the initiation of the Marshall Plan during the period
following World War II.80 However, from the 1950s through the 1970s, much
of the aid consisted of direct grants to needy countries.81 In contrast, as noted
previously, over the past two decades the government has delivered more and
more foreign aid through nongovernmental actors. 82 And with respect to
diplomacy, private organizations have long played a role in ongoing peace
negotiations and other efforts, but the high-level diplomatic work of
organizations such as the Carter Center is new and distinctive.83
The forces driving this trend toward privatization are not fully
understood, but the dominant rationale articulated by most scholars of the
subject is the promise of cutting costs. 84 The government need not offer
pensions or benefits to employees of private companies working under
contract, and it can hire contractors on a short-term basis, thereby decreasing
the size of government bureaucracies. Moreover, unlike many governmental
employees, private contractors are typically not unionized. The lack of
unionization fuels the political support of those on the right, and, at least in the
United States, there tends to be broad bi-partisan support for any trend that
seems to make government “smaller” and “more efficient.” In addition, in the
case of the military, private military companies may offer governments
greater flexibility. Such companies are touted for their ability to work
quickly,85 and in states with ill-equipped, poorly functioning militaries, private
companies can provide badly needed expertise to help train, or even replace,

79. The international non-governmental organization movement has its roots in missionary
activities that date back to the sixteenth century. Smillie, supra note 16, at 8. Beginning with the
founding of the Red Cross in 1860, many secular international NGOs were born out of the conflicts and
social movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Id. For example, Save the Children,
established in 1920, developed as a response to World War I; Foster Parents Plan emerged after the
Spanish Civil War (1936-39); Oxfam and CARE from World War II; World Vision from the Korean
War (1950-53); and Médecins Sans Frontières from the conflict in Biafra (1967-70). See id. Further
growth occurred in the 1960s and the 1970s, stimulated in part by operations such as the Peace Corps, as
well as the burgeoning human rights, environmental, and women’s movements. Id. at 8.
80. See
generally
Video:
The
Marshall
Plan
Study
Guide
(USAID),
http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/study.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
81. Cf. Smillie, supra note 16, at 249 (discussing the history of private aid organizations,
including growth in the 1960s and 1970s).
82. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
83. Taulbee & Creekmore, supra note 17, at 156.
84. See Barry Yeoman, Need an Army? Just Pick Up the Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at
A19. It should be noted, however, that these cost savings have not been conclusively demonstrated.
Indeed, private military companies typically pay their employees more than government employees, and
because of the types of contracts they receive, private military companies are particularly susceptible to
cost overruns.
85. Samantha M. Shapiro, Iraq, Outsourced, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 14, 2003, at 79
(quoting Steve Schooner).
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government troops. 86 Using private military companies can also offset
shortages of troops by offering a rapid means of growing a state’s military
capacity, and states can deploy their forces with lower domestic political costs
because fewer uniformed troops are put at risk, thus keeping official casualty
figures down. 87 Finally, some have suggested that the growth of private
military firms has been fueled in part by the labor pool created as many
military dictatorships and their accompanying security forces have been
dismantled during transitions to democracy.88
Foreign aid privatization also appears to be motivated largely by a desire
to cut costs. Certainly in the United States the outsourcing of aid is linked to
the political push for smaller government, combined with weak political
support for foreign aid generally. Indeed, USAID, perhaps motivated in part
by the need to justify its activities to an increasingly skeptical Congress, was
one of the first agencies in the United States to take then-Vice President Al
Gore’s “Reinventing Government” message to heart, declaring in 1994 that
“USAID is now fully committed to reinventing itself as a more efficient,
effective, and results-oriented organization.”89
The privatization of diplomatic tasks such as peacemaking has received
even less scholarly attention than other forms of foreign affairs privatization,
and the reasons behind this trend are thus even less clear. It appears, however,
that the growing use of private entities in this arena has stemmed from the
high-level experience of those such as former President Carter who have
founded and worked for such organizations, as well as the organizations’
independence, which frees them from some of the political costs of sensitive
diplomatic efforts.90
Thus, the recent rise of privatization does represent a shift, at least as
compared to the recent past, away from the large, highly-bureaucratized state.
Just as states are outsourcing their domestic functions, they are also
outsourcing their foreign affairs activities. And while the surge in foreign
affairs privatization raises many questions that merit further study,91 a central
issue presented by this trend is whether increased outsourcing undermines the
public law values that apply primarily to state actors.

86. See Garmon, supra note 33, at 331-34.
87. Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19. The promise of placing fewer uniformed troops at risk is,
of course, not always fulfilled. For example, after four Blackwater security contractors were killed in
Fallujah in March, 2004, and their burned bodies hung from a bridge, the American military launched
major assaults on Fallujah in April and November of that year, resulting in some of the highest U.S.
military casualty numbers of the war.
88. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, supra note 45, at 32.
89. USAID, ENHANCING AID’S ABILITY TO MANAGE FOR RESULTS (1994).
90. See, e.g., Taulbee & Creekmore, supra note 17, at 170.
91. It remains unclear whether foreign affairs privatization yields the efficiency gains that are
often touted to garner support for the practice. For example, because of the lack of competition in the
military contracting process, due in part to security concerns, as well as poor monitoring, it may be that
outsourcing actually increases governmental expenditures. See Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in U.S.
Government Contracting in Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Democratic Policy Comm., 109th Cong. 10
(2005) [hereinafter SDPC Hearing] (statement of Franklin Willis) (arguing that choice of poorly
qualified Iraq security contractors, due in part to lack of competition in contractor selection, along with
virtually non-existent monitoring has cost taxpayers millions of dollars).
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The Threat to Public Law Values

Just as the protections contained in the U.S. Constitution are generally
viewed as prohibitions on state misconduct only,92 the principal international
human rights and humanitarian law instruments of the twentieth century—the
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights,93 the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,94 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 95 the Genocide Convention, 96 the Convention Against
Torture, 97 the Fourth Geneva Conventions, 98 and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court99—were drafted primarily with states in mind.
As such, at least in the conventional account of public international law, states
are seen as both the primary parties to the treaties and the central bearers of
rights and responsibilities. These instruments do grant individuals rights, of
course—such as the right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, or the right to a fair trial—but these are generally conceived
primarily as rights against the state.100 Conversely, individuals can be held
criminally liable, but usually only if some connection to the state is
demonstrated. And while there are some exceptions within the overarching
framework of public international law—for example, individuals can be
convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity (as defined in the recent
statute of the International Criminal Court) regardless of any connection to a
state apparatus101—state action (or at least a link to it) still remains at the core
of most conceptions of international law liability.
The private contractor interrogators and translators implicated in the
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison provide a notable example of how these non-state
actors might fall through the cracks of this traditional, state-centered approach
to public international law. Although the Geneva Conventions and the

92. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC.
DOC. D, 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
96. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
97. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1456 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter
Torture Convention].
98. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
99. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
100. The Torture Convention, for example, defines as torture only acts that are committed “by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.” Torture Convention, supra note 97, art. 1. The ICCPR likewise defines the rights
to a fair trial as rights in proceedings before public “courts and tribunals.” ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 14.
101. The Genocide Convention provides explicitly that “[p]ersons committing genocide or any
of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals.” Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art. 4. The
definition of crimes against humanity requires only that the attacks be committed as part of a “State or
organizational” policy. ICC Statute, supra note 99, art. 7(2)(a).
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Convention Against Torture clearly prohibit any abuses committed by US
military personnel, 102 the treaties’ applicability to non-state actors is
ambiguous, and fora for holding non-state actors accountable are limited.103
The U.S. government’s use of private contractors to transport terrorism
suspects to countries known to practice torture104 has raised similar questions
because again, while the Convention Against Torture prohibits governments
from taking such actions, its applicability to private actors is ambiguous.105
Private military companies engaging in direct combat also arguably fall
through the cracks of current international law provisions, despite probably
being the most notorious for committing atrocities. Although multiple treaties
ban the use of certain categories of mercenaries outright, broad gaps in the
definition of “mercenary” leave most types of work by private military
companies outside the treaties’ prohibitions.106 For example, in Sierra Leone
in the 1990s officers of Executive Outcomes, working under contract with the
government, reportedly ordered employees carrying out air strikes against
rebels to “[k]ill everybody,” even though the employees had told their
superiors they could not distinguish between civilians and rebels. 107 While
such a command would almost certainly constitute a war crime if ordered by a
military or civilian authority in the chain of command, it is less clear that such
actions committed by private contractors would qualify, at least absent inquiry
into the extent of the contractor’s link to the government.
Abuses committed by private actors who deliver aid also raise
complicated questions about the application of international law. Although aid
workers do not by any means regularly mistreat aid beneficiaries, such

102. Under international law, the abuses could be characterized as torture; cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment; or war crimes. See ICC Statute, supra note 99, arts. 1, 16; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 98, art. 147; Torture Convention, supra note 97, art. 8. The acts might also
constitute crimes against humanity, if the abuses were “widespread or systematic” and committed
“pursuant to . . . a State or organizational policy.” ICC Statute, supra note 99, art. 7.
103. See Dickinson, supra note 20; see also Adam Liptak, Who Would Try Civilians from U.S.?
No One in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A11. To be sure, a civil suit under the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), already has been filed against the contractors implicated at Abu
Ghraib for violations of international law. See T. Christian Miller, Ex-Detainees Sue 2 U.S. Contractors,
L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A9. Because it has been brought against private parties, the suit will need
to demonstrate a link to state action, at least with respect to the claims of torture and other norms that
require such a link. In the Abu Ghraib setting, however, such a link may not be so difficult to establish
because the private contractors were working in a facility actually run by the U.S. government.
Nevertheless, ATCA suits are not likely to be an option in all but a handful of the most egregious cases.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (upholding the ATCA as a tool for non-Americans to
bring civil suits in U.S. courts, but only for violations of a relatively narrow class of norms).
104. On December 18, 2001, “American operatives participated in what amounted to the
kidnapping of two Egyptians . . . who had sought asylum in Sweden.” HERSH, supra note 47, at 53.
Believed to be linked to Islamic militant groups, the Egyptians “were abruptly seized in the late
afternoon and flown out of Sweden a few hours later on a U.S. government-leased Gulfstream 5 private
jet to Cairo, where they underwent extensive, and brutal, interrogation.” Id. The company that owns the
jet is apparently a corporation registered in Delaware and represented by the Massachusetts law firm
Hill & Plakias. Farah Stockman, Terror Suspects’ Torture Claims Have Mass. Link, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 29, 2004, at A1.
105. Torture Convention, supra note 97, art. 3 (“No State Party shall expel, return . . . or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.”) (emphasis added).
106. See Milliard, supra note 33, at 19-69 (summarizing treaties).
107. Elizabeth Rubin, An Army of One’s Own, HARPER’S, Feb. 1997, at 48.
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incidents occur more often than one might suspect. For example, employees
of Dyncorp Inc., a private corporation that was charged with training police in
Bosnia in the 1990s under a contract with the U.S. government, were
“implicated in a sex-trafficking scandal” involving acts of rape, sexual abuse,
and exploitation.108 Even staff members of not-for-profit organizations have at
times been implicated in abuses. Indeed, a recent study of refugees and
internally displaced persons in West African camps in Guinea, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone reported widespread rape and sexual exploitation of women and
children by many actors, including aid workers. 109 The aid workers and
peacekeeping forces allegedly relied on their positions of relative power to use
“the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit the refugee
population as a tool of exploitation.”110 In some camps, it appears that even
necessities such as using a toilet were sometimes conditioned on the
willingness to perform sexual favors.111 Although, as in the military context,
such abuses committed by governmental actors generally violate international
agreements, the same acts committed by non-state actors fall into a gray
area.112
Even outside the human rights context, the principal regional treaties
seeking to deter corruption, for example, apply primarily to misconduct
involving governmental actors. 113 Yet, foreign aid contractors have been
implicated in fraud and waste. Indeed, Kellogg Brown & Root’s more than
$10 billion in contracts with the U.S. government in Iraq “have been dogged

108. Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19. Although Dyncorp offers security services under the
contract, I include it and other such contracts within the foreign aid section because they provide
assistance to a foreign country, as opposed to assistance to the U.S. military.
109. UNHCR & SAVE THE CHILDREN UK, NOTE FOR IMPLEMENTING AND OPERATIONAL
PARTNERS
ON
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
&
EXPLOITATION
(2002),
available
at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/6010f9ed3c651c93c1256b6d00560fca; see also
Michel Alger & Francoise Bouchet-Soulinier, Humanitarian Spaces: Spaces of Exception, in IN THE
SHADOW, supra note 66, at 297, 302 (describing such abuses in refugee and IDP camps in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone); Fabrice Weissman, Sierra Leone: Peace at Any Price, in IN THE SHADOW,
supra note 66 (describing sexual exploitation by aid workers in IDP camps in Sierra Leone).
110. See Scott A. Levin, Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by U.N. Peacekeepers, 19
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 833, 834-35 (2003).
111. See Malinda M. Schmiechen, Parallel Lives, Uneven Justice: An Analysis of Rights,
Protection and Redress for Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Camps, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 473, 490 (2003).
112. For example, rape or other sexual abuse committed by a public official would in many
cases constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture, but similar actions taken by a non-state
actor would not, unless undertaken with the “consent or acquiescence” of such an official. Torture
Convention, supra note 97, art. 1. Rape and related sexual violence are also considered war crimes if
committed in either international or internal armed conflict, but only those individuals acting under the
authority of the actual parties to the conflict may be held criminally responsible for such acts. ICC
Statute, supra note 99, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). Though non-state actors can commit crimes
against humanity, such activity would only qualify if it is “widespread or systematic” and conducted
pursuant to an organizational plan or policy. Id. arts. 7(1)(g), 7(2)(a).
113. For example, states parties to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions agree to criminalize bribery, but bribery is defined only as payment to public
officials to secure a pecuniary or other advantage. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter
OECD Convention]. Payment to a government contractor providing services in order to secure a
subcontract, for example, or some other advantage, would not clearly fall within the prohibition.
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by charges of preferential treatment, overbilling, cost overruns, and waste.”114
Elsewhere, employees of Custer Battles, a company that was awarded two $16
million contracts by USAID to provide security for the Baghdad airport and
distribute Iraqi dinars, 115 reportedly chartered a flight to Beirut with $10
million in new Iraqi dinars in their luggage—which were promptly
confiscated by Lebanese officials.116 The company also set up sham Cayman
Islands subsidiaries to submit invoices, and regularly overcharged for
materials—in one case charging the United States $10 million for materials
that it purchased for $3.5 million.117 In short, corruption and fraud have been
rampant in the Iraqi contracts. Yet, legal oversight (and democratic
accountability) is limited because such contractors operate beyond many of
the transparency rules that would apply to government entities.118
Thus, widespread privatization potentially threatens a wide variety of
public law values.119 One response to this problem, of course, is to interpret
(or amend) the international law norms themselves either to remove any state
action requirement, or at any rate to construe such a requirement leniently.
Indeed, at least some of the conventional state-centered story of international
law that I have recounted has long been subject to challenge. For example, the
U.N.’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts aims to make clear that the “conduct of any State organ shall be
considered an act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s
conduct shall be attributed to the state if he or she is acting on the state’s

114. Warren Hoge, U.N. Criticizes Iraq Occupation Oil Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at
A21. In addition, the chief contracting officer for the Army Corps of Engineers has publicly accused the
Army of granting preferential treatment to KBR (through its parent company, Halliburton) in awarding
contracts in Iraq and Bosnia, in violation of U.S. contracting regulations. Erik Eckholm, A Top U.S.
Contracting Official for the Army Calls for an Inquiry in the Halliburton Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2004, at A13.
115. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4.
116. Id. at 1-2 (statement of Alan Grayson).
117. Id. at 2 (statement of Alan Grayson). These allegations resulted in a private enforcement
suit under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000). See Yochai J. Dreazen, Attorney
Pursues Iraq Contractor Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at B1 (discussing the suit). Indeed, in
March 2006 a jury ordered Custer Battles to return $10 million in ill-gotten funds to the government. See
id. Yet, though the district court judge in that case had permitted the suit to proceed, United States ex
rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), it is unclear whether the
verdict will ultimately hold up on appeal and whether such False Claims Act suits will be deemed
sustainable in this context.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 129-130. As noted in note 117, supra, it is unclear
whether or not the False Claims Act will ultimately provide an effective avenue for legal accountability.
119. To be sure, as I have argued elsewhere, these gaps may not be as significant as they first
appear. See Dickinson, supra note 20. To begin with, the baseline of accountability for state actors
performing foreign affairs functions is not that great. Such actors are not held accountable for violating
the norms that effectuate public law values that often. Thus, the shift to private actors does not represent
a dramatic decline in accountability—certainly not as great a decline as in the domestic setting, where
state actors are at least sometimes held accountable for failing to uphold public law values. This
comparison places the perils of privatization in perspective.
In addition, alternative avenues of legal accountability may exist under private law. As in
the domestic privatization context, immunities applicable to governmental employees arguably do not
apply, thereby opening up potential private law actions such as tort claims. Thus, in some ways private
contractors may face a greater risk of legal liability than governmental actors.
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instructions or under the state’s direction.120 Likewise, courts and tribunals
have at times applied principles of state responsibility for instrumentalities to
impute the liability of companies onto states. 121 And some courts have
suggested that certain international law norms, such as the laws of war, can be
used to hold non-state actors directly accountable, at least in some
circumstances. 122 Alternatively, non-state actors can be held liable under
theories of complicity or aiding and abetting.123 Thus, it would be wrong to
characterize international law as completely impotent with regard to private
contractors.124
Yet, though I am sympathetic to efforts to revise or interpret the norms
of public international law to apply to private contractors, I argue that such
efforts should not be the only response to privatization in the international
realm. Indeed, public international law norms are imperfectly enforced in the
best of circumstances, and any interpretational ambiguities with regard to
contractors only compounds the practical difficulties. Thus, those concerned
that public values may be lost in a privatized world would be well-advised to
look in other directions as well. And, as we will see, the contractual
relationship that creates the very structure of privatization may itself offer a
means of promoting and enforcing public law values, and it is to such avenues
of accountability that we now turn.
III. CONTRACT AS A TOOL TO EXTEND AND ENFORCE PUBLIC LAW VALUES
Contracts between governmental entities and the private organizations
providing services can themselves serve as vehicles to promote public law
values. Contractual terms can specify norms and structure the contractual
relationship in ways that spur contractors to implement those norms. Thus,
although typically conceived as the quintessential private law form, contracts
used in this way can be a tool to “publicize” the privatization relationship.125

120. See supra note 28; see also, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private
Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801 (2002).
121. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding Iran responsible for corporation over which it exercised control); Foremost Tehran, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228, 241-42 (1987) (holding the same); Maffezini
v. Kingdom of Spain (Rectification and Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Nov. 13, 2000, Jan. 31,
2001) (translation in English) (holding Spain responsible for the acts of its state entity); Case
Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 4,
39, P 58 (Feb. 5) (“[V]eil lifting . . . is admissible to play . . . a role in international law.”).
122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on the Defense Motion on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 61 (Aug. 10, 1995) (noting that war crimes include “crimes committed by any person ...
whether committed by combatants or civilians, including the nationals of neutral states”); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals”).
123. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005).
124. See generally, e.g., Chia Lehnardt, Private Military Companies and State Responsibility,
in MARKET FORCES: REGULATING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt
eds., forthcoming 2007) (describing ways in which international law holds states accountable for acts of
private military companies).
125. See Freeman, supra note 11.
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Administrative law scholars have recently explored this insight in the
domestic context. Most notably, Jody Freeman has suggested that states
“could require compliance with both procedural and substantive standards that
might otherwise be inapplicable or unenforceable against private
providers.” 126 Yet this work has focused on privatization of healthcare,
welfare, and prisons in the United States and has not considered privatization
of military, foreign aid, and diplomatic activities. Meanwhile, as noted
previously,127 few if any international law scholars, policymakers, or NGOs
have considered the possibilities of using contractual terms in the international
context. Accordingly, this Part seeks to bridge the gap between domestic
administrative law and international law scholarship by exploring a variety of
contractual mechanisms that might be used to extend public law values to
privatized foreign affairs.
Specifically, I discuss nine contracting practices that could be deployed
in the foreign affairs arena: (1) incorporating public law standards in
contractual terms; (2) requiring that private contractors receive training; (3)
enhancing contractual monitoring, both by internal governmental actors and
third parties; (4) requiring that contractors receive accreditation from
independent organizations; (5) laying out clear performance benchmarks; (6)
mandating contractor self-evaluation; (7) enhancing governmental termination
provisions and allowing for partial governmental takeover of contracts; (8)
allowing for beneficiary participation in contract design; and (9) strengthening
enforcement mechanisms, including greater whistleblower protections and
more opportunities for third-party beneficiary suits. In considering these
possibilities, I will use Iraq as a case study, examining all of the publicly
available contracts the U.S. government has negotiated to support the U.S.
military or to provide for foreign aid to Iraq. Nevertheless, these same
principles would apply to other types of contracts negotiated by states or
international organizations with contractors providing a variety of foreign
affairs functions.
The contractual mechanisms I discuss are particularly important in the
foreign affairs context because many of these contracts are negotiated in
secret, without competition, on a “no bid basis,” based on exceptions to the
normal requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 128 For
example, with respect to the U.S. government’s foreign affairs contracts in
Iraq, in many cases it is impossible for the public or a watchdog group even to
obtain the text of the contracts, either because government officials have kept
them secret for security reasons,129 or because the contractors have exercised
what is essentially a veto, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), for
certain types of commercial information.130 Problems posed by secrecy are
reinforced by problems of conflict of interest because many of the contracts

126. Freeman, supra note 18, at 634.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
128. See Megan A. Kinsey, Note, Transparency in Government Procurement: An International
Consensus?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 161-62 (2004).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(1) (2000).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(4) (2000).
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are awarded to firms run by former government personnel. A 2003 study by
the Center for Public Integrity reports that sixty percent of the companies that
received contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan “had employees or board members
who either served in or had close ties to the executive branch for Republican
and Democratic administrations, for members of Congress of both parties, or
at the highest levels of the military.”131 Thus, it is essential that, at the very
least, the contracts themselves incorporate public values.
A.

Incorporating Public Law Standards in Contractual Terms

First, of course, the contracts could explicitly require that the contractors
obey the norms that implement public law values. Specifically, the terms of
each agreement could provide that private contractors must abide by relevant
legal rules applicable to governmental actors. Such contractual terms would
obviate the need to show that the private actors were functioning as an
extension of government so as to satisfy any state action requirement that
might arise under domestic and international legal regimes. Instead, the norms
applicable to governmental actors would simply be part of the contractual
terms, enforceable like any other provisions, regardless of state action.
In the domestic setting, such provisions are commonplace. As a term in
their contracts with privately run prisons, for example, many states require
compliance with constitutional, federal, state, and private standards for prison
operation and inmates’ rights. 132 In addition, contractual agreements may
require contractors to provide for hearings and review of contractor actions.133
The U.S. government’s military and foreign aid contracts in Iraq, by
contrast, are woefully inadequate on this score. To be sure, a 2005 Department
of Defense (DOD) document providing general instructions regarding
contracting practices does state that contractors “shall abide by applicable
laws, regulations, DoD policy, and international agreements….”134 Yet, of the
sixty publicly available Iraq contracts, 135 none contains specific provisions
requiring contractors to obey human rights, anticorruption, or transparency

131. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, WINNING CONTRACTORS: U.S. CONTRACTORS REAP
WINDFALLS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION (2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/
wow/printer-friendly.aspx?aid=65 [hereinafter WINNING CONTRACTORS].
132. For example, under the model contract for private prison management drafted by the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, contractors must comply with constitutional, federal, state, and
private standards, including those established by the American Correctional Association. See Okla.
Dep’t of Corr., Correctional Services Contract, art. 1, available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us
/Private%20Prisons/98cnta.pdf [hereinafter Oklahoma Contract]. Other states’ contracts with companies
that manage private prisons contain similar provisions. See, e.g., Fla. Corr. Privatization Comm’n,
Correctional Services Contract with Corrections Corp. of America, § 5.1 [hereinafter Florida Contract];
Freeman, supra note 18, at 634 (citing Texas Department of Criminal Justice model contract); see also J.
Michael Keating, Jr., Public over Private: Monitoring the Performance of Privately Operated Prisons
and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 130, 138-41 (Douglas C. MacDonald ed.,
1990).
133. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 608 (discussing contractual hearing and oversight
mechanisms in the nursing home context).
134. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, No. 3020.41, § 6.1 (Oct. 3, 2005).
135. See Center for Public Integrity, Contracts and Reports, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
wow/resources.aspx?act=resources (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Contracts and Reports]
(providing text of contracts).
THE
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norms. The agreements between the U.S. government and CACI to supply
military interrogators starkly illustrate this point. The intelligence personnel
were hired pursuant to a standing “blanket purchase agreement” between the
Department of the Interior and CACI, negotiated in 2000.136 Under such an
agreement the procuring agency need not request specific services at the time
the agreement is made but rather may enter task orders as the need arises. In
2003, eleven task orders, worth $66.2 million were entered (none of which
was the result of competitive bidding).137 The orders specify only that CACI
would provide interrogation support and analysis work for the U.S. Army in
Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel, intelligence report writing, and
screening/interrogation of detainees at established holding areas.” 138
Significantly, the orders do not expressly require that the private contractor
interrogators comply with international human rights or humanitarian law
rules such as those contained in the Torture Convention or the Geneva
Conventions. Likewise, although the contractors are subject to international
and domestic laws prohibiting the bribery of government officials,139 as well
as the general terms of the FAR,140 none of the contracts specifically prohibits
the contractors themselves from accepting bribes, an area that remains
ambiguous in domestic and international law. Similarly, the contracts do not
provide terms specifying the applicability of FOIA, which would help make
contractor activities more transparent.
B.

Requiring that Private Contractors Receive Training

Foreign affairs contracts could also explicitly require that contractors
receive training in activities that would promote public law values. Such
training, as a contractual requirement, could help instill in contractor
employees a sense of the importance of these values. At the same time,
training could provide employees with concrete recommendations about how
to implement these values in specific, challenging situations.
Again, in the domestic setting such training provisions are
commonplace. A standard term in state agreements with companies that
manage private prisons, for example, requires companies to certify that the
training they provide to personnel is comparable to that offered to state
employees. 141 Such training would normally include instruction concerning
legal limits on the use of force and examples of what those limits mean in
circumstances likely to arise in the prison setting.

136. See Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and CACI Premier Technology,
Inc., No. NBCHA010005 (2000) [hereinafter DOI-CACI].
137. Work Orders Nos. 000035D004, 000036D004, 000037D004, 000038D0004,
000064D004, 000067D004, 000070D004, 000071D004, 000072D004, 000073D004, & 000080D004,
issued under DOI-CACI, supra note 136, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org
/wow/docs/CACI_ordersAll.pdf.
138. Work Order No. 000071/0001, supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., OECD Convention, supra note 113; False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
140. 48 C.F.R. §§ 2.000 (2006).
141. See, e.g., Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 6.4; Florida Contract, supra note 132, §
6.5; Freeman, supra note 18, at 634 (describing model contract for private prison management drafted
by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice).
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Yet, while the 2005 DOD instructions require documentation of training
concerning appropriate use of force, 142 none of the publicly available Iraq
contracts appears to require such training. Indeed, although a few of the
agreements require that contractors hire employees with a certain number of
years’ experience, 143 none specifies that the contractor must provide any
particular training at all. For example, the U.S. government’s agreement with
Chugach McKinley, Inc. to screen and hire a broad range of military support
personnel—from doctors to “special mission advisers”—says nothing about
whether such personnel will receive training in applicable international law
standards, even though such personnel may be in a position to commit
abuses. 144 The U.S. government’s agreements with CACI to provide
interrogators are likewise completely silent on whether interrogators will
receive education in international humanitarian and human rights law, training
that U.S. military interrogators would normally receive.145 Not surprisingly
then, an Army Inspector General report on the conditions that led to the Abu
Ghraib scandal concluded that 35% of CACI’s Iraqi interrogators did not even
have any “formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques,”
let alone training in international law norms.146 This omission is particularly
glaring given the highly volatile Iraqi environment.
Anti-corruption training would also be useful for foreign affairs
contractors generally, and for contracts in Iraq specifically. Iraq ranks among
the worst countries in the world on Transparency International’s corruption
index,147 and it is no surprise that such corruption reaches U.S. contractors
operating there. Indeed, one former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
official, Alan Grayson, has asserted that lack of employee screening and
training led to the shocking abuses committed by Custer Battles.148 Yet such
contracts say nothing about training for contractors in practices to avoid
corruption. And while training requirements undoubtedly would increase the
cost of the contracts, the fraud and waste that could be deterred with better
training might well offset such increases.

142. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, supra note 134, § 6.3.5.3.4.
143. See, e.g., Work Order No. 000071/0001, supra note 137 (statement of work) (requiring
that human intelligence advisor must have at least “10 years of experience” and must be “knowledgeable
of Army/Joint Interrogation procedures”). Notably, this work order does not require the contractor to
provide any training. See id.
144. See Agreement between USDOD and Chugach McKinley, Inc., Professional Skills, No.
DASW01-03-D-0025 (July 3, 2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/
ChugachMcKinley-Iraq.pdf.
145. Id.
146. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INSPECTOR GEN., DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 87-89 (2004),
available
at
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ArmyIGDetaineeAbuse/DAIG%20Detainee%20
Operations%20Inspection%20Report.pdf.
147. Out of 145 countries (with 145 as the worst), Iraq ranks 129th. TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PRACTICES INDEX 2004, available at http://www.transparency.org/
pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.20.cpi.en.html.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 115–118.
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Enhancing Contractual Monitoring, Both by Internal Governmental
Actors and by Third Parties

Provisions could also be made for increased contract monitoring, which
could provide an important check on abuses. Such monitoring should include,
to begin with, sufficient numbers of trained and experienced governmental
contract monitors. At the same time, governmental ombudspersons—leaders
of independent offices charged with providing enhanced oversight—serve as
an important supplement to the contract monitors. Thus, at a minimum, it is
essential that government agencies devote enough resources to ensure that
these requirements are implemented in a meaningful way. In addition, outside
independent non-governmental organizations, both for-profit and non-profit,
can serve an important function by monitoring contracts.
Contracts for services in the domestic context regularly include this
three-tiered monitoring structure: government personnel assigned as contract
monitors, supplemented by agency actors such as ombudspersons, further
supplemented by independent outside groups. In the privatized health care
context, for example, where private nursing homes receive Medicaid funding
and private hospitals receive Medicare and Medicaid support, the trend is
toward agreements that require a state-appointed contract manager.149 Federal
agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services (whose
Inspector General issues reports on contracts with private hospitals that
receive public funding 150 ) and the Health Care Financing Administration
(which exerts fairly tight control over private nursing homes receiving
Medicaid funding 151 ) also have significant oversight authority. In addition,
third-party independent organizations play an important role. For example, the
Joint Commission on Health Care and Accreditation of Health Organizations
(JCAHO), a private organization of professional associations, certifies health
care institutions for compliance with federal regulations and state licensure
laws.152
Foreign affairs contracts currently provide for far less monitoring. To be
sure, the statutory and regulatory scheme includes provisions for
governmental contract monitors, supplemented by inspectors general of the
respective agencies responsible for the contracts,153 as well as for auditing of

149. Freeman, supra note 18, at 608-09.
150. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE EXTERNAL
REVIEW OF HOSPITAL QUALITY: A CALL FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY 1-2 (1999), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00050.pdf; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE EXTERNAL REVIEW OF HOSPITAL QUALITY: THE ROLE OF
ACCREDITATION 6-7 (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gove/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00051.pdf
[hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ACCREDITATION] (detailing lack of accountability and quality
oversight in accredited hospitals).
151. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NURSING HOME COMPARE,
http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/Home.asp (last modified Sept. 1, 2005) (database includes
information on nursing homes certified by Medicare or Medicaid).
152. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government
Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 47, 52 (1994).
153. Inspector General oversight arises from the Inspector General (IG) Act, codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-12 (1994). “The IG Act authorized the creation of offices whose
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contracts by independent private accounting firms.154 Yet, the work of these
monitors focuses primarily on whether the contractors are keeping adequate
accounts and refraining from fraud and bribery. Contracts say little about
human rights norms, and governmental contract monitors and ombudspersons
are not ordinarily focused on these values when scrutinizing contractors.155 To
the extent that independent third-party groups are empowered to monitor
under the contract, they tend to be auditing firms, whose expertise lies in
financial matters, not in international human rights or humanitarian law.
Foreign affairs contracts rarely, if ever, provide for monitoring by independent
groups with expertise in this area.156
Moreover, in practice, foreign affairs contracts tend to escape even this
limited oversight. This is because many of the monitoring requirements tend
not to apply in emergency situations, which are, of course, precisely the
occasions when military intervention or humanitarian relief efforts and postreconstruction aid are most likely. Thus, ordinary contracting procedures, such
as competitive bidding, are often waived.157 In addition, many of the contracts
are written as cost reimbursement contracts, often termed “cost-plus”
agreements, under which the government reimburses the contractor for costs
incurred in providing a service, plus a fee that is calculated as a percentage of
the cost.158 Though often criticized as leading to waste and abuse,159 such
contracts become the norm in emergency situations, rather than the exception.
At the same time, too few contract monitors are appointed, those who are
mission is to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in their respective departments and agencies
across the executive branch.” Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector
General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2027 (1998). For an analysis of the role that inspectors general play
in various agencies, see id.
154. See USAID, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT 13 (2004), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/semiann/sarc0409.pdf.
155. After a scandal, however, such as the uproar surrounding revelations of abuse at Abu
Ghraib prison, ombudspersons may be enlisted to investigate such problems.
156. A model for this type of oversight might be the role that the International Committee on
the Red Cross (ICRC) currently plays in monitoring the conduct of governmental actors during armed
conflict. The Geneva Conventions require states parties to allow ICRC representatives to visit military
detention centers to ensure that detainees are treated in accord with the principles of international human
rights and humanitarian law. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 126,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 98, arts. 76, 143.
Yet, it is at best ambiguous whether the ICRC would be empowered to play a similar role with respect to
private security contractors. The contracts could make this role explicit.
157. In practice, one way these requirements are avoided is through the use of blanket purchase
order agreements, in which task orders can be issued under pre-existing contracts. See WINNING
CONTRACTORS, supra note 131, and accompanying text. For criticism of the lack of open bidding on the
Iraq contracts, see CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, REBUILDING IRAQ—THE CONTRACTORS,
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/rebuilding_iraq/index.asp. For an opposing view, see
Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, USAID’s Procurement Contracts: Insider’s View, 39 PROCUREMENT LAW
10 (2003).
158. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.301-16.307 (2006).
159. Under the cost-plus system, companies have an incentive to inflate the costs of services so
that their fee, typically measured as a percentage of this cost, is as high as possible, see Laura Peterson,
Outsourcing Government: Service Contracting Has Risen Dramatically in the Last Decade, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=68
[hereinafter Outsourcing Government], although such contracts do contain a cost ceiling that cannot be
exceeded without the contracting officer’s approval. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1 (2005). Under the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), these contracts can only be utilized when costs cannot be estimated with
sufficient accuracy. Id. § 16.301-2.
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appointed lack expertise, and ombudspersons are not given the resources they
need to do an effective job.
The monitoring of the Iraq contracts, or virtual lack thereof, provides a
salient example. The government agencies with responsibility for the
contracts—primarily USAID, the DOD, and the now dismantled Coalition
Provisional Authority—devoted extraordinarily minimal resources to
monitoring.160 For example, USAID has responsibility for approximately $3
billion in reconstruction projects, 161 but the agency had only four contract
monitoring personnel on the ground as of March 2003.162 In fact, due to the
difficulties of monitoring contracts with so little staff, USAID determined to
contract out the monitoring function itself! 163 Likewise, a recent DOD
Inspector General study concluded that more than half of the Iraq contracts
had not been adequately monitored.164 This fact is not surprising given that
DOD’s acquisition workforce was reduced by more than half between 1990
and 2001, while the department’s contracting workload increased by more
than twelve percent. 165 In addition, those who were assigned to monitor
contract performance were often inadequately trained.166 Finally, in an ironic
twist, private contractors themselves are often hired to write the procedural
rules governing contracting rules and monitoring protocols, thus leading to
further conflict-of-interest problems. Indeed, the DOD handbook on the
contracting process was drafted by one of its principal military contractors.167
The CPA was plagued with similar problems. A recent report notes that
the CPA hadn’t kept accounts for the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash
in its vault, had awarded contracts worth billions of dollars to American firms
without tender, and had no idea what was happening to the money from the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) which was being spent by the interim Iraqi
government ministries.168
One former CPA official has observed that, as a result of poor oversight,
“contracts were made that were mistakes, and were poorly, if at all, supervised
[and] money was spent that could have been saved, if we simply had the right
numbers of people.”169 For example, even devoting a single staff person to the
160. For a searing indictment of the government’s failure to oversee military contractors and
that failure’s role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, see Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu
Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 549 (2005).
161. See ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE, supra note 65.
162. See Shane Harris, AID Plans To Contract Out Oversight of Iraq Contracts,
GOVEXEC.COM, May 20, 2003, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0503/052003h1.htm.
163. See id.
164. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITIONS: CONTRACTS
AWARDED FOR THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BY THE DEFENSE CONTRACTING COMMANDWASHINGTON, REP. NO. D-2004-057, at 24 (2004).
165. COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOURCING AND ACQUISITION, REP.
NO. GAO-03-771R, at 1 (2003); see also Outsourcing Government, supra note 159. For a detailed
discussion of the depletion of the acquisition workforce, see David A. Whiteford, Negotiated
Procurements: Squandering the Benefit of the Bargain, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 509, 555-57 (2003).
166. Id.
167. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 123-24.
168. Ed Harriman, Where Has All the Money Gone?, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, July 7, 2005, at
4, 5.
169. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4.
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two $16 million Custer Battles contracts that gave rise to multiple instances of
fraud and abuse170 would have saved at least $4 million.171
Finally, the dispersal of authority to issue foreign affairs contracts across
multiple agencies creates interagency communication problems and conflicts
of interest that impede oversight. 172 For example, officials at different
agencies use different methods to calculate the costs of contracts, and these
methods may also vary from those used by the companies themselves.173 In
addition, because agencies can earn fees for facilitating other agencies’
contracts but are not adequately held to account for monitoring those
contracts, agencies have incentives to sponsor other agencies’ contracts but
little incentive to supervise them.174 These arrangements can lead to abuse, as
occurred in the case of the Department of the Interior sponsorship of DOD’s
task orders for intelligence services at Abu Ghraib prison under an existing
contract between CACI and the Interior Department.175
In short, the foreign affairs contracts could provide far better protections
for public law values through greater monitoring. Although the statutory and
regulatory regime contemplates a combination of supervision by contract
monitors, independent agency oversight through inspectors general, and
limited financial auditing by third-party entities, these provisions have not
worked well in practice due to insufficient staffing and resources, combined
with the large number of contracts. To be sure, statutory and regulatory
reforms could address these problems. But, alternatively, the contracts
themselves could remedy these deficiencies to some extent, by specifying
greater numbers of monitors and requiring that they possess a certain degree
of training, as well as by allowing for independent oversight by third-party
groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
D.

Laying Out Clear Performance Benchmarks

Of course, to some degree increased contract monitoring can only be
effective to the extent that the contracts have clear benchmarks against which
to measure compliance. In the domestic context, commentators and
policymakers have long urged that contracts include benchmarks, and rigorous
performance standards regularly appear in contracts.176 Scholars have argued
that, ideally, performance-based contracts should “clearly spell out the desired

170. See supra text accompanying notes 115-117
171. See generally SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 24 (statement of Franklin Willis). Of
course, the lack of oversight may have a more cynical explanation: it permits private contractors (who
may have powerful connections within government) to reap profits without significant constraints.
172. The DOD has taken more and more control over reconstruction and emergency relief
functions, normally the province of USAID. See Contracts and Reports, supra note 135. The State
Department, meanwhile, manages the contract with DynCorp to provide Iraqi police training. Id. And
the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) manages refugee
assistance funds.
173. WINNING CONTRACTORS, supra note 131.
174. Schooner, supra note 160, at 564-70
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., HARRY P. HATRY, URBAN INST., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: GETTING
RESULTS 3-10 (1999).
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end result” but leave the choice of method to the contractor, who should have
“as much freedom as possible in figuring out how to best meet government’s
performance objective.”177
These ideas have been implemented most notably in contracts with
private prisons. For example, under the model contract for private prison
management drafted by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, contractors
must meet such delineated standards for security, meals, and education. 178
They must also certify that the training provided to personnel is comparable to
that offered to state employees.179 In Texas, contractors must abide by similar
terms and, in addition, must “establish performance measures for
rehabilitative programs.” 180 In addition, the American Correctional
Association is revising its accreditation standards to include performance
measures, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is
developing performance-based standards for juvenile correctional facilities.181
Commentators have noted, further, that performance measures for private
prison operators could include both
process measures such as the number of educational or vocational programs, or outcome
measures such as the Logan quality of confinement index, the number of assaults, or the
recidivism rate. . . . Because no single statistic adequately captures ‘quality,’ and because
focusing on any single measure could have perverse effects, performance-based contracts
should tie compensation to a large and rich set of variables.182

Privatized welfare programs have also experimented with performance
measures as a means to improve quality. In 1996, Congress authorized the
implementation of welfare programs “through contracts with charitable,
religious, or private organizations.” 183 Since then, states have increasingly
contracted with such organizations, 184 and many of these contracts contain
performance benchmarks and output requirements. 185 For example, under a
performance-based system, a welfare contractor might receive financial

177. WILLIAM D. EGGERS, PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTRACTING: DESIGNING STATE-OF-THEART CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND MONITORING SYSTEMS 2 (1997).
178. See, e.g., Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 5.
179. Id. §§ 6.3-6.4.
180. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 634-35 (describing contract between private corporation
and state of Texas).
181. See Performance Standards Home: Performance-Based Standards for Juvenile Correction
and Detention Facilities, http://www.pbstandards.org; see also 1 Geoffrey F. Segal & Adrian T. Moore,
Weighing the Watchmen: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Outsourcing Correctional Services 15-16
(Policy Study 290, 2002).
182. A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1868, 1889-90 (2002) [hereinafter Tale of Two Systems].
183. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
184. See Winston, supra note 4.
185. See M. BRYNA SANGER, THE WELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND WELFARE
REFORM 28-48 (2003) (discussing issues raised by performance contracting for welfare services);
Sheena McConnell et al., Privatization in Practice: Case Studies of Contracting for TANF Case
Management 39-51 (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Reference No. 8834-008, 2003), available at
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/privatize.pdf (discussing use of performance measures in
welfare contracts).
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rewards for increasing the percentage of program participants who receive job
placements.186
The foreign affairs contracts are notably less rigorous in providing for
performance measures. Although military service contracts are difficult to
evaluate because so many of them are not publicly available, contract officers
familiar with the contracts have remarked on their generally vague terms.187
And the fact that they are often indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ)
contracts adds to their open-ended quality. 188 Under this structure, the
government awards a contract that does not specify how many services or
goods will be necessary or the dates upon which they will be required. 189
These additional details are specified in subsequent task orders, which
themselves are often vague because the task orders need not pass though the
same degree of supervision as the initial contract award.190 Of course, such
contracts may sometimes be necessary, because the government cannot know
in advance precisely what will be required or for how long.191 Yet the lack of
any administrable standards in these contracts can lead to significant
abuses.192
Of the publicly available Iraq contracts for military services, it is striking
that none contains clear benchmarks or output requirements. Instead, they are
phrased in amorphous language that provides little opportunity for compliance
evaluation. For example, a contract between the U.S. government and MPRI
to provide translators for government personnel, including interrogators,
simply provides that the contractors will supply interpreters.193 The agreement
says nothing about whether the interpreters must be effective or how
effectiveness might be measured. 194 Similarly, the CACI task orders for
interrogators specify only that CACI will provide interrogation support and
analysis work for the U.S. Army in Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel,
intelligence report writing, and screening/interrogation of detainees at
established holding areas.”195 Other than these broad goals, the task orders say
little more. To be sure, security concerns may require some degree of
vagueness. Nonetheless, the task orders could be much more specific about
training requirements, standards of conduct, supervision, and performance
parameters.
Turning to the foreign aid context, agencies tend to promote the use of
results-based agreements, under which contractors must demonstrate specific,

186. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1387-88.
187. See, e.g., SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 3-4 (prepared statement of Franklin Willis).
188. For example, the CACI agreement was an ID/IQ contract. Cf. Schooner, supra note 160, at
569 (using the “Abu Ghraib experience” as an illustration of the dangers of ID/IQ contracts).
189. ID/IQ contracts are governed by 48 C.F.R. § 16.500-6 (2005). For a discussion of ID/IQ
contracts, see Karen DaPonte Thornton, Fine-Tuning Acquisition Reform’s Favorite Procurement
Vehicle, the Indefinite Delivery Contract, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 383 (2002).
190. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.504 (2005); see also Schooner, supra note 160, at 565.
191. See Thornton, supra note 189, at 387.
192. See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 160, at 563.
193. Agreement Between DOD and MPRI, Iraq Interpretors, No. GS-23F-9814H (Apr. 28,
2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/MPRI_Linguists.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Work Order No. 000071D004, supra note 137, at 6.
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tangible results that are to be evaluated by the agency.196 Yet in practice many
such agreements do not actually contain any results-based requirements, often
because the aid, particularly in emergency relief settings, is provided on an
expedited basis to organizations with very small staffs. With regard to Iraq,
for example, a review of the publicly available USAID agreements reveals
that only a few set forth specific performance benchmarks or requirements.197
To be sure, performance benchmarks that are too strict can pose
problems. As scholars of domestic privatization have noted, discretion can
serve useful goals; indeed, discretion is in part what makes privatization
desirable, as private contractors have more flexibility than rulebound
bureaucratic actors to pursue innovative approaches.198 Output requirements
that preserve flexibility about the means to achieve those results are therefore
the most effective.199 But even carefully tailored output requirements can go
awry, as when, for example, private welfare providers “cream” those accepted
into their programs in order to increase the percentage of those who receive
job placements. 200 Moreover, output requirements can sometimes give
contractors tunnel vision, leading them to focus only on the benchmarks,
thereby missing opportunities to achieve wider benefits. A recent study of the
enhanced “auditing” that accompanied privatization in Thatcherite Britain, for
example, suggests that narrow output requirements steered organizations and
individuals away from broader, more diffuse, social goals.201

196. See, e.g., Judith Tendler, Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development
Agencies: Questions for Evaluation (127.49 AIG Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 12, 1982)
(making recommendations regarding USAID’s evaluation process for contracted projects).
197. See Agreement Between USAID and Bechtel National, Inc., Iraq Infrastructure
Reconstruction—Phase II, No. SPU-C-00-04-00001-00 (Jan. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/iirii.html; Agreement Between USAID and Bearing Point Inc.,
Economic Recovery, Reform, and Sustained Growth, No. RAN-C-00-03-00043-00 (July 25, 2003),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/errsgi.html; Agreement Between USAID and Skylink
Air and Logistic Support (USA), Inc., Airport Administration, No. DFD-C-00-03-00026-00 (May 5,
2003), available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/aa.html; Agreement Between USAID and Abt
Associates, Inc., Public Health, No. RAN-C-00-03-0001-00 (Apr. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/ph.html; Agreement Between USAID and Bechtel, Inc., Capital
Construction,
No.
EEE-C-00-03-00018-00
(Apr.
17,
2003),
available
at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/cc.html; Agreement Between USAID and Creative Associates
International, Inc., Primary and Secondary Education, No. EDG-C-00-03-00011-00 (Apr. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pse.html; Agreement Between USAID and Research
Triangle Institute, Local Governance, No. EDG-C-00-03-00010-00 (Apr. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/lg.html.
198. See, e.g., Nestor Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare:
The Case of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=887398 (arguing for a “relational” approach to
contracting that “shifts the locus of efficiency and accountability efforts from contractual specificity and
enforcement to encouraging flexibility and fostering mutual responsibility for program goals”); Metzger,
supra note 7, at 1388 (“[T]he operational flexibility of private providers can make them better able to
improve staff performance and tailor their programs to meet the needs of particular participants of
employers.”); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1262 (2003) (“Rigid standards could force private providers to behave like
government and lose their potential for innovation, efficiency, and flexibility.”).
199. See EGGERS, supra note 177, at 2.
200. See Sanger, supra note 185, at 21-22, 42-43, 68-69, 104-06.
201. See generally MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1999).
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In addition, by their very nature, results-based contracts raise difficult
questions about how best to measure output. Creating benchmarks may be
relatively straight-forward if the project at issue involves simply building a
bridge or dam, but it is very difficult to measure intangibles, such as fostering
human development or building civil society.202 Likewise, short-term results,
such as whether food aid was delivered, are much easier to measure than
longer-term systemic efforts to alleviate poverty, provide education, and so
on. As a consequence, results-based contracts tend to put more emphasis on
short-term delivery of services rather than longer-term impact. 203 Finally,
contractual output requirements do not, of course, necessarily ensure
compliance because contractors may simply fail to meet their goals. In
addition, even the most detailed performance requirements and standards
inevitably leave considerable discretion to the contractor.204
Nonetheless, despite problems with overly rigid performance
benchmarks, the foreign affairs contracts (at least those that are publicly
available) appear to fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Indeed, they
possess so few benchmarks and output requirements that they contain no
meaningful evaluative criteria whatsoever. In such circumstances, enhanced
performance benchmarks could be a useful contractual tool.
E.

Requiring that Contractors Receive Accreditation from Independent
Organizations

Another contract-based tool for promoting public law values is
accreditation. Independent organizations, often consisting of experts or
professionals in the field, can evaluate and rate private contractors. These
ratings can then be used in the contracting process because agreements can
require that contractors receive certain rankings. Or, governmental entities or
international institutions, such as the United Nations, could develop
accreditation regimes.
Again, the domestic context offers a particularly rich set of examples
that could provide useful lessons in the foreign affairs setting. For example, in
the field of publicly funded, privately provided health care, JCAHO accredits
hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding. Indeed, such
accreditation is required by statute as well as by contract.205 State laws or
contractual terms also often specify that health maintenance organizations
must receive accreditation by the National Committee for Quality Assurance
(NCQA), an independent non-profit organization, before receiving public
funding. 206 Until recently, NCQA certification was primarily voluntary,

202. See Smillie, supra note 16, at 10.
203. Id. at 10-11.
204. See, e.g., supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing important benefits of
discretion).
205. See Kinney, supra note 152, at 52.
206. Although NCQA’s accreditation program is voluntary, almost half the HMOs in the
nation, covering three quarters of all HMO enrollees, are currently involved in the NCQA Accreditation
process. Significantly, employers increasingly require or request NCQA accreditation of the plans with
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offering health maintenance organizations an advantage when competing for
lucrative health care delivery contracts. When states became managed care
purchasers, however, they adopted NCQA as a benchmark of quality.207
Similarly, many contracts with private prison operators require
companies to receive accreditation by the American Correctional Association
(ACA).208 An organization of correctional professionals that has existed for
over a century, the ACA accredits prisons and provides training for prison
personnel while also setting standards that apply to virtually every aspect of
prison operation. 209 Not only has ACA accreditation become a standard
contract requirement, 210 but federal courts have used ACA standards to
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.211 Even private investors look
to accreditation as an indication of quality. 212 Thus, the accreditation
requirement creates significant compliance incentives.
Privatized education regimes such as charter schools have also
considered accreditation by independent organizations as a means of ensuring
quality. 213 The focus of many independent organizations on facilities and
administrative processes over underlying educational quality has led some
critics to charge that educational accreditation is relatively ineffective. 214
Nonetheless, commentators have advocated improved accreditation
procedures and greater use of such accreditation to promote public law
values.215
Indeed, domestic administrative law scholars have noted that these
independent, private accrediting entities are effectively setting the standards
that give meaning to public law values.216 In that regard, the relative insularity
which they do business. See National Comm. for Quality Assurance, NCQA: Overview,
http://www.ncqa.org/Communications/Publications/overviewncqa.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
207. Freeman, supra note 18, at 618-19; see also J. Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, The
Corrections-Commercial Complex, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 150, 156-57 (1993).
208. See, e.g., Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132; Freeman, supra note 18, at 634 (describing
model contract for private prison management drafted by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice that
contains such a requirement).
209. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 628-29. Freeman notes that, “throughout its history, the
ACA has fostered professionalism in prison administration through the development of standards and
promoted progressive reforms such as rehabilitation.” Id.
210. See, e.g., Florida Contract, supra note 132, § 5.21 (requiring prison to maintain
accreditation); Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 5.2.
211. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 162-64 (1998).
212. Freeman, supra note 18, at 629.
213. See Isabel V. Sawhill & Shannon L. Smith, Vouchers for Elementary and Secondary
Education, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 263 (C. Eugene Steuerle et. al. eds.,
2000).
214. See Accreditation: What Does It Mean?, PARENT POWER!, Dec. 2000, at 2-3, available at
http://www.edreform.com/_upload/00dec.pdf#ppArt75.
215. Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. Kuboyama, Approving Charter Schools: The GateKeeper Function, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 937 (2001).
216. As Freeman observes, in the prison context, “the ACA, rather than government agencies,
may effectively establish correctional standards.” Freeman, supra note 18, at 629. Other private
organizations—such as the American Medical Association, the National Sheriffs’ Association, the
American Public Health Association, and the National Fire Protection Association, all of which have
published guidelines or standards governing “such things as medical care, sanitation, and safety in
prisons”—play a similar role. Id. In the health care context, the Joint Commission on Healthcare and
Accreditation also develops industry standards, through “a committee that includes representatives of
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of the standard-setting and accreditation process may undermine the ability of
broader groups, including consumers and the public at large, to participate in
the process.217 There is also the concern that private accreditors in some cases
might be too close to the contractors, and therefore too lenient. 218
Nevertheless, even critics agree that the standards are often much better than
those that would be developed by agency bureaucrats, and despite the
imperfections, accreditation has served as an important check on the
contracting process.219
In contrast, accreditation is glaringly absent in the foreign affairs
context.220 Human rights organizations, governments, and the United Nations
have begun to encourage corporations, particularly those in the extraction
industries, to comply with voluntary labor, environmental, and human rights
standards. 221 A consortium of NGOs that deliver humanitarian relief have
initiated the SPHERE project, which is an effort to set standards for the
provision of humanitarian aid, including specific guidelines for field
operations, training, and self evaluation. 222 And an industry-founded
association of private security companies, the International Peace Officers
Association (IPOA), has begun to construct a comprehensive code of conduct
that includes human rights standards.223 Nevertheless, neither the U.N., nor
domestic governments, nor outside groups concerned with potential abuses by
foreign affairs contractors have so far undertaken serious efforts either to
harness these nascent accreditation initiatives or to promote other
accreditation projects.
This failure is particularly striking in the Iraq context. Not one of the
available contracts for aid or military services requires that the entities
professional and industry groups, as well as government representatives from” the Health Care
Financing Administration. Id. at 610-12.
217. Id. at 612-13; see also Kinney, supra note 152, at 65.
218. Because ACA officials are generally chosen from the ranks of experienced corrections
officials, for example, “personal and professional relationships between ACA overseers and prison
management are not uncommon, creating a common sympathy and sense of purpose that tells against
both more meaningful standards and more rigorous enforcement.” Dolovich, supra note 7, at 492.
Moreover, Dolovich argues that because the institutions pay for accreditation, thereby “providing
income on which the ACA is dependent for its survival . . . .a degree of capture is likely.” Id. (citation
omitted).
219. Id. at 490-491 (acknowledging benefits of ACA accreditation of prisons); Kinney, supra
note 152, at 65 (acknowledging benefits of JCAHO accreditation of hospitals).
220. To be sure, the Federal Acquisition Regulation does require the evaluation of all contracts
in excess of $1,000,000, 48 C.F.R. § 42.1502 (2006), and also requires contract officers to take into
account the past performance of contractors in all competitively negotiated acquisitions expected to
exceed $1,000,000. 48 C.F.R. § 15.304(c)(3) (2006). Thus, in theory, an internal “blacklist” of rogue
contractors could be created to guard against repeat abuses. But such an internal system hardly
substitutes for independent accreditation.
221. See, e.g., U.N. Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGC/index.html
(May 17, 2005) (program, launched by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to encourage corporations
to agree voluntarily to respect nine principles, including the protection of human rights and the
environment); David Stout, Oil and Mining Leaders Agree To Protect Rights in Remote Areas, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at A9 (describing agreement among oil and mining companies, the British and
U.S. governments, and human rights organizations, providing that companies will voluntarily comply
with human rights standards).
222. See THE SPHERE PROJECT, HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM STANDARDS IN
DISASTER RESPONSE (2004), available at http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/hdbkpdf/hdbk_hc.pdf
[hereinafter SPHERE CHARTER].
223. See IPOA Code of Conduct, http://www.ipoaonline.org/conduct/ (Mar. 31, 2005).
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receiving the contracts be vetted or accredited by independent organizations.
For example, unlike domestic prison contracts, which routinely require
accreditation by ACA and compliance with a comprehensive set of standards,
the contracts with CACI to provide interrogators at Abu Ghraib contain only
the most basic guidelines and make no mention of human rights compliance or
accreditation requirements.224 The contract between the U.S. government and
Dyncorp to provide law enforcement advisers to train Iraqi police similarly
contains no provision mandating that Dyncorp be accredited,225 even though
Dyncorp employees were implicated in sex abuse when performing under a
similar contract in Bosnia.226 Likewise, although contracts could require that
humanitarian aid organizations agree to the SPHERE guidelines in order to
receive contracts, no such requirement has been imposed.227
Yet, such accreditation would seem to be particularly important in the
foreign affairs area, where, as discussed previously, security concerns and
special considerations often eliminate competition in the contracting process,
resulting in contracts that are structured without the usual market controls.
Significantly, the problem is not only that international organizations and
domestic governments neglect to require accreditation in their contracts, but
also that NGOs and other independent groups have not sought a robust
accreditation role. After all, more NGOs could, like the SPHERE Project’s
efforts in humanitarian aid, begin to rate military contractors independently,
regardless of whether the government contracts require such accreditation.
These ratings might then become an industry standard that the government
could be persuaded to use as a contracting factor. This is what occurred with
NCQA in the domestic health care context. And, even if agency officials
negotiating contracts choose not to impose accreditation requirements, the
ratings could serve as a point of pressure in Congress and the public at large.
Thus, NGOs should spend at least as much energy developing accreditation
regimes as they do pursuing transnational litigation under various formal
international law instruments. International organizations could also seek to
create accreditation regimes. Such accreditation would likely be influential
over time, even if states at first formally refuse to implement accreditation
requirements into their contracts.
F.

Mandating Contractor Self-Evaluation

Contractors could also be required to perform self-evaluations as a way
of enhancing accountability. Presented with an internal self-evaluation, an
outside monitor, whether governmental or third-party, can often scrutinize the

224. See Work Orders, supra note 137.
225. See Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of State and Dyncorp, Iraq Law Enforcement, No.
SLMAQM-03-C-0028 (Apr. 18, 2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow
/DynCorp.pdf.
226. See Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19.
227. See SPHERE CHARTER, supra note 222. Although SPHERE itself is a project of the notfor-profit sector, see http://www.sphereproject.org (listing representatives of not-for-profits and
governments as board members), nothing prevents contracting agencies from requiring for-profit entities
as well to follow SPHERE guidelines in fulfilling contracts.
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contractor’s performance more quickly and efficiently. Of course, selfevaluation gives the contractor discretion to massage the data and indeed can
be subject to outright manipulation and abuse.228 But nonetheless, it can be a
useful starting point for outside monitors, who can at least at the outset make a
faster assessment as to whether the contractor has met the contract goals. In
addition, self-evaluation can encourage more effective internal policing by the
contractor.
Due to these potential benefits, self-evaluation has emerged as a frequent
tool in the domestic context. In the world of private prisons, for example,
contractors regularly are subjected to self-evaluation requirements. In Texas,
prison contractors must “establish performance measures for rehabilitative
programs and develop a system to assess achievement and outcomes.” 229
Likewise in the field of health care, a health maintenance organization must, if
it is to receive accreditation, conduct continuous “quality improvement,” in an
Contracts that require
ongoing internal self-evaluation process. 230
accreditation thus effectively mandate such self-evaluation.
In the foreign affairs context, private foreign aid providers operating
under agreement with USAID are regularly required to perform selfevaluation, but foreign aid contracts provided through other agencies and
military contracts seem to be devoid of such provisions. Again, taking the
publicly available Iraq contracts as an example, none requires the private
contractor to file self-evaluation reports, develop internal assessment
practices, or otherwise engage in self-evaluation.231 And while self-evaluation
on its own is unlikely to significantly improve contract compliance, such selfevaluation can be useful in combination with some or all of the other
contractual provisions discussed in this Article.
G.

Enhancing Governmental Termination Provisions and Allowing for
Partial Governmental Takeover of Contracts

Contracts could also include terms allowing the relevant government (or
international organization) to take over the contract by degrees before
ultimately terminating the agreement for failure to observe provisions
implementing public law values. Currently, most contracts have implied or
explicit provisions allowing only for outright termination for noncompliance.
On its face this sort of termination provision seems as if it would provide a
strong incentive for contractor compliance. In actual practice, however,
outright termination is such an extreme measure that governments are often
reluctant to invoke it, and because contractors know that termination is so
unlikely, the provisions have almost no disciplining effect.

228. See id.
229. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 634-35 (describing contract between private corporation
and the Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice).
230. See, e.g., NCQA, What Does NCQA Review When It Accredits an HMO?,
http://www.ncqa.org/Programs/Accreditation/mco/mcostdsoverview.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
231. See Contracts and Reports, supra note 135.
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Thus, it would be better if such termination provisions were
supplemented with more graduated penalties, such as provisions permitting
the partial governmental takeover of contracts. Because graduated penalties
are less extreme than outright termination, they are far more likely actually to
be invoked by contract monitors, making them a more effective enforcement
mechanism than the harsher (though rarely invoked) termination provisions.
Moreover, if partial takeover fails to stem the abuses, outright termination still
remains a penalty of last resort. In the domestic context, states are increasingly
turning to mechanisms such as graduated penalties, for example, to increase
oversight of private nursing homes receiving public funding.232 Scholars and
practitioners have also called for the use of such penalties in the private prison
setting.233
Turning to foreign affairs, while contracts subject to the FAR do contain
termination provisions, they are rarely exercised and are not supplemented by
lesser, graduated penalties. As a result, the government has little leverage over
contractors. The Iraq contracts provide a notable demonstration of this
problem. When CACI employees were implicated in abuses at Abu Ghraib
prison, for example, the U.S. government did not terminate its contract.
Indeed, although the particular employees implicated in the abuse charges no
longer work at CACI, 234 it is unclear whether government actors even so
much as stepped up their supervision of the contracts. To the contrary, CACI
actually received a contract extension for interrogation services.235
Obviously, governments (and international organizations) should be
encouraged to invoke termination provisions when contractors fall short. But
even without full termination of the contractors, graduated government (or
international organization) takeover could provide an added incentive for
contractors to promote public law values.
H.

Allowing for Beneficiary Participation or Broader Public Involvement in
Contract Design

Contracts could also permit beneficiaries or the broader public to help
shape contract terms and evaluate performance. In the domestic context,
commentators have suggested that such beneficiary participation or
involvement by the broader public could greatly enhance the extent to which
contractors fulfill public law values. 236 Indeed, as Fred Aman has argued,
precisely because privatization contracts are difficult to terminate and

232. Freeman, supra note 18, at 608.
233. Tale of Two Systems, supra note 182, at 1888; see also Alphonse Gerhardstein, Private
Prison Litigation: The “Youngstown” Case and Theories of Liability, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 183, 198
(2000).
234. See CACI, CACI in Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.caci.com/
iraq_faqs.shtml (last visited May 21, 2005) [hereinafter CACI in Iraq]; News Release, CACI, CACI
Says the Fay Report Clearly Shifts Focus of Blame Away From Its Employee Named in a Previous
Report (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.caci.com/about/news/news2004/08_26_04_NR.html.
235. See CACI in Iraq, supra note 234.
236. Jody Freeman, for example, has suggested that, in order to protect public law values,
“perhaps interested individuals, or representative groups should be entitled to participate in contract
negotiation.” Freeman, supra note 18, at 668.
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sometimes become “immutable,” it is “important that the participation of the
public and the public’s representatives be maximized as early in the process as
possible.”237 He thus advocates allowing the broader public to play a role in
the design of the contracts themselves.238
Some state and local governments have begun to do so. For example,
Wisconsin’s contracts with managed care organizations to provide health care
to Medicare and Medicaid recipients include provisions for participation by
community groups.239 Other states have gone even further and now require
broad public involvement in virtually all privatization decisions. In Montana,
for example, any privatization decision must be made subject to a plan
available to the public and open to public comment. 240 Other states have
similar provisions.241
Foreign affairs contracts might benefit from this approach. Indeed, such
participation may be particularly important to promote public law values
because the ordinary democratic process open to those experiencing the
effects of privatization in the domestic context is essentially unavailable for
non-citizens outside the United States who are affected by the activities of
contractors. To be sure, even in the domestic context, there has long been a
worry that privatization removes a crucial democratic check on government.
The link between those affected by government action and the government
actors is attenuated when that activity is farmed out first from legislatures to
agencies, and then from agencies to private contractors. Scholars and policymakers worry that this form of delegation reduces transparency, which in turn
reduces the ability of those affected to vote their preferences when things are
not going well. 242 But when governments turn to private contractors to
perform foreign affairs functions, the problem is increased exponentially
because many of the people affected by the contracts in question do not
belong to the U.S. democratic polity or indeed any democratic polity at all.
Moreover, U.S. citizens may be less inclined to use the democratic process to
voice their views when the effects of contracting are felt mainly overseas.
While it may make less sense to allow involvement of those non-citizens
affected by military contractors overseas, due to obvious security concerns,
beneficiary involvement or broader public participation in the design and
evaluation of foreign aid contracts might be particularly useful. Governments
providing long-term development aid through private organizations have to
some degree already begun to adopt this approach. In the United States,

237. AMAN, supra note 33, at 155.
238. See id. at 155-56 (critiquing a number of state privatization statutes for failing to provide
adequate provisions for public participation in the design of contracts).
239. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 624-25.
240. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-8-302 (2005).
241. For a discussion of such provisions, see AMAN, supra note 33, at 154-56.
242. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 72 (2002)
(“This layer of agencies creates obvious problems for theories of democracy that emphasize the ability
of citizens to influence their government through participatory action or deliberative process.”). But see
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1542 (1992) (arguing that agencies, because they fall between the extremes of a “politically overresponsive Congress and the over-insulated courts,” may be best situated to institute a civic republican
model of policymaking).
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USAID has allowed local beneficiaries and NGOs to help design development
aid agreements, usually on an informal basis, and most frequently when such
agreements are negotiated through field offices. 243 Agencies other than
USAID, however, are less likely to engage in such consultation. 244
Humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction assistance are also less
likely to incorporate such an approach, though recently the UNHCR has
begun to explore the possibility of refugee and internally displaced person
evaluation of humanitarian aid.245
I must leave to a future article a more detailed discussion of how best to
maximize opportunities for those affected by a foreign aid project to
participate in the design of that project.246 Certainly, the idea raises a whole
host of practical problems. For example, it will be difficult to determine who
exactly can speak for an affected population. Is NGO participation sufficient?
How does one determine which civil society actors are most representative?
What if different sectors of the population disagree as to the efficacy of a
proposed project? Even assuming one determines the appropriate voices, what
form should the feedback take? Is informal consultation enough? Or should
there be a more formal notice and comment period? Or is it necessary to
establish an independent tribunal with the power to quash the project
altogether? And should such a tribunal be governmental or private? While
these questions certainly must be addressed, it seems to me that if we are
asking them, we will have already advanced the debate quite a bit. The
important point for now is that we must at the very least begin to explore ways
of involving in the contracting process itself those affected by foreign affairs
agreements. Explicit contractual requirements would go a long way toward
facilitating consultation with beneficiary populations, thereby effectuating
through contract a broader form of public participation.
I.

Strengthening Enforcement Mechanisms

Finally, the contracts could provide for enhanced enforcement
mechanisms. They could, for example, give beneficiaries the opportunity for
privatized administrative hearings. Additionally, contracts might include
third-party beneficiary suit provisions, empowering contract beneficiaries or
other interested parties to sue in domestic courts for breach of contract. And
whistleblower protections might be enhanced. All of these measures would
likely increase compliance with contractual terms.
In the domestic context, governments and policymakers have begun to
implement such measures, though private grievance procedures remain more
prevalent than broader third-party beneficiary suit provisions and

243. See generally Tania Kaiser, Participation or Consultation? Reflections on a ‘Beneficiary
Based’ Evaluation of UNHCR’s Programme for Sierra Leonean and Liberian Refugees in Guinea, JuneJuly 2000, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 185, 186 (2004) (discussing ways to facilitate measuring the impact of
aid programs).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Laura Dickinson, Privatization and Public Participation in Foreign Affairs (2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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whistleblower protections. Commentators regularly call for an expansion of
third-party beneficiary suit provisions 247 (which courts generally refuse to
imply unless clearly specified in the contract),248 but such provisions remain
rare. Many private contractors providing aid, however, do offer individual
complaint mechanisms for affected beneficiaries. 249 Although these aid
providers are not state actors and would therefore generally be immune from
constitutional review, such contractual provisions do allow for notice and
opportunity to be heard, thereby incorporating elements of constitutional due
process. These private grievance systems are perhaps most evident in
contracts with private prison operators, which typically require such
mechanisms.250 But they appear in other contexts as well, such as health care.
For example, the Medicare statute requires that health maintenance
organizations receiving federal funding to cover their treatment of Medicare
beneficiaries must “provide meaningful procedures for hearing and resolving
grievances between the organization . . . and members enrolled.”251
Governments might experiment with similar measures in the foreign
affairs arena.252 The World Bank has taken steps in this direction, by enabling
aid beneficiaries to bring grievances before special tribunals challenging gross
abuses.253 Third-party beneficiary suit provisions, however, are virtually nonexistent, and none of the Iraq contracts contains such a provision.
Whistleblower protections should also be enhanced. Government officials
currently receive whistleblower protection for reporting abuses in the
negotiation or management of contracts, but employees of private companies
are not protected under the general Whistleblower Protection Act. 254 In
specific statutes, however, Congress has at times extended whistleblower
protection to private employees. For example, seven of the major federal

247. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 11, at 1317.
248. For example, section 313(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides “[A]
promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do an act for or render a service
to the public is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages
resulting from performance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the promise provide for such
liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the damages and a
direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with the policy of the
law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 313(2) (1981). For further discussion of third-party beneficiary suits involving
government contracts, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358,
1406-12 (1992).
249. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1494.
250. For examples of contracts with private operators that require grievance procedures, see
Florida Contract, supra note 132, § 5.24; Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 5.15; Freeman, supra
note 18 (describing Texas Contract).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5)(A) (2000).
252. Such experiments might focus, at least initially, on those contracts deemed most
vulnerable to serious abuses.
253. See Lori Udall, The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything Changed?, in
THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 391,
392-93 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1989). While it is true that such employees could bring a qui tam action
for fraud, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), (c), (d), (h) (2000), such a suit would do nothing to protect the
employee from being fired.
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environmental statutes contain such whistleblower clauses. 255 Thus,
whistleblower protection could also be extended to private sector employees
working for a government contractor, who provide information concerning the
unlawful performance of a contract. Such a provision, combined with the
availability of third-party beneficiary suits, or possibly even qui tam
actions,256 would go a long way towards making sure that any contract-based
efforts to provide accountability will have back-end enforcement to encourage
compliance.
As discussed previously, enforcing international law norms through
contract, rather than directly in an international forum, obviates any need to
argue that the contractor should be deemed a state actor. In addition, because
international law enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak compared to
their domestic counterparts, a contractual approach is far more likely to lead
to meaningful judicial review. In addition, requiring domestic judges to
enforce international public law values embodied in contracts may have
important norm internalization effects because such judges would essentially
be enforcing international law norms. 257 This increased familiarity with
international law principles might lead to less resistance to those norms as a
general matter, thereby effectively expanding the reach of international law.
On the other hand, one might argue that localizing the enforcement of
international law norms might either cause international enforcement
mechanisms to atrophy from disuse or lead to heterogeneity in different
countries’ understandings of the principles, which could undermine the notion
of a common international law. Neither objection, however, should create
serious hesitation about pursuing contractual accountability. First, as
previously discussed, international law enforcement mechanisms are already
weak, and to the extent that they have been effective, at least in the human
rights context, it has been by selectively limiting the scope of enforcement to
the very most egregious human rights violators. Thus, it is not at all clear that
providing a possibly effective domestic avenue for pursuing claims against
private actors (who would have been unlikely to face prosecution
internationally in any event) will in any meaningful way undermine
international law institutions. Second, to the extent that domestic judicial
systems, government officials, and broader populations internalize
international law norms, it strikes me that the benefits of such norm
internalization far outweigh any possible concern about maintaining the
“purity” of the international norm. Local variation is to be expected, of course,

255. See Toxic Substance Control Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 2, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 §
312, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act
of 1980 § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2000);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000) (amended 1978, 1992).
256. See supra note 117 (describing such an action against Custer Battles, LLC, an Iraq
contractor).
257. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996)
(arguing that international law is often enforced through the domestic internalization of international law
norms).
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but such hetereogeneity in the domestic incorporation of international norms
strikes me as a strength, not a weakness. Finally, the key point is that without
focusing on contracts, there may be no realistic way to impose norms of
accountability on privatized foreign affairs activity at all. Accordingly, those
seeking to expand the applicability of international law norms should at the
very least seriously consider using contractual enforcement mechanisms or
risk the possibility that such norms will simply be ignored in an increasingly
privatized world.
IV. CONCLUSION
Resisting privatization in the foreign affairs context is probably no
longer an option. Indeed, if anything the scope and pace of privatization in the
international arena is increasing. Moreover, it will not be sufficient merely to
tweak existing international law treaties or doctrines (or even invent new
ones) in order to bring private contractors within the ambit of formal
international law. After all, even if international or domestic courts could be
convinced that private contractors should be held liable for violation of
international law norms (which is far from certain), international and
transnational public law litigation will never be able to hold accountable more
than a handful of people. Accordingly, those who seek to preserve or expand
the values embodied in public international law will also need to look
elsewhere to find mechanisms for ensuring accountability in a privatized
world.
In this Article, I have suggested one such mechanism: the government
contract that creates the privatized relationship in the first place. Drawing on
the far more extensive domestic administrative law literature on the subject, I
have identified a variety of provisions that could be incorporated into such
contracts. These provisions seek to encourage compliance with (and
enforcement of) human rights and humanitarian law, ensure transparency and
democratic accountability, and promote norms against corruption, waste, and
fraud. Taken together, they provide a menu of options for regulators, activists,
policymakers, and scholars who are concerned at the potential for abuse in our
current contracting processes.
Of course, governments may be hesitant to insist on some of these
contractual provisions. For example, officials may fear that such requirements
could unduly increase the costs of privatization both to the contractor and to
the government entity overseeing the contract. 258 Or, more cynically,
resistance might stem from the fact that governments actually benefit from a
more opaque process with less public oversight. In any event, one seeming
difficulty with relying on contractual provisions is that the increased oversight

258. See, e.g., Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors
Share the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 191 (1997)
(expressing concern that litigation and administrative costs could “siphon away public resources that
could have been devoted to, among other things, the effective implementation and oversight of the
contractors’ work”).
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will be included in contracts only as a “matter of legislative or executive
grace,” and therefore can be rescinded or limited at any time.259
Yet, such objections do not render a contractual approach unrealistic. To
begin with, concerns about the cost of additional contractual requirements
may well be over-stated. As the Custer Battles fiasco makes clear, in many
cases better oversight could actually save the government far more money
than it costs. And as to concerns that added contractual provisions will cause
contractors to walk away or prohibitively raise their rates, the short answer is
that far more empirical work must be done to assess whether such dire
predictions are accurate. After all, it seems quite unlikely that contractors
bidding for these extraordinarily lucrative contracts with governments such as
the United States will pull out of the process just because of some added
contract requirements. To the contrary, the government should, by all rights,
have tremendous leverage in the contracting process because there are
unlikely to be competing customers similarly able to offer billions of dollars
in contract awards. Indeed, while government contractors in the past have
often raised concerns about increased compliance costs to object to enhanced
contractual oversight,260 at least one commentator has challenged such claims,
noting the absence of compelling evidence that increased oversight through,
for example, qui tam suits has resulted in a significant number of firms
refusing to do business with the government.261
In addition, while some governmental officials surely would prefer a
more opaque process, governments are not monolithic entities, and proposals
such as the ones outlined in this Article may be taken up and championed by
members of the bureaucracy, even without the imprimatur of higher level
executive branch officials or the legislature. Moreover, it is incorrect to think
that more robust contractual monitoring can only come about through official
executive branch or legislative action. First of all, some of the proposals for
monitoring of contracts and accreditation or rating of contractors could be
undertaken by NGOs or other groups without any official action whatsoever.
While such evaluations might not initially have the power of the state behind
them, the example of NCQA indicates that, over time, governments can be
convinced to adopt a previously unofficial rating system as its own. Second,
even if governments never adopted the standards, simply the process of
evaluating and accrediting contractors would provide a rich source of public
information about privatization that could be used to bring popular political
(or economic) pressure to bear on noncompliant contractors. Such public
reporting might also allow citizen watchdog groups (or even competing
contractors) to monitor the effectiveness of particular contracts, publicize

259. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1404-05.
260. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation
in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 205 (1998) (reporting contractors’
concerns that the specter of qui tam suits is “a costly, substantial burden of doing business with the
government”).
261. See Stephen L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike
Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 668 n.137 (2001).
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deficiencies, and lobby government officials for change.262 Third, advocacy at
the international level could result in treaties or other international regimes
that actually require governments to include oversight provisions in certain
categories of contracts, thus creating increasing pressure for change. In any
event, as the domestic examples demonstrate, governments and agencies can,
at least at times, be mobilized to require meaningful contractual oversight.
In the end, whatever the drawbacks of a contractual approach, they are
certainly no greater than the weaknesses of the existing formal
transnational/international court system. Indeed, the use of contractual
provisions has the benefit of opening up the possibility of legal enforcement
regardless of whether or not there is state action and to provide the foundation
for legal action in domestic, as well as international, fora. Such contractual
mechanisms might also pave the way for statutes and treaties. Thus,
international law scholars, activists, and advocates should spend at least as
much time studying and lobbying for contract-based compliance regimes as
they do seeking further openings for international or transnational litigation.
Perhaps most importantly, we must remember that the proper
management of privatization will almost certainly require a variety of
approaches, and we need not choose one to the exclusion of others. My aim
here is simply to focus attention on privatization in the international realm as a
crucial field of study, to call for dialogue among international and domestic
scholars, advocates, and policy-makers concerning appropriate responses, and
to suggest that more attention be paid to the possibility of using contractual
provisions to provide accountability. None of these aims requires that contract
become the only response to privatization.263 To the contrary, in the coming
years we will need to think broadly and creatively about how best to respond
to the threats posed by the outsourcing of governmental functions to nongovernmental entities. Only through such efforts will we be able to find ways

262. Indeed, as Bradley Karkkainen has pointed out, the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), 42
U.S.C. § 11023 (2000), which requires that industrial facilities report the release and transfer of specific
chemicals, has had a significant impact on pollution emissions. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information
as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257, 287-88 (2001). According to Karkkainen, the TRI, because it creates a performance
metric, “both compels and enables facilities and firms to monitor their own environmental performance”
and “encourages them to compare, rank, and track performance among production processes, facilities,
operating units, and peer or competitor firms.” Id. at 261. In addition, Karkkainen argues that the TRI
data “subjects the environmental performance of facilities and firms to an unprecedented degree of
scrutiny by their peers, competitors, investors, employees, consumers, community residents,
environmental organizations, activists, elected officials, regulators, and the public in general.” Id. at
261-62. As a result, this transparency scheme “unleashes, strengthens, and exploits multiple pressures,
all tending to push in the direction of continuous improvement as facilities and firms endeavor to
leapfrog over their peers to receive credit for larger improvements or superior performance.” Id. at 262.
In addition, administrators—whether within companies or in government bureaucracies monitoring
contract compliance—have a management incentive to improve transparency. Id. at 295-305. Thus,
although information by itself does not provide accountability, see id. at 338-43 (noting that some small
firms may be unconcerned about the mere release of information), it can enable other accountability
mechanisms.
263. Indeed, I see contract as one of an array of accountability mechanisms—including the
formation of a treaty regime, litigation, statutory reform, political accountability, and internal
organizational sanctions—each of which merits further exploration and study.

426

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31: 383

to protect crucial public law values in the era of privatization that is already
upon us.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Domestic law scholars and policymakers have long debated issues
surrounding privatization.1 Over the past twenty years, the U.S. government
has increasingly contracted with private organizations to perform a variety of
functions—from health care, 2 to education, 3 to welfare, 4 to prison

†
Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This Article was first presented at a
Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues of International Law, sponsored by the American Society of
International Law, in The Hague, Netherlands in July 2005. The ideas contained here were also
presented at a faculty workshop at George Washington University Law School, and at a conference on
“The Future of the State in International Law,” held at the University of Virginia School of Law. I
acknowledge the participants in all three events for helpful comments and suggestions. In addition,
special thanks go to Dan Bedansky, Paul Schiff Berman, Rosa Brooks, Nestor M. Davidson, Robert W.
Gordon, John Harrison, Paul Kahn, Harold Hongju Koh, David Luban, Jordan Paust, Leila Sadat, Steven
Schooner, and Dinah Shelton for their useful contributions to this draft at various stages along the way.
This Article was selected for inclusion in the Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum, held at Yale Law
School in June 2006.
1.
A recent symposium issue of the Harvard Law Review even goes so far as to declare that
we are in “an era of privatization.” See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1211 (2003).
2.
See generally THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY
PERSPECTIVES (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003).
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management.5 While advocates of privatization have generally argued for the
practice on efficiency grounds,6 critics have worried that, even if privatization
may cut financial costs, it can threaten important public law values.7 Because
many constitutional norms protect individuals only from government
misconduct,8 and because courts have been largely unwilling to view such
norms as applicable to private contractors, 9 these critics have argued that
privatization will dramatically reduce the scope of public law protections in
the United States. 10 Others have sought a middle ground, arguing that
privatization offers a means to extend public law values through the
government contracts themselves, in a process of “publicization.”11
To date, however, none of these scholars has squarely confronted the
growing phenomenon of privatization in the international realm or its impact
on the values embodied in public international law. Yet, with both nationstates and international organizations increasingly privatizing foreign affairs
functions, privatization is now as significant a phenomenon internationally as
it is domestically. For example, states are turning to private actors to perform
3.
See Pearl Rock Kane & Christopher J. Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of
Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION 203 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001) (discussing rise of
privatized education generally and noting that number of charter schools grew from two to nearly 2,500
from 1992 to 2002).
4.
See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2000) (authorizing implementation of welfare programs
“through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations”); see also Pamela Winston et al.,
Privatization of Welfare Services: A Review of the Literature 3-6 (Mathematica Policy Research Inc.,
Reference No. 8834-002, 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/privatization02/report/pdf
(discussing increase in private welfare providers).
5.
See ALLEN J. BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 4 (2001) (reporting that private
prison facilities held 76,010 inmates at mid-year 2000).
6.
See, e.g., Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory,
Evidence, Prospects, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Winter 1997, at 67, 72-75 (arguing that privatization
is efficient in a variety of contexts); F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter, What Does Private
Management Offer Public Education?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271 (2000) (arguing for private
management of “public” schools).
7.
See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 439
(2005) (arguing that prison privatization undermines core public law values of humanity and
parsimony); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (arguing
that privatization can threaten public law values embodied in constitutional norms).
8.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . .”) (emphasis added).
9.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the National
Collegiate Athletic Association is not a state actor); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee, a corporation
created by federal statute and given control over U.S. participation in the Olympics as well as exclusive
oversight of private amateur sports organizations participating in international competition, is not a state
actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (holding that private nursing homes providing
long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries are not state actors, even though they operate under contract
with the government and make need determinations authorized by statute); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982) (holding that private schools are not state actors even though the government
contracted with the schools to fulfill its statutory obligation to provide education to special-needs
students). But see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001)
(holding that a private organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school athletic events is
a state actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a private doctor treating prisoners
pursuant to a contract with a prison is a state actor).
10. See Dolovich, supra note 7, at 446-50 (arguing that private prisons fail to fulfill society’s
obligations to inmates); Metzger, supra note 7, at 1373-74.
11. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1285, 1300 (2003).

Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=873086

2006]

Public Law Values

385

core military, foreign aid, and diplomatic functions. Military privatization
entered the popular consciousness in early 2004, when private contractors
working as interrogators and translators for the U.S. government abused
detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.12 But this kind of military privatization
is only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, though the United States does not yet
contract out direct combat functions, we now frequently turn to private actors
to provide logistical support to those in combat on the battlefield as well as to
aid in strategic planning and tactical advice. 13 Other states, such as Sierra
Leone, have used private contractors to engage in direct combat, 14 and
international organizations have weighed the possibility of using private
contractors to perform peacekeeping.15 In the foreign aid context, states and
international organizations are increasingly entering into agreements with
private non-profit and for-profit entities to deliver all forms of aid, including
humanitarian
relief,
development
assistance,
and
post-conflict
16
reconstruction. Even diplomatic tasks such as peacekeeping negotiations are
being undertaken by private actors in conjunction with governments and
international organizations.17
All of this privatization in the international sphere raises the same sort of
question for international public law that domestic privatization raises for
domestic public law: Will privatization erode fundamental public law values,
such as human rights norms, norms against corruption and waste, and
democratic process values? 18 After all, international law norms, like many
domestic constitutional norms, traditionally apply only to states. The
Convention Against Torture, for example, generally prohibits only official

12. See Douglas Jehl & Kate Zernike, Greater Urgency on Prison Interrogation Led to Use of
Untrained Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at A11.
13. See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003).
14. See Abraham McLaughlin, Guns for Hire Thrive in Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 6.
15. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 13, at 182-86.
16. See, e.g., BEYOND U.N. SUBCONTRACTING: TASK-SHARING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDING NGOS (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1998) [hereinafter U.N.
SUBCONTRACTING]; Ian Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship Between
Northern NGOs and Northern Governments, in STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT-NGO PARTNERSHIPS FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 7 (Ian Smillie & Henny Helmich eds., 1999) [hereinafter
STAKEHOLDERS].
17. See, e.g., James L. Taulbee & Marion V. Creekmore, NGO Mediation: The Carter Center,
in MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOS 156 (Henry F. Carey & Oliver P. Richmond eds., 2003).
18. One can, of course, challenge the idea that certain values can even be labeled “public law
values.” Indeed, as both critical legal studies and public choice theory teach, the line between the
“public” and “private” is largely incoherent. Yet, that is precisely my point. Instead of seeing
privatization solely as a threat to public values, as if there were some meaningful divide between the
two, we should focus on the negotiated contractual relationships between the public and the private. As
Jody Freeman has noted in discussing domestic privatization, “[t]he view that private actors . . . are
menacing outsiders whose influence threatens to derail legitimate ‘public’ pursuits—features
prominently in the dominant models of the field. And yet, private actors are also regulatory resources
capable of contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy of administration. This realization suggests the
possibility of harnessing private capacity to serve public goals.” Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-49 (2000). Similarly, I seek to use privatization
contracts to pursue what are usually deemed the public ends of international law.
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misconduct. 19 Thus, we must ask: as more and more non-state contractors
emerge on the international scene, will these individuals and groups
necessarily fall through the cracks of international law and evade any public
accountability?
My answer to that question is “no,” and in this Article I suggest that the
domestic U.S. administrative law literature may provide a useful set of
responses to privatization that has been largely overlooked by international
law scholars, policy-makers, and activists. In particular, I argue that
possibilities for extending public law values inhere in the privatized
relationship itself, particularly in the government contracts that are the very
engine of privatization. Indeed, the contracts governments enter into with nonstate actors can include many provisions that would help to create both
standards of behavior, performance benchmarks, and a means of providing
some measure of public accountability. While such contractual provisions are
not a panacea, they may be at least as effective as the relatively weak
enforcement regime of public international law. 20 At the same time, by
considering international privatization, I seek to open what I believe could be
a fruitful dialogue between domestic administrative law scholars and
international law scholars about possible responses.
Significantly, while domestic scholars of privatization have not yet
turned their attention to foreign affairs privatization, international law scholars
have not really focused on privatization at all, and, in any event, have not
seriously considered contract as a source of solutions to the potential threat to
public law values that privatization may seem to pose. Of course, international
law scholars have recognized concerns about how to apply international legal
norms to non-state actors in general.21 But “non-state actors” is too broad a
category because a private contractor is very different from, say, a guerrilla
soldier. In particular, because privatization involves an increasing contractual
relationship between governments (or international organizations) and private
actors, contractual mechanisms for importing public accountability are
potentially available with regard to privatization, whereas they obviously are

19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14 (defining torture as
certain activities designed to inflict pain or suffering when such “pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity”). Of course, this international “state action” requirement can be challenged on a
variety of grounds. See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
20. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, in considering the question of whether privatization
undermines international law’s public values, we need to recognize that it is not as if state actors are
always held accountable for failing to uphold these values. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for
Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 135 (2005). After all, international law has often been criticized for having relatively
weak enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17, 18-20 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998)
(noting lack of enforcement in international human rights law). And while this fact may not be cause for
celebration, it does serve to remind us that we do not quite lose as much when we privatize in the
international sphere as we do when, for example, we privatize domestically.
21. See, e.g., PHILIP ALSTON, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); Math
Noortman, Non-State Actors in International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 59, 71-72 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001).
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not relevant to many other instances in which non-state actors play a role in
the international sphere.
Moreover, to the extent that international law scholars and policymakers have proposed any solutions to potential problems created by
privatization, these proposals fall far short. At the extreme, some have argued
that the best response to military outsourcing, for example, is simply to
oppose it altogether, because military functions are somehow “inherently”
governmental or because state bureaucracies can be better monitored and held
to account in court than private contractors can.22 However, those who simply
resist privatization are misguided because the trend toward outsourcing of
foreign affairs functions previously performed by state bureaucracies (at least
in the recent past) is probably irreversible. The privatization train has not only
already left the station, but has gone far down the track. Indeed, even those
who seek to send the train back home should favor alternative solutions in the
interim, because any return is likely to take a very long time.
Others have argued that private actors with significant impact in the
international sphere should be more formally brought within the normative
framework of international law. Thus, with each wave of non-state actors—
such as guerrilla movements,23 terrorists,24 non-governmental organizations,25
and corporations26 —many international law practitioners and scholars have
considered expanding the coverage of public international law to apply to
each group. They have therefore contended either that states should (by treaty
or customary international law) develop new norms that apply directly to
these categories of non-state actors,27 or that any “state action” requirements
contained in existing norms (again either in treaties or customary international
law) should be interpreted expansively to apply to non-state actors linked to
the state.28 At the same time, these scholars and practitioners have tended to
focus on the need for courts and tribunals—in many cases new ones—to apply
and interpret these norms.

22. John Sifton, Remarks on Private Military Contractors at Conference at Georgetown
University Law Center (Apr. 2005).
23. See, e.g., Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 29,
30-33 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 756-57 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Noortman, supra note 21, at 72.
26. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 524-30 (2001) (arguing that more international law norms should be
extended to bind corporations directly); see also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2003) (same). But see Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect
Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005) (urging
caution).
27. See Junod, supra note 23, at 34-38 (discussing guerrillas and insurgents); Noortmann,
supra note 21, at 71-74 (discussing the “legal personality” of NGOs under international law); Ratner,
supra note 26, at 524-27 (discussing corporations).
28. See, e.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts.
4, 8, in Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (stating that the “conduct of any State organ shall be considered an
act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s conduct shall be attributed to the state if he
or she is acting on the state’s instructions or under the state’s direction).
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Yet this approach, though it is important because it results in the
articulation of norms in the international sphere, can have only a limited
effect. Even if the proposed courts and tribunals are established and fully
functioning, and even if they expand the norms of international law to apply to
the broad range of privatized action, these tribunals will never have the
capacity to hold more than a limited number of individuals (and groups) to
account. Accordingly, we need to seek alternative mechanisms for extending
and implementing public law values to privatized actors in the international
sphere. And though literature on corporate responsibility, 29 NGOs, 30 soft
law,31 and transnational networks32 has attempted to address some informal
modes of accountability, international law scholars have so far not sufficiently
discussed the possibility of contract.
This Article begins by laying out the scope of the problem, surveying the
extent of foreign affairs privatization, the potential threat it poses to public
law values, and the failure of current outsourcing contracts to address this
problem. Using Iraq as a case study, I examine the publicly available military
contracts as well as contracts to provide foreign aid, and I suggest serious
deficiencies in the contracts thus far. Then, drawing on examples and insights
from the domestic privatization literature, I set forth nine ways in which
contractual provisions could be used to extend and enforce public law values
in the foreign affairs privatization context. Specifically, I suggest that
contracts be drafted to: explicitly extend relevant norms of public international
law to private contractors, delineate training requirements, provide for
enhanced monitoring both within the government and by independent thirdparty monitors, establish clear performance benchmarks, require accreditation,
mandate self-evaluation by the contractors, provide for governmental
takeovers of failing contracts, include opportunities for public participation in
the contract negotiation process, and enhance whistleblower protections and
rights of third-party beneficiaries to enforce contractual terms. And, because
these public values would be embodied in that quintessential private law
instrument—the contract—they would more readily come within the purview
of domestic courts or private arbitral bodies and so would rely less on
international public law enforcement mechanisms (though those are possible
as well). As a result, these contractual provisions may at least make some
progress in attempting to ensure that private contractors are accountable both
to the publics they serve and to those who are most affected by their work.

29. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 952-58 (2004); Sean
Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. INT’L L.
389, 424-30 (2005); Ratner, supra note 26, at 531-34; Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility
and the International Law of Human Rights: The Next Lex Mercatoria, in ALSTON, supra note 21, at
177-226.
30. See Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical
Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE U.N., AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 40-43 (Leon
Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 1996) [hereinafter GLOBAL GOVERNANCE].
31. See DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2003).
32. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
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Of course, one might think that these proposals are unrealistic because
one of the main reasons governments privatize is precisely to avoid the kind
of accountability I propose. Yet governments are not monolithic, and there are
undoubtedly many people within bureaucracies, such as contract monitors,
who honestly wish to do their job and would therefore welcome (and lobby
for) contractual mechanisms that increase accountability. In addition, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations can
sometimes pressure states to adopt oversight regimes such as the ones I
discuss. The problem is that the policymakers and scholars have not
sufficiently focused on privatization or the possible accountability
mechanisms that could be embodied in contracts. Thus, this Article seeks both
to raise awareness about the ways in which contractual provisions might
embody public law values and to stimulate a broader-ranging debate about the
best way to respond to privatization in the international context.
II.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIVATIZATION AND THE THREAT TO PUBLIC LAW
VALUES

States and international organizations are increasingly turning to private
entities, both for-profit and non-profit, to fulfill a broad range of foreign
affairs functions. Just as they are contracting with private organizations to
provide domestic services such as welfare, health care, education, and prison
management, they are also outsourcing military and intelligence activities,
foreign aid, and diplomatic tasks. Yet, until recently, this trend has largely
escaped scholarly attention. Moreover, to the extent that scholars have
addressed this issue, they have not examined the full scope of privatization
across a number of different areas of state activity.33 This Part briefly maps
out the broad-ranging nature of foreign affairs privatization and then discusses
the dangers such outsourcing poses to public law values.

33. To date, military/security privatization has generated the most scholarly attention. See
generally SINGER, supra note 13; Tina Garmon, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility:
Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 325 (2003); Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call To Recognize and Regulate
Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2003); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879
(2004); Peter Warren Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004); Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a
New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World
Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75 (1998). Other scholars have focused on privatized foreign aid. See
Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 30, at 1; Smillie, supra note 16, at 7. However, not only do these
specialized studies necessarily tell only part of the story, they do not systematically explore the
possibility of using contractual mechanisms to hold private actors accountable, nor do they draw on the
domestic administrative law literature on privatization. At the same time, domestic administrative law
scholars have not generally applied their insights to the international context, though there are important
exceptions. See generally, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, TAMING
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM 154-55 (2004) (identifying the democracy deficit created by
privatization and situating that deficit within a global context); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power:
How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy, 46 B.C.
L. REV. 989 (2005) (identifying the problems of military privatization).
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The Scope of Foreign Affairs Privatization: Military, Foreign Aid, and
Diplomatic Functions

The degree to which states and international organizations have farmed
out foreign affairs activities to private actors is truly breathtaking. It would not
be an exaggeration to say that the U.S. government has hired private entities
to help fight our wars, to deliver much of our foreign aid, and to play an
important role mediating our conflicts and engaging in other diplomatic
activities. Many other states are pursuing a similar course. International
organizations are likewise turning to private entities to support peacekeeping
and to deliver all manner of humanitarian, development, and post-conflict
reconstruction assistance, as well as to participate in peacemaking
negotiations.
The privatization of military functions is perhaps the most remarkable
example. Probably no function of government is deemed more
quintessentially a “state” function than the military protection of the state
itself, and some scholars of privatization in the domestic sphere have assumed
that the military is one area where privatization does not, or should not,
occur.34 Indeed, some have argued that, by hiring private armies to keep itself
secure, the state would threaten its own existence because it would have no
way to control these private military actors.35
Yet, governments around the world, including the United States, are
increasingly hiring private military companies to perform core military
functions. 36 For decades, of course, the U.S. government has entered into
agreements with private companies to build weapons and other equipment, as
well as to provide the basic goods necessary to run a government agency—
everything from desks to office supplies.37 However, such contracting activity
now covers services to active troops in the field.38 These activities include not
only support services, such as food, accommodations, and sanitation for
troops on the battlefield, but also core functions such as intelligence gathering,
communications, weapons maintenance, and even troop training.39 According
to one commentator, “while contractors have long accompanied U.S. armed
forces, the wholesale outsourcing of U.S. military services since the 1990s is
unprecedented.”40
Indeed, if one looks to U.S. forces deployed on the battlefield, the ratio
of private contractors to troops has increased dramatically in the past fifteen

34. Cf. Freeman, supra note 11, at 1295, 1300.
35. See, e.g., Rosky, supra note 33, at 882-83 (stating that a state in which the supply of
military force is entirely private is more vulnerable to military revolt than one in which the supply of
military force is entirely public and that “the intensity of force justifies the state’s monopoly of the
supply of force”).
36. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 3-17.
37. See Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 369, 371-72 (2004).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 416 n.312.
40. SINGER, supra note 13, at 16.
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years. In the first Gulf War, the ratio was roughly one to one hundred;41 in the
current war in Iraq, the ratio is one to ten.42 Although the United States has
not yet used the employees of private companies in actual combat roles,43 it
has deployed them to fulfill tasks such as military intelligence gathering, troop
training, weapons maintenance, and support functions that are very close to
combat; these private actors even have the power to wield force in a variety of
circumstances. 44 Other countries, such as Sierra Leone and Angola, have
explicitly hired private armies. 45 In many modern conflicts, these private
military companies have played a decisive role.46
The pervasiveness of the U.S. military’s use of contractors captured
media attention with news of their role in Iraq. When stories surfaced that
U.S. military personnel had abused detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, it
soon became clear that private contractors employed by CACI, Inc. and
working under an agreement with the Department of the Interior had
participated in the abuse.47 Indeed, intelligence operatives may actually have
given orders to uniformed military. 48 Translators hired under a similar
contract with the firm Titan, Inc. were also implicated in the abuse.49 News of
gruesome security contractor killings by Iraqi insurgents has sparked
additional popular attention.50
Yet, CACI is not an anomaly. Firms such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root
(KBR) have for years built and maintained military bases, transported troops
and equipment to and on the battlefield, repaired and maintained roads and
vehicles, distributed water and food to troops, washed laundry, refueled
equipment, attended to hazardous materials, and performed related
environmental services,51 earning roughly $1.7 billion annually from military
41. George Cahlink, Army of Contractors, GOV’T EXEC, Feb. 1, 2002, at 43, available at
http://www.govexec.com/features/0202/0202s5.htm.
42. Singer, supra note 33, at 523.
43. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, first issued in 1966 and revised as
recently as 2003, requires agencies to outsource all functions that are not “inherently-governmental.”
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-76,
PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 1-3 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/circulars/a076/a76_rev2003.pdf. In 1998, Congress gave added force to Circular A-76 by
mandating that all agencies must identify government positions that are not “inherently governmental”
and contract with the private sector to fill those positions if doing so would be more efficient than filling
them with governmental employees. Implementation of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR)
Act of 1998, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,927 (June 24, 1999). Inherently governmental functions may not be
outsourced, however, and such functions include combat positions. See Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up:
An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 233, 256-58 (2000).
44. Vernon, supra note 37, at 407-09.
45. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, ECONOMIST, July 29, 1995, at 32.
46. See Zarate, supra note 33, at 94-97.
47. See MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, 26, 36, 48 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]; SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF
COMMAND 32-34, 61 (2004); Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15.
48. HERSH, supra note 47, at 61.
49. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 47, at 26, 36, 48; Brinkley & Glanz, supra note 47, at
A15.
50. James Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, for Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at
A1.
51. See, e.g., Halliburton Company, About KBR, http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/aboutKBR/
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work.52 Beyond this logistical support, other companies provide core military
functions such as troop training and intelligence gathering. For example, since
1996, another U.S company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated
(MPRI) has run the ROTC training programs at universities around the
country and has played a key role in numerous programs to educate U.S.
forces, including officer training, war gaming, and tactical planning. 53 In
recent years, moreover, MPRI has expanded its services to a wide variety of
countries, including Croatia, Bosnia, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka,
Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea, 54 as well as to regional intergovernmental
programs such as the African Crisis Response Initiative.55 Finally, and most
controversially, military companies have provided direct combat services. For
example, the now-dissolved South African company Executive Outcomes,
which drew its personnel largely from the apartheid-era South African
Defense Force, won contracts with governments in Angola, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, Congo, and others to engage in
direct combat during the 1980s and 1990s.56 Indeed, its activities in Sierra
Leone and Angola are widely believed to have altered the outcome of the
conflicts in those states.57
Although privatization in the military context has received far more
attention, overseas aid is another area in which states are also increasingly
turning to private contractors to fulfill functions formerly performed directly
by the state.58 From emergency humanitarian relief, to long-term development
assistance, to post-conflict reconstruction programs, private actors under
contract with the United States, other governments, and international
organizations are taking a larger and larger role. The most dramatic surge in
privatized aid has involved humanitarian relief. The United States, for
example, has contracted with private companies such as KBR to build refugee
camps,59 and with nonprofit NGOs such as Save the Children to deliver relief
supplies and medical services.60 For fiscal year 2003, the USAID Office of
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance spent sixty-six percent of its nearly $300
million budget through NGOs. 61 Other countries and international

index.jsp (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
52. SINGER, supra note 13, at 139.
53. See News Release, Army Reserve 88th Regional Readiness Command, Team MPRI
Looking for ROTC Instructors (July 3, 2000), available at http://www.usarc.army.mil/
88thrsc/news/archive/news_rotc_instructors_needed.asp; see also MPRI, National Overview,
http://www.mpri.com/site/nat_overview.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2005).
54. SINGER, supra note 13, at 130-32.
55. Id. at 131.
56. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, supra note 45, at 32.
57. See Zarate, supra note 33, at 94-97.
58. Ian Smillie, United States, in STAKEHOLDERS, supra note 16, at 253.
59. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 144.
60. See USAID, DCHA/PVC-ASHA PORTFOLIO, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at B-5 (2005), available
at
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/portfolio
05.pdf.
61. USAID OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2003),
available
at
www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/
annual_reports/pdf /AR2003.pdf.
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organizations are similarly turning to NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid. 62
Longer-term development aid has followed a similar trend. By the mid-1980s,
development agencies had begun to shift their focus from general funding for
foreign governments to more targeted direct support both to grassroots
organizations helping to eradicate poverty and to other civil society
institutions seen as necessary for democracy and development.63 In the United
States, for example, the government now uses both international and foreign
NGOs to deliver much of its aid overseas, rather than providing aid directly to
foreign governments. 64 As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan make clear,
privatization is also taking place in the arena of post-conflict reconstruction,
with multimillion dollar contracts awarded not only to nonprofit organizations
but to for-profit corporations as well. 65 Indeed, so far in Iraq USAID has
awarded fifteen contracts worth a total of $3.2 billion to for-profit companies,
while it has awarded only six grants worth $40 million to nonprofit
organizations.66
In addition to military and foreign assistance functions, governments
have also turned to private entities to assist in peacemaking and other
diplomatic tasks. The Carter Center, probably the best-known organization in
this field, has engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts to avoid or end
conflicts at the behest of governments around the world.67 For example, in
1994, former President Carter assisted the U.S. government in reopening talks
with North Korea, negotiating an agreement for the peaceful departure of
Raoul Cedras from power in Haiti (thereby averting the need for increased
U.S. military intervention), and also brokering a ceasefire in Bosnia.68 More
recently, the Center has engaged in peacemaking activities at the request of

62. Smillie, supra note 16, at 9 (describing foreign aid in France, Sweden, and the EU); see
also Andrew S. Natsios, NGOs and the U.N. System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or
Cooperation?, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 30, at 73 (noting the relationships of UNICEF and
UNHCR with NGOs); Ruth Wedgwood, Legal Personality and the Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations and Non-State Political Entities in the United Nations System, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS
NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 23 (Rainer Hofmann ed., 1998) (describing the use of
private contractors by UNHCR).
63. See, e.g., Mark Duffield, NGO Relief in War Zones: Toward an Analysis of the New Aid
Paradigm, in U.N. SUBCONTRACTING, supra note 16, at 139, 146 (“By the mid-1980s, a noticeable
change in donor funding policy had occurred, from direct donor assistance to recognized governments in
favour of international support for private, non-governmental sectors.”).
64. See Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 30, at 17, 37.
65. See USAID, ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ: ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES (2005),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activities.html [hereinafter ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE].
66. Id. Although USAID has awarded a total of sixteen contracts, one of those contracts was
awarded to the U.S. Air Force, so I did not include it in the total. Id.; see also Rony Brauman & Pierre
Salignon, Iraq: In Search of a ‘Humanitarian Crisis’, in IN THE SHADOW OF ‘JUST WARS’: VIOLENCE,
POLITICS AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION 269, 271 (Fabrice Weissman ed., 2004) (noting increased use of
for-profit aid providers in Iraq) [hereinafter IN THE SHADOW].
67. See Taulbee & Creekmore, supra note 17, at 156-71 (discussing the Carter Center, a
prominent NGO in these fields).
68. Id.
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numerous governments, including Uganda, Sudan, and Ecuador. 69 Other
organizations have performed similar roles around the world.70
Finally, it is important to note that, in addition to states, international
organizations such as the United Nations have also turned to private entities.71
For example, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has entered partnerships with hundreds of NGOs around
the world for services including refugee protection, community services, field
security, child protection, engineering, and telecommunications in emergency
relief situations. 72 Although the United Nations has not deployed private
military firms in combat roles,73 some policymakers and commentators have
suggested that such a step would provide badly needed help to peacekeeping
and peace enforcement operations.74 And even those who do not endorse a
direct combat role for private firms nonetheless argue that the United Nations
should privatize military logistics functions, much as the U.S. government has
done.75
To be sure, one might argue that privatization in all of these areas of
foreign affairs is nothing new. With respect to the military, mercenaries
(loosely defined as soldiers working for private gain) have appeared
throughout history. From the Swiss guards of the Middle Ages, to the
merchant-armies of the British and Dutch East India Companies during the
colonial period, to the privateers of early America, to the French Foreign
Legion still active today, mercenaries have played a significant role over the
centuries. 76 Indeed, before the Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the
emergence of the state system that eventually gave rise to large standing
national armies, mercenaries were the norm rather than the exception.77 By the
twentieth century, however, apart from some post-colonial wars of
independence (where mercenaries often fought against national liberation
movements), the bulk of military security work has been performed by
professionalized, bureaucratized armies and not private actors.78 It is against

69. The Carter Center, International Conflict Resolution and Management,
http://cartercenter.org/peaceprograms/program12.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).
70. For example, the Public International Law and Policy Group has represented numerous
countries, including Bosnia, Somalia, and Sudan, in peace negotiations. Public International Law and
Policy Group, Peace Negotiations and Post-Conflict Constitutions, http://www.areas/peacebuilding/
negotiations/index.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).
71. See generally U.N. SUBCONTRACTING, supra note 16 (analyzing devolution and task
sharing by the U.N. and the implications for global governance); see also Natsios, supra note 62, at 73
(noting the relationships of UNICEF and UNHCR with NGOs); Wedgwood, supra note 62, at 23
(describing the use of private contractors by UNHCR).
72. UNHCR, NGO PARTNERSHIPS IN REFUGEE PROTECTION 16 (2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/partners/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PARTNERS&id=41c162d04.
73. Thalif Deen, U.N. Rejects Private Peacekeepers, INTER-PRESS NEWS, Aug. 27, 2004.
74. See, e.g., U.K. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES:
OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, at 18, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/
Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf.
75. Peter H. Gantz, Refugees International, The Private Sector’s Role in Peacekeeping and
Peace Enforcement, GLOBAL POL’Y F., Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
peacekpg/training/1118peacekeeping.htm.
76. Milliard, supra note 33, at 2-3.
77. Id.
78. SINGER, supra note 13, at 8.
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this backdrop that we have seen, over the past two decades, the increasing reprivatization of military functions.
Likewise, the privatization of foreign aid and diplomacy are not wholly
recent developments. With respect to foreign aid, private groups from the
United States funneled aid overseas for specific causes long before the
government developed foreign assistance programs.79 Indeed, the practice of
government-sponsored foreign assistance did not develop in a significant way
in the United States until the initiation of the Marshall Plan during the period
following World War II.80 However, from the 1950s through the 1970s, much
of the aid consisted of direct grants to needy countries.81 In contrast, as noted
previously, over the past two decades the government has delivered more and
more foreign aid through nongovernmental actors. 82 And with respect to
diplomacy, private organizations have long played a role in ongoing peace
negotiations and other efforts, but the high-level diplomatic work of
organizations such as the Carter Center is new and distinctive.83
The forces driving this trend toward privatization are not fully
understood, but the dominant rationale articulated by most scholars of the
subject is the promise of cutting costs. 84 The government need not offer
pensions or benefits to employees of private companies working under
contract, and it can hire contractors on a short-term basis, thereby decreasing
the size of government bureaucracies. Moreover, unlike many governmental
employees, private contractors are typically not unionized. The lack of
unionization fuels the political support of those on the right, and, at least in the
United States, there tends to be broad bi-partisan support for any trend that
seems to make government “smaller” and “more efficient.” In addition, in the
case of the military, private military companies may offer governments
greater flexibility. Such companies are touted for their ability to work
quickly,85 and in states with ill-equipped, poorly functioning militaries, private
companies can provide badly needed expertise to help train, or even replace,

79. The international non-governmental organization movement has its roots in missionary
activities that date back to the sixteenth century. Smillie, supra note 16, at 8. Beginning with the
founding of the Red Cross in 1860, many secular international NGOs were born out of the conflicts and
social movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Id. For example, Save the Children,
established in 1920, developed as a response to World War I; Foster Parents Plan emerged after the
Spanish Civil War (1936-39); Oxfam and CARE from World War II; World Vision from the Korean
War (1950-53); and Médecins Sans Frontières from the conflict in Biafra (1967-70). See id. Further
growth occurred in the 1960s and the 1970s, stimulated in part by operations such as the Peace Corps, as
well as the burgeoning human rights, environmental, and women’s movements. Id. at 8.
80. See
generally
Video:
The
Marshall
Plan
Study
Guide
(USAID),
http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/study.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
81. Cf. Smillie, supra note 16, at 249 (discussing the history of private aid organizations,
including growth in the 1960s and 1970s).
82. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
83. Taulbee & Creekmore, supra note 17, at 156.
84. See Barry Yeoman, Need an Army? Just Pick Up the Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at
A19. It should be noted, however, that these cost savings have not been conclusively demonstrated.
Indeed, private military companies typically pay their employees more than government employees, and
because of the types of contracts they receive, private military companies are particularly susceptible to
cost overruns.
85. Samantha M. Shapiro, Iraq, Outsourced, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 14, 2003, at 79
(quoting Steve Schooner).
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government troops. 86 Using private military companies can also offset
shortages of troops by offering a rapid means of growing a state’s military
capacity, and states can deploy their forces with lower domestic political costs
because fewer uniformed troops are put at risk, thus keeping official casualty
figures down. 87 Finally, some have suggested that the growth of private
military firms has been fueled in part by the labor pool created as many
military dictatorships and their accompanying security forces have been
dismantled during transitions to democracy.88
Foreign aid privatization also appears to be motivated largely by a desire
to cut costs. Certainly in the United States the outsourcing of aid is linked to
the political push for smaller government, combined with weak political
support for foreign aid generally. Indeed, USAID, perhaps motivated in part
by the need to justify its activities to an increasingly skeptical Congress, was
one of the first agencies in the United States to take then-Vice President Al
Gore’s “Reinventing Government” message to heart, declaring in 1994 that
“USAID is now fully committed to reinventing itself as a more efficient,
effective, and results-oriented organization.”89
The privatization of diplomatic tasks such as peacemaking has received
even less scholarly attention than other forms of foreign affairs privatization,
and the reasons behind this trend are thus even less clear. It appears, however,
that the growing use of private entities in this arena has stemmed from the
high-level experience of those such as former President Carter who have
founded and worked for such organizations, as well as the organizations’
independence, which frees them from some of the political costs of sensitive
diplomatic efforts.90
Thus, the recent rise of privatization does represent a shift, at least as
compared to the recent past, away from the large, highly-bureaucratized state.
Just as states are outsourcing their domestic functions, they are also
outsourcing their foreign affairs activities. And while the surge in foreign
affairs privatization raises many questions that merit further study,91 a central
issue presented by this trend is whether increased outsourcing undermines the
public law values that apply primarily to state actors.

86. See Garmon, supra note 33, at 331-34.
87. Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19. The promise of placing fewer uniformed troops at risk is,
of course, not always fulfilled. For example, after four Blackwater security contractors were killed in
Fallujah in March, 2004, and their burned bodies hung from a bridge, the American military launched
major assaults on Fallujah in April and November of that year, resulting in some of the highest U.S.
military casualty numbers of the war.
88. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, supra note 45, at 32.
89. USAID, ENHANCING AID’S ABILITY TO MANAGE FOR RESULTS (1994).
90. See, e.g., Taulbee & Creekmore, supra note 17, at 170.
91. It remains unclear whether foreign affairs privatization yields the efficiency gains that are
often touted to garner support for the practice. For example, because of the lack of competition in the
military contracting process, due in part to security concerns, as well as poor monitoring, it may be that
outsourcing actually increases governmental expenditures. See Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in U.S.
Government Contracting in Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Democratic Policy Comm., 109th Cong. 10
(2005) [hereinafter SDPC Hearing] (statement of Franklin Willis) (arguing that choice of poorly
qualified Iraq security contractors, due in part to lack of competition in contractor selection, along with
virtually non-existent monitoring has cost taxpayers millions of dollars).
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The Threat to Public Law Values

Just as the protections contained in the U.S. Constitution are generally
viewed as prohibitions on state misconduct only,92 the principal international
human rights and humanitarian law instruments of the twentieth century—the
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights,93 the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,94 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 95 the Genocide Convention, 96 the Convention Against
Torture, 97 the Fourth Geneva Conventions, 98 and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court99—were drafted primarily with states in mind.
As such, at least in the conventional account of public international law, states
are seen as both the primary parties to the treaties and the central bearers of
rights and responsibilities. These instruments do grant individuals rights, of
course—such as the right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, or the right to a fair trial—but these are generally conceived
primarily as rights against the state.100 Conversely, individuals can be held
criminally liable, but usually only if some connection to the state is
demonstrated. And while there are some exceptions within the overarching
framework of public international law—for example, individuals can be
convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity (as defined in the recent
statute of the International Criminal Court) regardless of any connection to a
state apparatus101—state action (or at least a link to it) still remains at the core
of most conceptions of international law liability.
The private contractor interrogators and translators implicated in the
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison provide a notable example of how these non-state
actors might fall through the cracks of this traditional, state-centered approach
to public international law. Although the Geneva Conventions and the

92. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC.
DOC. D, 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
96. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
97. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1456 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter
Torture Convention].
98. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
99. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
100. The Torture Convention, for example, defines as torture only acts that are committed “by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.” Torture Convention, supra note 97, art. 1. The ICCPR likewise defines the rights
to a fair trial as rights in proceedings before public “courts and tribunals.” ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 14.
101. The Genocide Convention provides explicitly that “[p]ersons committing genocide or any
of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals.” Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art. 4. The
definition of crimes against humanity requires only that the attacks be committed as part of a “State or
organizational” policy. ICC Statute, supra note 99, art. 7(2)(a).
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Convention Against Torture clearly prohibit any abuses committed by US
military personnel, 102 the treaties’ applicability to non-state actors is
ambiguous, and fora for holding non-state actors accountable are limited.103
The U.S. government’s use of private contractors to transport terrorism
suspects to countries known to practice torture104 has raised similar questions
because again, while the Convention Against Torture prohibits governments
from taking such actions, its applicability to private actors is ambiguous.105
Private military companies engaging in direct combat also arguably fall
through the cracks of current international law provisions, despite probably
being the most notorious for committing atrocities. Although multiple treaties
ban the use of certain categories of mercenaries outright, broad gaps in the
definition of “mercenary” leave most types of work by private military
companies outside the treaties’ prohibitions.106 For example, in Sierra Leone
in the 1990s officers of Executive Outcomes, working under contract with the
government, reportedly ordered employees carrying out air strikes against
rebels to “[k]ill everybody,” even though the employees had told their
superiors they could not distinguish between civilians and rebels. 107 While
such a command would almost certainly constitute a war crime if ordered by a
military or civilian authority in the chain of command, it is less clear that such
actions committed by private contractors would qualify, at least absent inquiry
into the extent of the contractor’s link to the government.
Abuses committed by private actors who deliver aid also raise
complicated questions about the application of international law. Although aid
workers do not by any means regularly mistreat aid beneficiaries, such

102. Under international law, the abuses could be characterized as torture; cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment; or war crimes. See ICC Statute, supra note 99, arts. 1, 16; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 98, art. 147; Torture Convention, supra note 97, art. 8. The acts might also
constitute crimes against humanity, if the abuses were “widespread or systematic” and committed
“pursuant to . . . a State or organizational policy.” ICC Statute, supra note 99, art. 7.
103. See Dickinson, supra note 20; see also Adam Liptak, Who Would Try Civilians from U.S.?
No One in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A11. To be sure, a civil suit under the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), already has been filed against the contractors implicated at Abu
Ghraib for violations of international law. See T. Christian Miller, Ex-Detainees Sue 2 U.S. Contractors,
L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A9. Because it has been brought against private parties, the suit will need
to demonstrate a link to state action, at least with respect to the claims of torture and other norms that
require such a link. In the Abu Ghraib setting, however, such a link may not be so difficult to establish
because the private contractors were working in a facility actually run by the U.S. government.
Nevertheless, ATCA suits are not likely to be an option in all but a handful of the most egregious cases.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (upholding the ATCA as a tool for non-Americans to
bring civil suits in U.S. courts, but only for violations of a relatively narrow class of norms).
104. On December 18, 2001, “American operatives participated in what amounted to the
kidnapping of two Egyptians . . . who had sought asylum in Sweden.” HERSH, supra note 47, at 53.
Believed to be linked to Islamic militant groups, the Egyptians “were abruptly seized in the late
afternoon and flown out of Sweden a few hours later on a U.S. government-leased Gulfstream 5 private
jet to Cairo, where they underwent extensive, and brutal, interrogation.” Id. The company that owns the
jet is apparently a corporation registered in Delaware and represented by the Massachusetts law firm
Hill & Plakias. Farah Stockman, Terror Suspects’ Torture Claims Have Mass. Link, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 29, 2004, at A1.
105. Torture Convention, supra note 97, art. 3 (“No State Party shall expel, return . . . or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.”) (emphasis added).
106. See Milliard, supra note 33, at 19-69 (summarizing treaties).
107. Elizabeth Rubin, An Army of One’s Own, HARPER’S, Feb. 1997, at 48.
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incidents occur more often than one might suspect. For example, employees
of Dyncorp Inc., a private corporation that was charged with training police in
Bosnia in the 1990s under a contract with the U.S. government, were
“implicated in a sex-trafficking scandal” involving acts of rape, sexual abuse,
and exploitation.108 Even staff members of not-for-profit organizations have at
times been implicated in abuses. Indeed, a recent study of refugees and
internally displaced persons in West African camps in Guinea, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone reported widespread rape and sexual exploitation of women and
children by many actors, including aid workers. 109 The aid workers and
peacekeeping forces allegedly relied on their positions of relative power to use
“the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit the refugee
population as a tool of exploitation.”110 In some camps, it appears that even
necessities such as using a toilet were sometimes conditioned on the
willingness to perform sexual favors.111 Although, as in the military context,
such abuses committed by governmental actors generally violate international
agreements, the same acts committed by non-state actors fall into a gray
area.112
Even outside the human rights context, the principal regional treaties
seeking to deter corruption, for example, apply primarily to misconduct
involving governmental actors. 113 Yet, foreign aid contractors have been
implicated in fraud and waste. Indeed, Kellogg Brown & Root’s more than
$10 billion in contracts with the U.S. government in Iraq “have been dogged

108. Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19. Although Dyncorp offers security services under the
contract, I include it and other such contracts within the foreign aid section because they provide
assistance to a foreign country, as opposed to assistance to the U.S. military.
109. UNHCR & SAVE THE CHILDREN UK, NOTE FOR IMPLEMENTING AND OPERATIONAL
PARTNERS
ON
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
&
EXPLOITATION
(2002),
available
at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/6010f9ed3c651c93c1256b6d00560fca; see also
Michel Alger & Francoise Bouchet-Soulinier, Humanitarian Spaces: Spaces of Exception, in IN THE
SHADOW, supra note 66, at 297, 302 (describing such abuses in refugee and IDP camps in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone); Fabrice Weissman, Sierra Leone: Peace at Any Price, in IN THE SHADOW,
supra note 66 (describing sexual exploitation by aid workers in IDP camps in Sierra Leone).
110. See Scott A. Levin, Sexual Exploitation of Refugee Children by U.N. Peacekeepers, 19
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 833, 834-35 (2003).
111. See Malinda M. Schmiechen, Parallel Lives, Uneven Justice: An Analysis of Rights,
Protection and Redress for Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Camps, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 473, 490 (2003).
112. For example, rape or other sexual abuse committed by a public official would in many
cases constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture, but similar actions taken by a non-state
actor would not, unless undertaken with the “consent or acquiescence” of such an official. Torture
Convention, supra note 97, art. 1. Rape and related sexual violence are also considered war crimes if
committed in either international or internal armed conflict, but only those individuals acting under the
authority of the actual parties to the conflict may be held criminally responsible for such acts. ICC
Statute, supra note 99, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). Though non-state actors can commit crimes
against humanity, such activity would only qualify if it is “widespread or systematic” and conducted
pursuant to an organizational plan or policy. Id. arts. 7(1)(g), 7(2)(a).
113. For example, states parties to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions agree to criminalize bribery, but bribery is defined only as payment to public
officials to secure a pecuniary or other advantage. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter
OECD Convention]. Payment to a government contractor providing services in order to secure a
subcontract, for example, or some other advantage, would not clearly fall within the prohibition.
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by charges of preferential treatment, overbilling, cost overruns, and waste.”114
Elsewhere, employees of Custer Battles, a company that was awarded two $16
million contracts by USAID to provide security for the Baghdad airport and
distribute Iraqi dinars, 115 reportedly chartered a flight to Beirut with $10
million in new Iraqi dinars in their luggage—which were promptly
confiscated by Lebanese officials.116 The company also set up sham Cayman
Islands subsidiaries to submit invoices, and regularly overcharged for
materials—in one case charging the United States $10 million for materials
that it purchased for $3.5 million.117 In short, corruption and fraud have been
rampant in the Iraqi contracts. Yet, legal oversight (and democratic
accountability) is limited because such contractors operate beyond many of
the transparency rules that would apply to government entities.118
Thus, widespread privatization potentially threatens a wide variety of
public law values.119 One response to this problem, of course, is to interpret
(or amend) the international law norms themselves either to remove any state
action requirement, or at any rate to construe such a requirement leniently.
Indeed, at least some of the conventional state-centered story of international
law that I have recounted has long been subject to challenge. For example, the
U.N.’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts aims to make clear that the “conduct of any State organ shall be
considered an act of that State under international law,” and that a person’s
conduct shall be attributed to the state if he or she is acting on the state’s

114. Warren Hoge, U.N. Criticizes Iraq Occupation Oil Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at
A21. In addition, the chief contracting officer for the Army Corps of Engineers has publicly accused the
Army of granting preferential treatment to KBR (through its parent company, Halliburton) in awarding
contracts in Iraq and Bosnia, in violation of U.S. contracting regulations. Erik Eckholm, A Top U.S.
Contracting Official for the Army Calls for an Inquiry in the Halliburton Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2004, at A13.
115. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4.
116. Id. at 1-2 (statement of Alan Grayson).
117. Id. at 2 (statement of Alan Grayson). These allegations resulted in a private enforcement
suit under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000). See Yochai J. Dreazen, Attorney
Pursues Iraq Contractor Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at B1 (discussing the suit). Indeed, in
March 2006 a jury ordered Custer Battles to return $10 million in ill-gotten funds to the government. See
id. Yet, though the district court judge in that case had permitted the suit to proceed, United States ex
rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), it is unclear whether the
verdict will ultimately hold up on appeal and whether such False Claims Act suits will be deemed
sustainable in this context.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 129-130. As noted in note 117, supra, it is unclear
whether or not the False Claims Act will ultimately provide an effective avenue for legal accountability.
119. To be sure, as I have argued elsewhere, these gaps may not be as significant as they first
appear. See Dickinson, supra note 20. To begin with, the baseline of accountability for state actors
performing foreign affairs functions is not that great. Such actors are not held accountable for violating
the norms that effectuate public law values that often. Thus, the shift to private actors does not represent
a dramatic decline in accountability—certainly not as great a decline as in the domestic setting, where
state actors are at least sometimes held accountable for failing to uphold public law values. This
comparison places the perils of privatization in perspective.
In addition, alternative avenues of legal accountability may exist under private law. As in
the domestic privatization context, immunities applicable to governmental employees arguably do not
apply, thereby opening up potential private law actions such as tort claims. Thus, in some ways private
contractors may face a greater risk of legal liability than governmental actors.
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instructions or under the state’s direction.120 Likewise, courts and tribunals
have at times applied principles of state responsibility for instrumentalities to
impute the liability of companies onto states. 121 And some courts have
suggested that certain international law norms, such as the laws of war, can be
used to hold non-state actors directly accountable, at least in some
circumstances. 122 Alternatively, non-state actors can be held liable under
theories of complicity or aiding and abetting.123 Thus, it would be wrong to
characterize international law as completely impotent with regard to private
contractors.124
Yet, though I am sympathetic to efforts to revise or interpret the norms
of public international law to apply to private contractors, I argue that such
efforts should not be the only response to privatization in the international
realm. Indeed, public international law norms are imperfectly enforced in the
best of circumstances, and any interpretational ambiguities with regard to
contractors only compounds the practical difficulties. Thus, those concerned
that public values may be lost in a privatized world would be well-advised to
look in other directions as well. And, as we will see, the contractual
relationship that creates the very structure of privatization may itself offer a
means of promoting and enforcing public law values, and it is to such avenues
of accountability that we now turn.
III. CONTRACT AS A TOOL TO EXTEND AND ENFORCE PUBLIC LAW VALUES
Contracts between governmental entities and the private organizations
providing services can themselves serve as vehicles to promote public law
values. Contractual terms can specify norms and structure the contractual
relationship in ways that spur contractors to implement those norms. Thus,
although typically conceived as the quintessential private law form, contracts
used in this way can be a tool to “publicize” the privatization relationship.125

120. See supra note 28; see also, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private
Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801 (2002).
121. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding Iran responsible for corporation over which it exercised control); Foremost Tehran, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228, 241-42 (1987) (holding the same); Maffezini
v. Kingdom of Spain (Rectification and Award), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Nov. 13, 2000, Jan. 31,
2001) (translation in English) (holding Spain responsible for the acts of its state entity); Case
Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 4,
39, P 58 (Feb. 5) (“[V]eil lifting . . . is admissible to play . . . a role in international law.”).
122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on the Defense Motion on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 61 (Aug. 10, 1995) (noting that war crimes include “crimes committed by any person ...
whether committed by combatants or civilians, including the nationals of neutral states”); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals”).
123. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005).
124. See generally, e.g., Chia Lehnardt, Private Military Companies and State Responsibility,
in MARKET FORCES: REGULATING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt
eds., forthcoming 2007) (describing ways in which international law holds states accountable for acts of
private military companies).
125. See Freeman, supra note 11.
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Administrative law scholars have recently explored this insight in the
domestic context. Most notably, Jody Freeman has suggested that states
“could require compliance with both procedural and substantive standards that
might otherwise be inapplicable or unenforceable against private
providers.” 126 Yet this work has focused on privatization of healthcare,
welfare, and prisons in the United States and has not considered privatization
of military, foreign aid, and diplomatic activities. Meanwhile, as noted
previously,127 few if any international law scholars, policymakers, or NGOs
have considered the possibilities of using contractual terms in the international
context. Accordingly, this Part seeks to bridge the gap between domestic
administrative law and international law scholarship by exploring a variety of
contractual mechanisms that might be used to extend public law values to
privatized foreign affairs.
Specifically, I discuss nine contracting practices that could be deployed
in the foreign affairs arena: (1) incorporating public law standards in
contractual terms; (2) requiring that private contractors receive training; (3)
enhancing contractual monitoring, both by internal governmental actors and
third parties; (4) requiring that contractors receive accreditation from
independent organizations; (5) laying out clear performance benchmarks; (6)
mandating contractor self-evaluation; (7) enhancing governmental termination
provisions and allowing for partial governmental takeover of contracts; (8)
allowing for beneficiary participation in contract design; and (9) strengthening
enforcement mechanisms, including greater whistleblower protections and
more opportunities for third-party beneficiary suits. In considering these
possibilities, I will use Iraq as a case study, examining all of the publicly
available contracts the U.S. government has negotiated to support the U.S.
military or to provide for foreign aid to Iraq. Nevertheless, these same
principles would apply to other types of contracts negotiated by states or
international organizations with contractors providing a variety of foreign
affairs functions.
The contractual mechanisms I discuss are particularly important in the
foreign affairs context because many of these contracts are negotiated in
secret, without competition, on a “no bid basis,” based on exceptions to the
normal requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 128 For
example, with respect to the U.S. government’s foreign affairs contracts in
Iraq, in many cases it is impossible for the public or a watchdog group even to
obtain the text of the contracts, either because government officials have kept
them secret for security reasons,129 or because the contractors have exercised
what is essentially a veto, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), for
certain types of commercial information.130 Problems posed by secrecy are
reinforced by problems of conflict of interest because many of the contracts

126. Freeman, supra note 18, at 634.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
128. See Megan A. Kinsey, Note, Transparency in Government Procurement: An International
Consensus?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 161-62 (2004).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(1) (2000).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(4) (2000).
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are awarded to firms run by former government personnel. A 2003 study by
the Center for Public Integrity reports that sixty percent of the companies that
received contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan “had employees or board members
who either served in or had close ties to the executive branch for Republican
and Democratic administrations, for members of Congress of both parties, or
at the highest levels of the military.”131 Thus, it is essential that, at the very
least, the contracts themselves incorporate public values.
A.

Incorporating Public Law Standards in Contractual Terms

First, of course, the contracts could explicitly require that the contractors
obey the norms that implement public law values. Specifically, the terms of
each agreement could provide that private contractors must abide by relevant
legal rules applicable to governmental actors. Such contractual terms would
obviate the need to show that the private actors were functioning as an
extension of government so as to satisfy any state action requirement that
might arise under domestic and international legal regimes. Instead, the norms
applicable to governmental actors would simply be part of the contractual
terms, enforceable like any other provisions, regardless of state action.
In the domestic setting, such provisions are commonplace. As a term in
their contracts with privately run prisons, for example, many states require
compliance with constitutional, federal, state, and private standards for prison
operation and inmates’ rights. 132 In addition, contractual agreements may
require contractors to provide for hearings and review of contractor actions.133
The U.S. government’s military and foreign aid contracts in Iraq, by
contrast, are woefully inadequate on this score. To be sure, a 2005 Department
of Defense (DOD) document providing general instructions regarding
contracting practices does state that contractors “shall abide by applicable
laws, regulations, DoD policy, and international agreements….”134 Yet, of the
sixty publicly available Iraq contracts, 135 none contains specific provisions
requiring contractors to obey human rights, anticorruption, or transparency

131. See CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, WINNING CONTRACTORS: U.S. CONTRACTORS REAP
WINDFALLS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION (2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/
wow/printer-friendly.aspx?aid=65 [hereinafter WINNING CONTRACTORS].
132. For example, under the model contract for private prison management drafted by the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, contractors must comply with constitutional, federal, state, and
private standards, including those established by the American Correctional Association. See Okla.
Dep’t of Corr., Correctional Services Contract, art. 1, available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us
/Private%20Prisons/98cnta.pdf [hereinafter Oklahoma Contract]. Other states’ contracts with companies
that manage private prisons contain similar provisions. See, e.g., Fla. Corr. Privatization Comm’n,
Correctional Services Contract with Corrections Corp. of America, § 5.1 [hereinafter Florida Contract];
Freeman, supra note 18, at 634 (citing Texas Department of Criminal Justice model contract); see also J.
Michael Keating, Jr., Public over Private: Monitoring the Performance of Privately Operated Prisons
and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 130, 138-41 (Douglas C. MacDonald ed.,
1990).
133. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 608 (discussing contractual hearing and oversight
mechanisms in the nursing home context).
134. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, No. 3020.41, § 6.1 (Oct. 3, 2005).
135. See Center for Public Integrity, Contracts and Reports, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
wow/resources.aspx?act=resources (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Contracts and Reports]
(providing text of contracts).
THE
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norms. The agreements between the U.S. government and CACI to supply
military interrogators starkly illustrate this point. The intelligence personnel
were hired pursuant to a standing “blanket purchase agreement” between the
Department of the Interior and CACI, negotiated in 2000.136 Under such an
agreement the procuring agency need not request specific services at the time
the agreement is made but rather may enter task orders as the need arises. In
2003, eleven task orders, worth $66.2 million were entered (none of which
was the result of competitive bidding).137 The orders specify only that CACI
would provide interrogation support and analysis work for the U.S. Army in
Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel, intelligence report writing, and
screening/interrogation of detainees at established holding areas.” 138
Significantly, the orders do not expressly require that the private contractor
interrogators comply with international human rights or humanitarian law
rules such as those contained in the Torture Convention or the Geneva
Conventions. Likewise, although the contractors are subject to international
and domestic laws prohibiting the bribery of government officials,139 as well
as the general terms of the FAR,140 none of the contracts specifically prohibits
the contractors themselves from accepting bribes, an area that remains
ambiguous in domestic and international law. Similarly, the contracts do not
provide terms specifying the applicability of FOIA, which would help make
contractor activities more transparent.
B.

Requiring that Private Contractors Receive Training

Foreign affairs contracts could also explicitly require that contractors
receive training in activities that would promote public law values. Such
training, as a contractual requirement, could help instill in contractor
employees a sense of the importance of these values. At the same time,
training could provide employees with concrete recommendations about how
to implement these values in specific, challenging situations.
Again, in the domestic setting such training provisions are
commonplace. A standard term in state agreements with companies that
manage private prisons, for example, requires companies to certify that the
training they provide to personnel is comparable to that offered to state
employees. 141 Such training would normally include instruction concerning
legal limits on the use of force and examples of what those limits mean in
circumstances likely to arise in the prison setting.

136. See Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and CACI Premier Technology,
Inc., No. NBCHA010005 (2000) [hereinafter DOI-CACI].
137. Work Orders Nos. 000035D004, 000036D004, 000037D004, 000038D0004,
000064D004, 000067D004, 000070D004, 000071D004, 000072D004, 000073D004, & 000080D004,
issued under DOI-CACI, supra note 136, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org
/wow/docs/CACI_ordersAll.pdf.
138. Work Order No. 000071/0001, supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., OECD Convention, supra note 113; False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
140. 48 C.F.R. §§ 2.000 (2006).
141. See, e.g., Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 6.4; Florida Contract, supra note 132, §
6.5; Freeman, supra note 18, at 634 (describing model contract for private prison management drafted
by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice).
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Yet, while the 2005 DOD instructions require documentation of training
concerning appropriate use of force, 142 none of the publicly available Iraq
contracts appears to require such training. Indeed, although a few of the
agreements require that contractors hire employees with a certain number of
years’ experience, 143 none specifies that the contractor must provide any
particular training at all. For example, the U.S. government’s agreement with
Chugach McKinley, Inc. to screen and hire a broad range of military support
personnel—from doctors to “special mission advisers”—says nothing about
whether such personnel will receive training in applicable international law
standards, even though such personnel may be in a position to commit
abuses. 144 The U.S. government’s agreements with CACI to provide
interrogators are likewise completely silent on whether interrogators will
receive education in international humanitarian and human rights law, training
that U.S. military interrogators would normally receive.145 Not surprisingly
then, an Army Inspector General report on the conditions that led to the Abu
Ghraib scandal concluded that 35% of CACI’s Iraqi interrogators did not even
have any “formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques,”
let alone training in international law norms.146 This omission is particularly
glaring given the highly volatile Iraqi environment.
Anti-corruption training would also be useful for foreign affairs
contractors generally, and for contracts in Iraq specifically. Iraq ranks among
the worst countries in the world on Transparency International’s corruption
index,147 and it is no surprise that such corruption reaches U.S. contractors
operating there. Indeed, one former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
official, Alan Grayson, has asserted that lack of employee screening and
training led to the shocking abuses committed by Custer Battles.148 Yet such
contracts say nothing about training for contractors in practices to avoid
corruption. And while training requirements undoubtedly would increase the
cost of the contracts, the fraud and waste that could be deterred with better
training might well offset such increases.

142. Dep’t of Defense Instruction, supra note 134, § 6.3.5.3.4.
143. See, e.g., Work Order No. 000071/0001, supra note 137 (statement of work) (requiring
that human intelligence advisor must have at least “10 years of experience” and must be “knowledgeable
of Army/Joint Interrogation procedures”). Notably, this work order does not require the contractor to
provide any training. See id.
144. See Agreement between USDOD and Chugach McKinley, Inc., Professional Skills, No.
DASW01-03-D-0025 (July 3, 2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/
ChugachMcKinley-Iraq.pdf.
145. Id.
146. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INSPECTOR GEN., DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 87-89 (2004),
available
at
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ArmyIGDetaineeAbuse/DAIG%20Detainee%20
Operations%20Inspection%20Report.pdf.
147. Out of 145 countries (with 145 as the worst), Iraq ranks 129th. TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PRACTICES INDEX 2004, available at http://www.transparency.org/
pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.20.cpi.en.html.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 115–118.
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Enhancing Contractual Monitoring, Both by Internal Governmental
Actors and by Third Parties

Provisions could also be made for increased contract monitoring, which
could provide an important check on abuses. Such monitoring should include,
to begin with, sufficient numbers of trained and experienced governmental
contract monitors. At the same time, governmental ombudspersons—leaders
of independent offices charged with providing enhanced oversight—serve as
an important supplement to the contract monitors. Thus, at a minimum, it is
essential that government agencies devote enough resources to ensure that
these requirements are implemented in a meaningful way. In addition, outside
independent non-governmental organizations, both for-profit and non-profit,
can serve an important function by monitoring contracts.
Contracts for services in the domestic context regularly include this
three-tiered monitoring structure: government personnel assigned as contract
monitors, supplemented by agency actors such as ombudspersons, further
supplemented by independent outside groups. In the privatized health care
context, for example, where private nursing homes receive Medicaid funding
and private hospitals receive Medicare and Medicaid support, the trend is
toward agreements that require a state-appointed contract manager.149 Federal
agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services (whose
Inspector General issues reports on contracts with private hospitals that
receive public funding 150 ) and the Health Care Financing Administration
(which exerts fairly tight control over private nursing homes receiving
Medicaid funding 151 ) also have significant oversight authority. In addition,
third-party independent organizations play an important role. For example, the
Joint Commission on Health Care and Accreditation of Health Organizations
(JCAHO), a private organization of professional associations, certifies health
care institutions for compliance with federal regulations and state licensure
laws.152
Foreign affairs contracts currently provide for far less monitoring. To be
sure, the statutory and regulatory scheme includes provisions for
governmental contract monitors, supplemented by inspectors general of the
respective agencies responsible for the contracts,153 as well as for auditing of

149. Freeman, supra note 18, at 608-09.
150. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE EXTERNAL
REVIEW OF HOSPITAL QUALITY: A CALL FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY 1-2 (1999), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00050.pdf; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE EXTERNAL REVIEW OF HOSPITAL QUALITY: THE ROLE OF
ACCREDITATION 6-7 (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gove/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00051.pdf
[hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ACCREDITATION] (detailing lack of accountability and quality
oversight in accredited hospitals).
151. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NURSING HOME COMPARE,
http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/Home.asp (last modified Sept. 1, 2005) (database includes
information on nursing homes certified by Medicare or Medicaid).
152. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government
Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 47, 52 (1994).
153. Inspector General oversight arises from the Inspector General (IG) Act, codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-12 (1994). “The IG Act authorized the creation of offices whose
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contracts by independent private accounting firms.154 Yet, the work of these
monitors focuses primarily on whether the contractors are keeping adequate
accounts and refraining from fraud and bribery. Contracts say little about
human rights norms, and governmental contract monitors and ombudspersons
are not ordinarily focused on these values when scrutinizing contractors.155 To
the extent that independent third-party groups are empowered to monitor
under the contract, they tend to be auditing firms, whose expertise lies in
financial matters, not in international human rights or humanitarian law.
Foreign affairs contracts rarely, if ever, provide for monitoring by independent
groups with expertise in this area.156
Moreover, in practice, foreign affairs contracts tend to escape even this
limited oversight. This is because many of the monitoring requirements tend
not to apply in emergency situations, which are, of course, precisely the
occasions when military intervention or humanitarian relief efforts and postreconstruction aid are most likely. Thus, ordinary contracting procedures, such
as competitive bidding, are often waived.157 In addition, many of the contracts
are written as cost reimbursement contracts, often termed “cost-plus”
agreements, under which the government reimburses the contractor for costs
incurred in providing a service, plus a fee that is calculated as a percentage of
the cost.158 Though often criticized as leading to waste and abuse,159 such
contracts become the norm in emergency situations, rather than the exception.
At the same time, too few contract monitors are appointed, those who are
mission is to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in their respective departments and agencies
across the executive branch.” Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector
General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2027 (1998). For an analysis of the role that inspectors general play
in various agencies, see id.
154. See USAID, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT 13 (2004), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/semiann/sarc0409.pdf.
155. After a scandal, however, such as the uproar surrounding revelations of abuse at Abu
Ghraib prison, ombudspersons may be enlisted to investigate such problems.
156. A model for this type of oversight might be the role that the International Committee on
the Red Cross (ICRC) currently plays in monitoring the conduct of governmental actors during armed
conflict. The Geneva Conventions require states parties to allow ICRC representatives to visit military
detention centers to ensure that detainees are treated in accord with the principles of international human
rights and humanitarian law. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 126,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 98, arts. 76, 143.
Yet, it is at best ambiguous whether the ICRC would be empowered to play a similar role with respect to
private security contractors. The contracts could make this role explicit.
157. In practice, one way these requirements are avoided is through the use of blanket purchase
order agreements, in which task orders can be issued under pre-existing contracts. See WINNING
CONTRACTORS, supra note 131, and accompanying text. For criticism of the lack of open bidding on the
Iraq contracts, see CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, REBUILDING IRAQ—THE CONTRACTORS,
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/rebuilding_iraq/index.asp. For an opposing view, see
Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, USAID’s Procurement Contracts: Insider’s View, 39 PROCUREMENT LAW
10 (2003).
158. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.301-16.307 (2006).
159. Under the cost-plus system, companies have an incentive to inflate the costs of services so
that their fee, typically measured as a percentage of this cost, is as high as possible, see Laura Peterson,
Outsourcing Government: Service Contracting Has Risen Dramatically in the Last Decade, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=68
[hereinafter Outsourcing Government], although such contracts do contain a cost ceiling that cannot be
exceeded without the contracting officer’s approval. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1 (2005). Under the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), these contracts can only be utilized when costs cannot be estimated with
sufficient accuracy. Id. § 16.301-2.
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appointed lack expertise, and ombudspersons are not given the resources they
need to do an effective job.
The monitoring of the Iraq contracts, or virtual lack thereof, provides a
salient example. The government agencies with responsibility for the
contracts—primarily USAID, the DOD, and the now dismantled Coalition
Provisional Authority—devoted extraordinarily minimal resources to
monitoring.160 For example, USAID has responsibility for approximately $3
billion in reconstruction projects, 161 but the agency had only four contract
monitoring personnel on the ground as of March 2003.162 In fact, due to the
difficulties of monitoring contracts with so little staff, USAID determined to
contract out the monitoring function itself! 163 Likewise, a recent DOD
Inspector General study concluded that more than half of the Iraq contracts
had not been adequately monitored.164 This fact is not surprising given that
DOD’s acquisition workforce was reduced by more than half between 1990
and 2001, while the department’s contracting workload increased by more
than twelve percent. 165 In addition, those who were assigned to monitor
contract performance were often inadequately trained.166 Finally, in an ironic
twist, private contractors themselves are often hired to write the procedural
rules governing contracting rules and monitoring protocols, thus leading to
further conflict-of-interest problems. Indeed, the DOD handbook on the
contracting process was drafted by one of its principal military contractors.167
The CPA was plagued with similar problems. A recent report notes that
the CPA hadn’t kept accounts for the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash
in its vault, had awarded contracts worth billions of dollars to American firms
without tender, and had no idea what was happening to the money from the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) which was being spent by the interim Iraqi
government ministries.168
One former CPA official has observed that, as a result of poor oversight,
“contracts were made that were mistakes, and were poorly, if at all, supervised
[and] money was spent that could have been saved, if we simply had the right
numbers of people.”169 For example, even devoting a single staff person to the
160. For a searing indictment of the government’s failure to oversee military contractors and
that failure’s role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, see Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu
Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 549 (2005).
161. See ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE, supra note 65.
162. See Shane Harris, AID Plans To Contract Out Oversight of Iraq Contracts,
GOVEXEC.COM, May 20, 2003, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0503/052003h1.htm.
163. See id.
164. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITIONS: CONTRACTS
AWARDED FOR THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BY THE DEFENSE CONTRACTING COMMANDWASHINGTON, REP. NO. D-2004-057, at 24 (2004).
165. COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOURCING AND ACQUISITION, REP.
NO. GAO-03-771R, at 1 (2003); see also Outsourcing Government, supra note 159. For a detailed
discussion of the depletion of the acquisition workforce, see David A. Whiteford, Negotiated
Procurements: Squandering the Benefit of the Bargain, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 509, 555-57 (2003).
166. Id.
167. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 123-24.
168. Ed Harriman, Where Has All the Money Gone?, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, July 7, 2005, at
4, 5.
169. SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 4.
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two $16 million Custer Battles contracts that gave rise to multiple instances of
fraud and abuse170 would have saved at least $4 million.171
Finally, the dispersal of authority to issue foreign affairs contracts across
multiple agencies creates interagency communication problems and conflicts
of interest that impede oversight. 172 For example, officials at different
agencies use different methods to calculate the costs of contracts, and these
methods may also vary from those used by the companies themselves.173 In
addition, because agencies can earn fees for facilitating other agencies’
contracts but are not adequately held to account for monitoring those
contracts, agencies have incentives to sponsor other agencies’ contracts but
little incentive to supervise them.174 These arrangements can lead to abuse, as
occurred in the case of the Department of the Interior sponsorship of DOD’s
task orders for intelligence services at Abu Ghraib prison under an existing
contract between CACI and the Interior Department.175
In short, the foreign affairs contracts could provide far better protections
for public law values through greater monitoring. Although the statutory and
regulatory regime contemplates a combination of supervision by contract
monitors, independent agency oversight through inspectors general, and
limited financial auditing by third-party entities, these provisions have not
worked well in practice due to insufficient staffing and resources, combined
with the large number of contracts. To be sure, statutory and regulatory
reforms could address these problems. But, alternatively, the contracts
themselves could remedy these deficiencies to some extent, by specifying
greater numbers of monitors and requiring that they possess a certain degree
of training, as well as by allowing for independent oversight by third-party
groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
D.

Laying Out Clear Performance Benchmarks

Of course, to some degree increased contract monitoring can only be
effective to the extent that the contracts have clear benchmarks against which
to measure compliance. In the domestic context, commentators and
policymakers have long urged that contracts include benchmarks, and rigorous
performance standards regularly appear in contracts.176 Scholars have argued
that, ideally, performance-based contracts should “clearly spell out the desired

170. See supra text accompanying notes 115-117
171. See generally SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 24 (statement of Franklin Willis). Of
course, the lack of oversight may have a more cynical explanation: it permits private contractors (who
may have powerful connections within government) to reap profits without significant constraints.
172. The DOD has taken more and more control over reconstruction and emergency relief
functions, normally the province of USAID. See Contracts and Reports, supra note 135. The State
Department, meanwhile, manages the contract with DynCorp to provide Iraqi police training. Id. And
the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) manages refugee
assistance funds.
173. WINNING CONTRACTORS, supra note 131.
174. Schooner, supra note 160, at 564-70
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., HARRY P. HATRY, URBAN INST., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: GETTING
RESULTS 3-10 (1999).
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end result” but leave the choice of method to the contractor, who should have
“as much freedom as possible in figuring out how to best meet government’s
performance objective.”177
These ideas have been implemented most notably in contracts with
private prisons. For example, under the model contract for private prison
management drafted by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, contractors
must meet such delineated standards for security, meals, and education. 178
They must also certify that the training provided to personnel is comparable to
that offered to state employees.179 In Texas, contractors must abide by similar
terms and, in addition, must “establish performance measures for
rehabilitative programs.” 180 In addition, the American Correctional
Association is revising its accreditation standards to include performance
measures, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is
developing performance-based standards for juvenile correctional facilities.181
Commentators have noted, further, that performance measures for private
prison operators could include both
process measures such as the number of educational or vocational programs, or outcome
measures such as the Logan quality of confinement index, the number of assaults, or the
recidivism rate. . . . Because no single statistic adequately captures ‘quality,’ and because
focusing on any single measure could have perverse effects, performance-based contracts
should tie compensation to a large and rich set of variables.182

Privatized welfare programs have also experimented with performance
measures as a means to improve quality. In 1996, Congress authorized the
implementation of welfare programs “through contracts with charitable,
religious, or private organizations.” 183 Since then, states have increasingly
contracted with such organizations, 184 and many of these contracts contain
performance benchmarks and output requirements. 185 For example, under a
performance-based system, a welfare contractor might receive financial

177. WILLIAM D. EGGERS, PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTRACTING: DESIGNING STATE-OF-THEART CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND MONITORING SYSTEMS 2 (1997).
178. See, e.g., Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 5.
179. Id. §§ 6.3-6.4.
180. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 634-35 (describing contract between private corporation
and state of Texas).
181. See Performance Standards Home: Performance-Based Standards for Juvenile Correction
and Detention Facilities, http://www.pbstandards.org; see also 1 Geoffrey F. Segal & Adrian T. Moore,
Weighing the Watchmen: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Outsourcing Correctional Services 15-16
(Policy Study 290, 2002).
182. A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1868, 1889-90 (2002) [hereinafter Tale of Two Systems].
183. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
184. See Winston, supra note 4.
185. See M. BRYNA SANGER, THE WELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND WELFARE
REFORM 28-48 (2003) (discussing issues raised by performance contracting for welfare services);
Sheena McConnell et al., Privatization in Practice: Case Studies of Contracting for TANF Case
Management 39-51 (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Reference No. 8834-008, 2003), available at
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/privatize.pdf (discussing use of performance measures in
welfare contracts).
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rewards for increasing the percentage of program participants who receive job
placements.186
The foreign affairs contracts are notably less rigorous in providing for
performance measures. Although military service contracts are difficult to
evaluate because so many of them are not publicly available, contract officers
familiar with the contracts have remarked on their generally vague terms.187
And the fact that they are often indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ)
contracts adds to their open-ended quality. 188 Under this structure, the
government awards a contract that does not specify how many services or
goods will be necessary or the dates upon which they will be required. 189
These additional details are specified in subsequent task orders, which
themselves are often vague because the task orders need not pass though the
same degree of supervision as the initial contract award.190 Of course, such
contracts may sometimes be necessary, because the government cannot know
in advance precisely what will be required or for how long.191 Yet the lack of
any administrable standards in these contracts can lead to significant
abuses.192
Of the publicly available Iraq contracts for military services, it is striking
that none contains clear benchmarks or output requirements. Instead, they are
phrased in amorphous language that provides little opportunity for compliance
evaluation. For example, a contract between the U.S. government and MPRI
to provide translators for government personnel, including interrogators,
simply provides that the contractors will supply interpreters.193 The agreement
says nothing about whether the interpreters must be effective or how
effectiveness might be measured. 194 Similarly, the CACI task orders for
interrogators specify only that CACI will provide interrogation support and
analysis work for the U.S. Army in Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel,
intelligence report writing, and screening/interrogation of detainees at
established holding areas.”195 Other than these broad goals, the task orders say
little more. To be sure, security concerns may require some degree of
vagueness. Nonetheless, the task orders could be much more specific about
training requirements, standards of conduct, supervision, and performance
parameters.
Turning to the foreign aid context, agencies tend to promote the use of
results-based agreements, under which contractors must demonstrate specific,

186. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1387-88.
187. See, e.g., SDPC Hearing, supra note 91, at 3-4 (prepared statement of Franklin Willis).
188. For example, the CACI agreement was an ID/IQ contract. Cf. Schooner, supra note 160, at
569 (using the “Abu Ghraib experience” as an illustration of the dangers of ID/IQ contracts).
189. ID/IQ contracts are governed by 48 C.F.R. § 16.500-6 (2005). For a discussion of ID/IQ
contracts, see Karen DaPonte Thornton, Fine-Tuning Acquisition Reform’s Favorite Procurement
Vehicle, the Indefinite Delivery Contract, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 383 (2002).
190. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.504 (2005); see also Schooner, supra note 160, at 565.
191. See Thornton, supra note 189, at 387.
192. See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 160, at 563.
193. Agreement Between DOD and MPRI, Iraq Interpretors, No. GS-23F-9814H (Apr. 28,
2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/MPRI_Linguists.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Work Order No. 000071D004, supra note 137, at 6.
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tangible results that are to be evaluated by the agency.196 Yet in practice many
such agreements do not actually contain any results-based requirements, often
because the aid, particularly in emergency relief settings, is provided on an
expedited basis to organizations with very small staffs. With regard to Iraq,
for example, a review of the publicly available USAID agreements reveals
that only a few set forth specific performance benchmarks or requirements.197
To be sure, performance benchmarks that are too strict can pose
problems. As scholars of domestic privatization have noted, discretion can
serve useful goals; indeed, discretion is in part what makes privatization
desirable, as private contractors have more flexibility than rulebound
bureaucratic actors to pursue innovative approaches.198 Output requirements
that preserve flexibility about the means to achieve those results are therefore
the most effective.199 But even carefully tailored output requirements can go
awry, as when, for example, private welfare providers “cream” those accepted
into their programs in order to increase the percentage of those who receive
job placements. 200 Moreover, output requirements can sometimes give
contractors tunnel vision, leading them to focus only on the benchmarks,
thereby missing opportunities to achieve wider benefits. A recent study of the
enhanced “auditing” that accompanied privatization in Thatcherite Britain, for
example, suggests that narrow output requirements steered organizations and
individuals away from broader, more diffuse, social goals.201

196. See, e.g., Judith Tendler, Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development
Agencies: Questions for Evaluation (127.49 AIG Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 12, 1982)
(making recommendations regarding USAID’s evaluation process for contracted projects).
197. See Agreement Between USAID and Bechtel National, Inc., Iraq Infrastructure
Reconstruction—Phase II, No. SPU-C-00-04-00001-00 (Jan. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/iirii.html; Agreement Between USAID and Bearing Point Inc.,
Economic Recovery, Reform, and Sustained Growth, No. RAN-C-00-03-00043-00 (July 25, 2003),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/errsgi.html; Agreement Between USAID and Skylink
Air and Logistic Support (USA), Inc., Airport Administration, No. DFD-C-00-03-00026-00 (May 5,
2003), available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/aa.html; Agreement Between USAID and Abt
Associates, Inc., Public Health, No. RAN-C-00-03-0001-00 (Apr. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/ph.html; Agreement Between USAID and Bechtel, Inc., Capital
Construction,
No.
EEE-C-00-03-00018-00
(Apr.
17,
2003),
available
at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/cc.html; Agreement Between USAID and Creative Associates
International, Inc., Primary and Secondary Education, No. EDG-C-00-03-00011-00 (Apr. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pse.html; Agreement Between USAID and Research
Triangle Institute, Local Governance, No. EDG-C-00-03-00010-00 (Apr. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/lg.html.
198. See, e.g., Nestor Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare:
The Case of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=887398 (arguing for a “relational” approach to
contracting that “shifts the locus of efficiency and accountability efforts from contractual specificity and
enforcement to encouraging flexibility and fostering mutual responsibility for program goals”); Metzger,
supra note 7, at 1388 (“[T]he operational flexibility of private providers can make them better able to
improve staff performance and tailor their programs to meet the needs of particular participants of
employers.”); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1262 (2003) (“Rigid standards could force private providers to behave like
government and lose their potential for innovation, efficiency, and flexibility.”).
199. See EGGERS, supra note 177, at 2.
200. See Sanger, supra note 185, at 21-22, 42-43, 68-69, 104-06.
201. See generally MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1999).
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In addition, by their very nature, results-based contracts raise difficult
questions about how best to measure output. Creating benchmarks may be
relatively straight-forward if the project at issue involves simply building a
bridge or dam, but it is very difficult to measure intangibles, such as fostering
human development or building civil society.202 Likewise, short-term results,
such as whether food aid was delivered, are much easier to measure than
longer-term systemic efforts to alleviate poverty, provide education, and so
on. As a consequence, results-based contracts tend to put more emphasis on
short-term delivery of services rather than longer-term impact. 203 Finally,
contractual output requirements do not, of course, necessarily ensure
compliance because contractors may simply fail to meet their goals. In
addition, even the most detailed performance requirements and standards
inevitably leave considerable discretion to the contractor.204
Nonetheless, despite problems with overly rigid performance
benchmarks, the foreign affairs contracts (at least those that are publicly
available) appear to fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Indeed, they
possess so few benchmarks and output requirements that they contain no
meaningful evaluative criteria whatsoever. In such circumstances, enhanced
performance benchmarks could be a useful contractual tool.
E.

Requiring that Contractors Receive Accreditation from Independent
Organizations

Another contract-based tool for promoting public law values is
accreditation. Independent organizations, often consisting of experts or
professionals in the field, can evaluate and rate private contractors. These
ratings can then be used in the contracting process because agreements can
require that contractors receive certain rankings. Or, governmental entities or
international institutions, such as the United Nations, could develop
accreditation regimes.
Again, the domestic context offers a particularly rich set of examples
that could provide useful lessons in the foreign affairs setting. For example, in
the field of publicly funded, privately provided health care, JCAHO accredits
hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding. Indeed, such
accreditation is required by statute as well as by contract.205 State laws or
contractual terms also often specify that health maintenance organizations
must receive accreditation by the National Committee for Quality Assurance
(NCQA), an independent non-profit organization, before receiving public
funding. 206 Until recently, NCQA certification was primarily voluntary,

202. See Smillie, supra note 16, at 10.
203. Id. at 10-11.
204. See, e.g., supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing important benefits of
discretion).
205. See Kinney, supra note 152, at 52.
206. Although NCQA’s accreditation program is voluntary, almost half the HMOs in the
nation, covering three quarters of all HMO enrollees, are currently involved in the NCQA Accreditation
process. Significantly, employers increasingly require or request NCQA accreditation of the plans with
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offering health maintenance organizations an advantage when competing for
lucrative health care delivery contracts. When states became managed care
purchasers, however, they adopted NCQA as a benchmark of quality.207
Similarly, many contracts with private prison operators require
companies to receive accreditation by the American Correctional Association
(ACA).208 An organization of correctional professionals that has existed for
over a century, the ACA accredits prisons and provides training for prison
personnel while also setting standards that apply to virtually every aspect of
prison operation. 209 Not only has ACA accreditation become a standard
contract requirement, 210 but federal courts have used ACA standards to
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.211 Even private investors look
to accreditation as an indication of quality. 212 Thus, the accreditation
requirement creates significant compliance incentives.
Privatized education regimes such as charter schools have also
considered accreditation by independent organizations as a means of ensuring
quality. 213 The focus of many independent organizations on facilities and
administrative processes over underlying educational quality has led some
critics to charge that educational accreditation is relatively ineffective. 214
Nonetheless, commentators have advocated improved accreditation
procedures and greater use of such accreditation to promote public law
values.215
Indeed, domestic administrative law scholars have noted that these
independent, private accrediting entities are effectively setting the standards
that give meaning to public law values.216 In that regard, the relative insularity
which they do business. See National Comm. for Quality Assurance, NCQA: Overview,
http://www.ncqa.org/Communications/Publications/overviewncqa.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
207. Freeman, supra note 18, at 618-19; see also J. Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, The
Corrections-Commercial Complex, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 150, 156-57 (1993).
208. See, e.g., Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132; Freeman, supra note 18, at 634 (describing
model contract for private prison management drafted by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice that
contains such a requirement).
209. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 628-29. Freeman notes that, “throughout its history, the
ACA has fostered professionalism in prison administration through the development of standards and
promoted progressive reforms such as rehabilitation.” Id.
210. See, e.g., Florida Contract, supra note 132, § 5.21 (requiring prison to maintain
accreditation); Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 5.2.
211. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 162-64 (1998).
212. Freeman, supra note 18, at 629.
213. See Isabel V. Sawhill & Shannon L. Smith, Vouchers for Elementary and Secondary
Education, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 263 (C. Eugene Steuerle et. al. eds.,
2000).
214. See Accreditation: What Does It Mean?, PARENT POWER!, Dec. 2000, at 2-3, available at
http://www.edreform.com/_upload/00dec.pdf#ppArt75.
215. Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. Kuboyama, Approving Charter Schools: The GateKeeper Function, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 937 (2001).
216. As Freeman observes, in the prison context, “the ACA, rather than government agencies,
may effectively establish correctional standards.” Freeman, supra note 18, at 629. Other private
organizations—such as the American Medical Association, the National Sheriffs’ Association, the
American Public Health Association, and the National Fire Protection Association, all of which have
published guidelines or standards governing “such things as medical care, sanitation, and safety in
prisons”—play a similar role. Id. In the health care context, the Joint Commission on Healthcare and
Accreditation also develops industry standards, through “a committee that includes representatives of
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of the standard-setting and accreditation process may undermine the ability of
broader groups, including consumers and the public at large, to participate in
the process.217 There is also the concern that private accreditors in some cases
might be too close to the contractors, and therefore too lenient. 218
Nevertheless, even critics agree that the standards are often much better than
those that would be developed by agency bureaucrats, and despite the
imperfections, accreditation has served as an important check on the
contracting process.219
In contrast, accreditation is glaringly absent in the foreign affairs
context.220 Human rights organizations, governments, and the United Nations
have begun to encourage corporations, particularly those in the extraction
industries, to comply with voluntary labor, environmental, and human rights
standards. 221 A consortium of NGOs that deliver humanitarian relief have
initiated the SPHERE project, which is an effort to set standards for the
provision of humanitarian aid, including specific guidelines for field
operations, training, and self evaluation. 222 And an industry-founded
association of private security companies, the International Peace Officers
Association (IPOA), has begun to construct a comprehensive code of conduct
that includes human rights standards.223 Nevertheless, neither the U.N., nor
domestic governments, nor outside groups concerned with potential abuses by
foreign affairs contractors have so far undertaken serious efforts either to
harness these nascent accreditation initiatives or to promote other
accreditation projects.
This failure is particularly striking in the Iraq context. Not one of the
available contracts for aid or military services requires that the entities
professional and industry groups, as well as government representatives from” the Health Care
Financing Administration. Id. at 610-12.
217. Id. at 612-13; see also Kinney, supra note 152, at 65.
218. Because ACA officials are generally chosen from the ranks of experienced corrections
officials, for example, “personal and professional relationships between ACA overseers and prison
management are not uncommon, creating a common sympathy and sense of purpose that tells against
both more meaningful standards and more rigorous enforcement.” Dolovich, supra note 7, at 492.
Moreover, Dolovich argues that because the institutions pay for accreditation, thereby “providing
income on which the ACA is dependent for its survival . . . .a degree of capture is likely.” Id. (citation
omitted).
219. Id. at 490-491 (acknowledging benefits of ACA accreditation of prisons); Kinney, supra
note 152, at 65 (acknowledging benefits of JCAHO accreditation of hospitals).
220. To be sure, the Federal Acquisition Regulation does require the evaluation of all contracts
in excess of $1,000,000, 48 C.F.R. § 42.1502 (2006), and also requires contract officers to take into
account the past performance of contractors in all competitively negotiated acquisitions expected to
exceed $1,000,000. 48 C.F.R. § 15.304(c)(3) (2006). Thus, in theory, an internal “blacklist” of rogue
contractors could be created to guard against repeat abuses. But such an internal system hardly
substitutes for independent accreditation.
221. See, e.g., U.N. Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGC/index.html
(May 17, 2005) (program, launched by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to encourage corporations
to agree voluntarily to respect nine principles, including the protection of human rights and the
environment); David Stout, Oil and Mining Leaders Agree To Protect Rights in Remote Areas, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at A9 (describing agreement among oil and mining companies, the British and
U.S. governments, and human rights organizations, providing that companies will voluntarily comply
with human rights standards).
222. See THE SPHERE PROJECT, HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND MINIMUM STANDARDS IN
DISASTER RESPONSE (2004), available at http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/hdbkpdf/hdbk_hc.pdf
[hereinafter SPHERE CHARTER].
223. See IPOA Code of Conduct, http://www.ipoaonline.org/conduct/ (Mar. 31, 2005).

416

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31: 383

receiving the contracts be vetted or accredited by independent organizations.
For example, unlike domestic prison contracts, which routinely require
accreditation by ACA and compliance with a comprehensive set of standards,
the contracts with CACI to provide interrogators at Abu Ghraib contain only
the most basic guidelines and make no mention of human rights compliance or
accreditation requirements.224 The contract between the U.S. government and
Dyncorp to provide law enforcement advisers to train Iraqi police similarly
contains no provision mandating that Dyncorp be accredited,225 even though
Dyncorp employees were implicated in sex abuse when performing under a
similar contract in Bosnia.226 Likewise, although contracts could require that
humanitarian aid organizations agree to the SPHERE guidelines in order to
receive contracts, no such requirement has been imposed.227
Yet, such accreditation would seem to be particularly important in the
foreign affairs area, where, as discussed previously, security concerns and
special considerations often eliminate competition in the contracting process,
resulting in contracts that are structured without the usual market controls.
Significantly, the problem is not only that international organizations and
domestic governments neglect to require accreditation in their contracts, but
also that NGOs and other independent groups have not sought a robust
accreditation role. After all, more NGOs could, like the SPHERE Project’s
efforts in humanitarian aid, begin to rate military contractors independently,
regardless of whether the government contracts require such accreditation.
These ratings might then become an industry standard that the government
could be persuaded to use as a contracting factor. This is what occurred with
NCQA in the domestic health care context. And, even if agency officials
negotiating contracts choose not to impose accreditation requirements, the
ratings could serve as a point of pressure in Congress and the public at large.
Thus, NGOs should spend at least as much energy developing accreditation
regimes as they do pursuing transnational litigation under various formal
international law instruments. International organizations could also seek to
create accreditation regimes. Such accreditation would likely be influential
over time, even if states at first formally refuse to implement accreditation
requirements into their contracts.
F.

Mandating Contractor Self-Evaluation

Contractors could also be required to perform self-evaluations as a way
of enhancing accountability. Presented with an internal self-evaluation, an
outside monitor, whether governmental or third-party, can often scrutinize the

224. See Work Orders, supra note 137.
225. See Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of State and Dyncorp, Iraq Law Enforcement, No.
SLMAQM-03-C-0028 (Apr. 18, 2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow
/DynCorp.pdf.
226. See Yeoman, supra note 84, at A19.
227. See SPHERE CHARTER, supra note 222. Although SPHERE itself is a project of the notfor-profit sector, see http://www.sphereproject.org (listing representatives of not-for-profits and
governments as board members), nothing prevents contracting agencies from requiring for-profit entities
as well to follow SPHERE guidelines in fulfilling contracts.
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contractor’s performance more quickly and efficiently. Of course, selfevaluation gives the contractor discretion to massage the data and indeed can
be subject to outright manipulation and abuse.228 But nonetheless, it can be a
useful starting point for outside monitors, who can at least at the outset make a
faster assessment as to whether the contractor has met the contract goals. In
addition, self-evaluation can encourage more effective internal policing by the
contractor.
Due to these potential benefits, self-evaluation has emerged as a frequent
tool in the domestic context. In the world of private prisons, for example,
contractors regularly are subjected to self-evaluation requirements. In Texas,
prison contractors must “establish performance measures for rehabilitative
programs and develop a system to assess achievement and outcomes.” 229
Likewise in the field of health care, a health maintenance organization must, if
it is to receive accreditation, conduct continuous “quality improvement,” in an
Contracts that require
ongoing internal self-evaluation process. 230
accreditation thus effectively mandate such self-evaluation.
In the foreign affairs context, private foreign aid providers operating
under agreement with USAID are regularly required to perform selfevaluation, but foreign aid contracts provided through other agencies and
military contracts seem to be devoid of such provisions. Again, taking the
publicly available Iraq contracts as an example, none requires the private
contractor to file self-evaluation reports, develop internal assessment
practices, or otherwise engage in self-evaluation.231 And while self-evaluation
on its own is unlikely to significantly improve contract compliance, such selfevaluation can be useful in combination with some or all of the other
contractual provisions discussed in this Article.
G.

Enhancing Governmental Termination Provisions and Allowing for
Partial Governmental Takeover of Contracts

Contracts could also include terms allowing the relevant government (or
international organization) to take over the contract by degrees before
ultimately terminating the agreement for failure to observe provisions
implementing public law values. Currently, most contracts have implied or
explicit provisions allowing only for outright termination for noncompliance.
On its face this sort of termination provision seems as if it would provide a
strong incentive for contractor compliance. In actual practice, however,
outright termination is such an extreme measure that governments are often
reluctant to invoke it, and because contractors know that termination is so
unlikely, the provisions have almost no disciplining effect.

228. See id.
229. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 634-35 (describing contract between private corporation
and the Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice).
230. See, e.g., NCQA, What Does NCQA Review When It Accredits an HMO?,
http://www.ncqa.org/Programs/Accreditation/mco/mcostdsoverview.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
231. See Contracts and Reports, supra note 135.
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Thus, it would be better if such termination provisions were
supplemented with more graduated penalties, such as provisions permitting
the partial governmental takeover of contracts. Because graduated penalties
are less extreme than outright termination, they are far more likely actually to
be invoked by contract monitors, making them a more effective enforcement
mechanism than the harsher (though rarely invoked) termination provisions.
Moreover, if partial takeover fails to stem the abuses, outright termination still
remains a penalty of last resort. In the domestic context, states are increasingly
turning to mechanisms such as graduated penalties, for example, to increase
oversight of private nursing homes receiving public funding.232 Scholars and
practitioners have also called for the use of such penalties in the private prison
setting.233
Turning to foreign affairs, while contracts subject to the FAR do contain
termination provisions, they are rarely exercised and are not supplemented by
lesser, graduated penalties. As a result, the government has little leverage over
contractors. The Iraq contracts provide a notable demonstration of this
problem. When CACI employees were implicated in abuses at Abu Ghraib
prison, for example, the U.S. government did not terminate its contract.
Indeed, although the particular employees implicated in the abuse charges no
longer work at CACI, 234 it is unclear whether government actors even so
much as stepped up their supervision of the contracts. To the contrary, CACI
actually received a contract extension for interrogation services.235
Obviously, governments (and international organizations) should be
encouraged to invoke termination provisions when contractors fall short. But
even without full termination of the contractors, graduated government (or
international organization) takeover could provide an added incentive for
contractors to promote public law values.
H.

Allowing for Beneficiary Participation or Broader Public Involvement in
Contract Design

Contracts could also permit beneficiaries or the broader public to help
shape contract terms and evaluate performance. In the domestic context,
commentators have suggested that such beneficiary participation or
involvement by the broader public could greatly enhance the extent to which
contractors fulfill public law values. 236 Indeed, as Fred Aman has argued,
precisely because privatization contracts are difficult to terminate and

232. Freeman, supra note 18, at 608.
233. Tale of Two Systems, supra note 182, at 1888; see also Alphonse Gerhardstein, Private
Prison Litigation: The “Youngstown” Case and Theories of Liability, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 183, 198
(2000).
234. See CACI, CACI in Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.caci.com/
iraq_faqs.shtml (last visited May 21, 2005) [hereinafter CACI in Iraq]; News Release, CACI, CACI
Says the Fay Report Clearly Shifts Focus of Blame Away From Its Employee Named in a Previous
Report (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.caci.com/about/news/news2004/08_26_04_NR.html.
235. See CACI in Iraq, supra note 234.
236. Jody Freeman, for example, has suggested that, in order to protect public law values,
“perhaps interested individuals, or representative groups should be entitled to participate in contract
negotiation.” Freeman, supra note 18, at 668.
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sometimes become “immutable,” it is “important that the participation of the
public and the public’s representatives be maximized as early in the process as
possible.”237 He thus advocates allowing the broader public to play a role in
the design of the contracts themselves.238
Some state and local governments have begun to do so. For example,
Wisconsin’s contracts with managed care organizations to provide health care
to Medicare and Medicaid recipients include provisions for participation by
community groups.239 Other states have gone even further and now require
broad public involvement in virtually all privatization decisions. In Montana,
for example, any privatization decision must be made subject to a plan
available to the public and open to public comment. 240 Other states have
similar provisions.241
Foreign affairs contracts might benefit from this approach. Indeed, such
participation may be particularly important to promote public law values
because the ordinary democratic process open to those experiencing the
effects of privatization in the domestic context is essentially unavailable for
non-citizens outside the United States who are affected by the activities of
contractors. To be sure, even in the domestic context, there has long been a
worry that privatization removes a crucial democratic check on government.
The link between those affected by government action and the government
actors is attenuated when that activity is farmed out first from legislatures to
agencies, and then from agencies to private contractors. Scholars and policymakers worry that this form of delegation reduces transparency, which in turn
reduces the ability of those affected to vote their preferences when things are
not going well. 242 But when governments turn to private contractors to
perform foreign affairs functions, the problem is increased exponentially
because many of the people affected by the contracts in question do not
belong to the U.S. democratic polity or indeed any democratic polity at all.
Moreover, U.S. citizens may be less inclined to use the democratic process to
voice their views when the effects of contracting are felt mainly overseas.
While it may make less sense to allow involvement of those non-citizens
affected by military contractors overseas, due to obvious security concerns,
beneficiary involvement or broader public participation in the design and
evaluation of foreign aid contracts might be particularly useful. Governments
providing long-term development aid through private organizations have to
some degree already begun to adopt this approach. In the United States,

237. AMAN, supra note 33, at 155.
238. See id. at 155-56 (critiquing a number of state privatization statutes for failing to provide
adequate provisions for public participation in the design of contracts).
239. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 624-25.
240. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-8-302 (2005).
241. For a discussion of such provisions, see AMAN, supra note 33, at 154-56.
242. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 72 (2002)
(“This layer of agencies creates obvious problems for theories of democracy that emphasize the ability
of citizens to influence their government through participatory action or deliberative process.”). But see
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1542 (1992) (arguing that agencies, because they fall between the extremes of a “politically overresponsive Congress and the over-insulated courts,” may be best situated to institute a civic republican
model of policymaking).
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USAID has allowed local beneficiaries and NGOs to help design development
aid agreements, usually on an informal basis, and most frequently when such
agreements are negotiated through field offices. 243 Agencies other than
USAID, however, are less likely to engage in such consultation. 244
Humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction assistance are also less
likely to incorporate such an approach, though recently the UNHCR has
begun to explore the possibility of refugee and internally displaced person
evaluation of humanitarian aid.245
I must leave to a future article a more detailed discussion of how best to
maximize opportunities for those affected by a foreign aid project to
participate in the design of that project.246 Certainly, the idea raises a whole
host of practical problems. For example, it will be difficult to determine who
exactly can speak for an affected population. Is NGO participation sufficient?
How does one determine which civil society actors are most representative?
What if different sectors of the population disagree as to the efficacy of a
proposed project? Even assuming one determines the appropriate voices, what
form should the feedback take? Is informal consultation enough? Or should
there be a more formal notice and comment period? Or is it necessary to
establish an independent tribunal with the power to quash the project
altogether? And should such a tribunal be governmental or private? While
these questions certainly must be addressed, it seems to me that if we are
asking them, we will have already advanced the debate quite a bit. The
important point for now is that we must at the very least begin to explore ways
of involving in the contracting process itself those affected by foreign affairs
agreements. Explicit contractual requirements would go a long way toward
facilitating consultation with beneficiary populations, thereby effectuating
through contract a broader form of public participation.
I.

Strengthening Enforcement Mechanisms

Finally, the contracts could provide for enhanced enforcement
mechanisms. They could, for example, give beneficiaries the opportunity for
privatized administrative hearings. Additionally, contracts might include
third-party beneficiary suit provisions, empowering contract beneficiaries or
other interested parties to sue in domestic courts for breach of contract. And
whistleblower protections might be enhanced. All of these measures would
likely increase compliance with contractual terms.
In the domestic context, governments and policymakers have begun to
implement such measures, though private grievance procedures remain more
prevalent than broader third-party beneficiary suit provisions and

243. See generally Tania Kaiser, Participation or Consultation? Reflections on a ‘Beneficiary
Based’ Evaluation of UNHCR’s Programme for Sierra Leonean and Liberian Refugees in Guinea, JuneJuly 2000, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 185, 186 (2004) (discussing ways to facilitate measuring the impact of
aid programs).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Laura Dickinson, Privatization and Public Participation in Foreign Affairs (2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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whistleblower protections. Commentators regularly call for an expansion of
third-party beneficiary suit provisions 247 (which courts generally refuse to
imply unless clearly specified in the contract),248 but such provisions remain
rare. Many private contractors providing aid, however, do offer individual
complaint mechanisms for affected beneficiaries. 249 Although these aid
providers are not state actors and would therefore generally be immune from
constitutional review, such contractual provisions do allow for notice and
opportunity to be heard, thereby incorporating elements of constitutional due
process. These private grievance systems are perhaps most evident in
contracts with private prison operators, which typically require such
mechanisms.250 But they appear in other contexts as well, such as health care.
For example, the Medicare statute requires that health maintenance
organizations receiving federal funding to cover their treatment of Medicare
beneficiaries must “provide meaningful procedures for hearing and resolving
grievances between the organization . . . and members enrolled.”251
Governments might experiment with similar measures in the foreign
affairs arena.252 The World Bank has taken steps in this direction, by enabling
aid beneficiaries to bring grievances before special tribunals challenging gross
abuses.253 Third-party beneficiary suit provisions, however, are virtually nonexistent, and none of the Iraq contracts contains such a provision.
Whistleblower protections should also be enhanced. Government officials
currently receive whistleblower protection for reporting abuses in the
negotiation or management of contracts, but employees of private companies
are not protected under the general Whistleblower Protection Act. 254 In
specific statutes, however, Congress has at times extended whistleblower
protection to private employees. For example, seven of the major federal

247. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 11, at 1317.
248. For example, section 313(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides “[A]
promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do an act for or render a service
to the public is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages
resulting from performance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the promise provide for such
liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the damages and a
direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with the policy of the
law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 313(2) (1981). For further discussion of third-party beneficiary suits involving
government contracts, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358,
1406-12 (1992).
249. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1494.
250. For examples of contracts with private operators that require grievance procedures, see
Florida Contract, supra note 132, § 5.24; Oklahoma Contract, supra note 132, § 5.15; Freeman, supra
note 18 (describing Texas Contract).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5)(A) (2000).
252. Such experiments might focus, at least initially, on those contracts deemed most
vulnerable to serious abuses.
253. See Lori Udall, The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything Changed?, in
THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 391,
392-93 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1989). While it is true that such employees could bring a qui tam action
for fraud, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), (c), (d), (h) (2000), such a suit would do nothing to protect the
employee from being fired.
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environmental statutes contain such whistleblower clauses. 255 Thus,
whistleblower protection could also be extended to private sector employees
working for a government contractor, who provide information concerning the
unlawful performance of a contract. Such a provision, combined with the
availability of third-party beneficiary suits, or possibly even qui tam
actions,256 would go a long way towards making sure that any contract-based
efforts to provide accountability will have back-end enforcement to encourage
compliance.
As discussed previously, enforcing international law norms through
contract, rather than directly in an international forum, obviates any need to
argue that the contractor should be deemed a state actor. In addition, because
international law enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak compared to
their domestic counterparts, a contractual approach is far more likely to lead
to meaningful judicial review. In addition, requiring domestic judges to
enforce international public law values embodied in contracts may have
important norm internalization effects because such judges would essentially
be enforcing international law norms. 257 This increased familiarity with
international law principles might lead to less resistance to those norms as a
general matter, thereby effectively expanding the reach of international law.
On the other hand, one might argue that localizing the enforcement of
international law norms might either cause international enforcement
mechanisms to atrophy from disuse or lead to heterogeneity in different
countries’ understandings of the principles, which could undermine the notion
of a common international law. Neither objection, however, should create
serious hesitation about pursuing contractual accountability. First, as
previously discussed, international law enforcement mechanisms are already
weak, and to the extent that they have been effective, at least in the human
rights context, it has been by selectively limiting the scope of enforcement to
the very most egregious human rights violators. Thus, it is not at all clear that
providing a possibly effective domestic avenue for pursuing claims against
private actors (who would have been unlikely to face prosecution
internationally in any event) will in any meaningful way undermine
international law institutions. Second, to the extent that domestic judicial
systems, government officials, and broader populations internalize
international law norms, it strikes me that the benefits of such norm
internalization far outweigh any possible concern about maintaining the
“purity” of the international norm. Local variation is to be expected, of course,

255. See Toxic Substance Control Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 2, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 §
312, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act
of 1980 § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2000);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000) (amended 1978, 1992).
256. See supra note 117 (describing such an action against Custer Battles, LLC, an Iraq
contractor).
257. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996)
(arguing that international law is often enforced through the domestic internalization of international law
norms).
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but such hetereogeneity in the domestic incorporation of international norms
strikes me as a strength, not a weakness. Finally, the key point is that without
focusing on contracts, there may be no realistic way to impose norms of
accountability on privatized foreign affairs activity at all. Accordingly, those
seeking to expand the applicability of international law norms should at the
very least seriously consider using contractual enforcement mechanisms or
risk the possibility that such norms will simply be ignored in an increasingly
privatized world.
IV. CONCLUSION
Resisting privatization in the foreign affairs context is probably no
longer an option. Indeed, if anything the scope and pace of privatization in the
international arena is increasing. Moreover, it will not be sufficient merely to
tweak existing international law treaties or doctrines (or even invent new
ones) in order to bring private contractors within the ambit of formal
international law. After all, even if international or domestic courts could be
convinced that private contractors should be held liable for violation of
international law norms (which is far from certain), international and
transnational public law litigation will never be able to hold accountable more
than a handful of people. Accordingly, those who seek to preserve or expand
the values embodied in public international law will also need to look
elsewhere to find mechanisms for ensuring accountability in a privatized
world.
In this Article, I have suggested one such mechanism: the government
contract that creates the privatized relationship in the first place. Drawing on
the far more extensive domestic administrative law literature on the subject, I
have identified a variety of provisions that could be incorporated into such
contracts. These provisions seek to encourage compliance with (and
enforcement of) human rights and humanitarian law, ensure transparency and
democratic accountability, and promote norms against corruption, waste, and
fraud. Taken together, they provide a menu of options for regulators, activists,
policymakers, and scholars who are concerned at the potential for abuse in our
current contracting processes.
Of course, governments may be hesitant to insist on some of these
contractual provisions. For example, officials may fear that such requirements
could unduly increase the costs of privatization both to the contractor and to
the government entity overseeing the contract. 258 Or, more cynically,
resistance might stem from the fact that governments actually benefit from a
more opaque process with less public oversight. In any event, one seeming
difficulty with relying on contractual provisions is that the increased oversight

258. See, e.g., Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors
Share the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 191 (1997)
(expressing concern that litigation and administrative costs could “siphon away public resources that
could have been devoted to, among other things, the effective implementation and oversight of the
contractors’ work”).
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will be included in contracts only as a “matter of legislative or executive
grace,” and therefore can be rescinded or limited at any time.259
Yet, such objections do not render a contractual approach unrealistic. To
begin with, concerns about the cost of additional contractual requirements
may well be over-stated. As the Custer Battles fiasco makes clear, in many
cases better oversight could actually save the government far more money
than it costs. And as to concerns that added contractual provisions will cause
contractors to walk away or prohibitively raise their rates, the short answer is
that far more empirical work must be done to assess whether such dire
predictions are accurate. After all, it seems quite unlikely that contractors
bidding for these extraordinarily lucrative contracts with governments such as
the United States will pull out of the process just because of some added
contract requirements. To the contrary, the government should, by all rights,
have tremendous leverage in the contracting process because there are
unlikely to be competing customers similarly able to offer billions of dollars
in contract awards. Indeed, while government contractors in the past have
often raised concerns about increased compliance costs to object to enhanced
contractual oversight,260 at least one commentator has challenged such claims,
noting the absence of compelling evidence that increased oversight through,
for example, qui tam suits has resulted in a significant number of firms
refusing to do business with the government.261
In addition, while some governmental officials surely would prefer a
more opaque process, governments are not monolithic entities, and proposals
such as the ones outlined in this Article may be taken up and championed by
members of the bureaucracy, even without the imprimatur of higher level
executive branch officials or the legislature. Moreover, it is incorrect to think
that more robust contractual monitoring can only come about through official
executive branch or legislative action. First of all, some of the proposals for
monitoring of contracts and accreditation or rating of contractors could be
undertaken by NGOs or other groups without any official action whatsoever.
While such evaluations might not initially have the power of the state behind
them, the example of NCQA indicates that, over time, governments can be
convinced to adopt a previously unofficial rating system as its own. Second,
even if governments never adopted the standards, simply the process of
evaluating and accrediting contractors would provide a rich source of public
information about privatization that could be used to bring popular political
(or economic) pressure to bear on noncompliant contractors. Such public
reporting might also allow citizen watchdog groups (or even competing
contractors) to monitor the effectiveness of particular contracts, publicize

259. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 1404-05.
260. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation
in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 205 (1998) (reporting contractors’
concerns that the specter of qui tam suits is “a costly, substantial burden of doing business with the
government”).
261. See Stephen L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike
Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 668 n.137 (2001).

2006]

Public Law Values

425

deficiencies, and lobby government officials for change.262 Third, advocacy at
the international level could result in treaties or other international regimes
that actually require governments to include oversight provisions in certain
categories of contracts, thus creating increasing pressure for change. In any
event, as the domestic examples demonstrate, governments and agencies can,
at least at times, be mobilized to require meaningful contractual oversight.
In the end, whatever the drawbacks of a contractual approach, they are
certainly no greater than the weaknesses of the existing formal
transnational/international court system. Indeed, the use of contractual
provisions has the benefit of opening up the possibility of legal enforcement
regardless of whether or not there is state action and to provide the foundation
for legal action in domestic, as well as international, fora. Such contractual
mechanisms might also pave the way for statutes and treaties. Thus,
international law scholars, activists, and advocates should spend at least as
much time studying and lobbying for contract-based compliance regimes as
they do seeking further openings for international or transnational litigation.
Perhaps most importantly, we must remember that the proper
management of privatization will almost certainly require a variety of
approaches, and we need not choose one to the exclusion of others. My aim
here is simply to focus attention on privatization in the international realm as a
crucial field of study, to call for dialogue among international and domestic
scholars, advocates, and policy-makers concerning appropriate responses, and
to suggest that more attention be paid to the possibility of using contractual
provisions to provide accountability. None of these aims requires that contract
become the only response to privatization.263 To the contrary, in the coming
years we will need to think broadly and creatively about how best to respond
to the threats posed by the outsourcing of governmental functions to nongovernmental entities. Only through such efforts will we be able to find ways

262. Indeed, as Bradley Karkkainen has pointed out, the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), 42
U.S.C. § 11023 (2000), which requires that industrial facilities report the release and transfer of specific
chemicals, has had a significant impact on pollution emissions. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information
as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257, 287-88 (2001). According to Karkkainen, the TRI, because it creates a performance
metric, “both compels and enables facilities and firms to monitor their own environmental performance”
and “encourages them to compare, rank, and track performance among production processes, facilities,
operating units, and peer or competitor firms.” Id. at 261. In addition, Karkkainen argues that the TRI
data “subjects the environmental performance of facilities and firms to an unprecedented degree of
scrutiny by their peers, competitors, investors, employees, consumers, community residents,
environmental organizations, activists, elected officials, regulators, and the public in general.” Id. at
261-62. As a result, this transparency scheme “unleashes, strengthens, and exploits multiple pressures,
all tending to push in the direction of continuous improvement as facilities and firms endeavor to
leapfrog over their peers to receive credit for larger improvements or superior performance.” Id. at 262.
In addition, administrators—whether within companies or in government bureaucracies monitoring
contract compliance—have a management incentive to improve transparency. Id. at 295-305. Thus,
although information by itself does not provide accountability, see id. at 338-43 (noting that some small
firms may be unconcerned about the mere release of information), it can enable other accountability
mechanisms.
263. Indeed, I see contract as one of an array of accountability mechanisms—including the
formation of a treaty regime, litigation, statutory reform, political accountability, and internal
organizational sanctions—each of which merits further exploration and study.
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to protect crucial public law values in the era of privatization that is already
upon us.

